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Abstract      Disruptive start-ups empowered by digitization are increasingly rendering business models of in-cumbent firms obsolete. At the same time, these start-ups face significant challenges as a result of the fast-paced and uncertain commercial environment. Instead of competing with each other, disruptive start-ups can engage in coopetitive partnerships with incumbent companies to collaboratively diffuse innovation. Coopetition constitutes a phenomenon characterized by simultaneous cooperation and competition. While the majority of previous research has focused on coopetition among equally large firms, this thesis combines the fields of disruptive innovation theory and coopetition by concentrating on partnerships between disruptive start-ups and incumbents.       This qualitative, multiple-case study is based on four start-ups in the energy industry, which develop a disruptive, blockchain-based platform and which are engaged in partnerships with incumbent firms threatened to be disrupted. The study draws on both primary and secondary data in form of interviews, whitepapers and other documents published by the case companies. The data analysis is conducted in four steps: within-case analysis, cross-case analysis, identification of patterns and creation of frame-work. The resulting theoretical framework takes previous research as well as novel empirical findings into account and presents a holistic basis for coopetition between start-ups and incumbents.       Besides the theoretical framework, the main findings of the study are threefold. First, an inter-temporal tension in the realization of benefits becomes evident, as the start-ups are able to capture value from the coopetition before the established firms can. Second, a model emerges which shows that external and internal factors significantly influence the balance of cooperative and competitive forces. External factors include changes in the commercial environment, whereas internal factors summarize the perceived marginal benefits of the partnership. Third, the study finds that the strategies of the case companies envisage a two-phase commercialization strategy, with a sustaining innovation in the first phase transitioning to a disruptive innovation in the second phase. Synthesizing these key findings, the study concludes that coopetition between start-ups and incumbents constitutes a distinct phenomenon and demands a finer-grained definition. Hence, the term “heterogeneous coopetition” is introduced to offer a pathway for future research.       From a managerial perspective, this study provides insight into an effective way for start-ups to dif-fuse disruptive innovations as well as for incumbent companies to react to disruptive threats. For both parties, the results of this research amplify recommendations how value creation and appropriation processes in heterogeneous coopetitive partnerships can be fostered. As the study takes place in the energy industry, the empirical findings and managerial implications of this thesis are generalizable for environments with similar characteristics. Replication of the underlying methodological approach of this study in other environments is required to substantiate or to repudiate the empirical findings and to enlarge their generalizability. Furthermore, since research in the conjunction of disruptive innova-tion theory and coopetition is still scarce, considering other constellations of dissimilar coopetition partners represents potential to bolster the newly defined term of heterogeneous partnerships.  
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1 Introduction 
Approximately half of all S&P 500 firms are expected to be replaced within the next 
decade. The average tenure of these enterprises is estimated to shrink from 33 years in 
1965 to merely 14 years in 2026. The emergence of disruptive start-ups plays an important 
role in this increasingly fast-paced displacement of incumbent companies (Anthony et al., 
2016). Airbnb, Spotify and Uber are only three examples for entrepreneurial firms, which 
redefined their industry landscape by capitalizing on innovative business models based 
on digital technologies. However, start-ups face considerable economic, technological as 
well as regulatory uncertainty in early stages of the venture, while incumbent firms 
represent a virtually insurmountable obstacle (Bhide, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1972). Instead 
of emerging as a direct competitor of these established firms, disruptive start-ups have 
the option to engage in partnerships with these to jointly create value. This phenomenon, 
the simultaneous cooperation and competition between potentially disruptive start-ups 
and disrupted incumbents is termed “coopetition” (Ansari et al., 2016). 
1.1 Background and Research Problem 
In coopetitive partnerships, start-ups and incumbents combine complementary skills and 
resources to collaboratively cope with uncertainties and obstacles. In an increasingly 
complex and fast-paced business environment, partnerships across organizational 
boundaries become increasingly relevant (De Backer and Rinaudo, 2019). Hence, 
research in this area adds value to multiple stakeholders.  
From an academic perspective, I seek to contribute to the advancement of two still nascent 
but rapidly developing research fields: disruptive innovation theory and coopetition. In 
the former, Christensen (1997) has first introduced the distinction between sustaining and 
disruptive innovation, drawing on previous findings from scholars such as Bower (1970) 
and Dosi (1982). According to the initial definition by Christensen, disruptive innovation 
results in a product underperforming the incumbent product in regard to mainstream 
attributes but outperforming this product in regard to novel attributes such as convenience 
or simplicity, creating a new value proposition for customers (Christensen, 1997). Even 
though the findings of this basic research are still valid today, several authors have 
contributed to the further development of this field. Markides (2006) additionally 
distinguishes disruptive technological, product and business model innovation to amplify 
the distinct challenges and implications. A magnitude of research in the framework of 
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disruptive innovation theory has also been focussed on response strategies of incumbent 
firms to disruption by new entrants (Markides and Oyon, 2010; Wessel and Christensen, 
2012). Marx et al. (2014) specifically pronounced partnerships with disruptive start-ups 
as a viable response strategy. Moreover, research in this area also considered the roles of 
regulation and digitisation in the context of disruptive innovation. As the key author in 
this research stream, Christensen et al. (2004) depict that governmental regulations have 
a significant impact on the innovation landscape of an industry, while Skog et al. (2018) 
framed the concept of digital disruption, underscoring the importance of digital 
technologies in the innovation process.  
Not only as a response strategy to disruptive innovation, the concept of coopetition was 
introduced by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) based on previous research in the field 
of strategy and innovation (Hamel, 1991; von Hippel, 1987). It describes a paradoxical 
phenomenon of cooperation among competitors to jointly create value. Research has 
particularly concentrated on the process of coopetition with its dynamic balance, tensions 
and critical success factors. Gnyawali and Charleton (2018) and Luo et al. (2016) link the 
coopetitive balance, the balance of cooperative and competitive forces among the 
partners, to the innovation performance. Furthermore, Petter et al. (2017) add the concept 
of coopetitive maturity to previous literature, explaining that the coopetitive maturity is 
affected by internal and inter-relationship factors. Analysing the existent research in this 
field, it becomes evident that the majority of research is focussed on innovation 
performance of coopetitive partnerships (i.e. Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Pereira and 
Leitao, 2016; Yami and Nemeh, 2017). Moreover, authors have analysed the 
opportunities and risks in the framework of coopetitive partnerships to elucidate how 
value is created (Bouncken et al., 2015; Levy and Powell, 2003). 
Connecting the research areas of disruptive innovation theory and coopetition, initial 
research has taken place in the field of coopetition among disruptive start-ups and 
incumbents. Several authors highlight that these partnerships are particularly beneficial 
due to the high complementarity of skills and resources (Freeman and Engel, 2007; 
Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015). However, the research in this conjunction is at an 
infantile stage. By examining coopetitive partnerships among Austrian start-ups and 
incumbents, Hora et al. (2018) illustrate the dynamics in the initiation phase of these 
collaborations. Furthermore, Ansari et al. (2016) focus on the process of disruption, 
especially highlighting tensions evolving from the partnership among these unequally 
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sized partners. These two studies have already identified particularities for the specific 
case of coopetition between start-ups and incumbent companies. Having identified this 
aspect, the research problem becomes evident that the findings of previous research in 
this field, which is primarily based on partnerships among equally-sized competitors, 
cannot be entirely projected on the specific case. 
Besides the academic contribution, I aim to show how innovative start-ups can “disrupt” 
societal challenges. My view is that the innovative capabilities of start-ups in combination 
with the economic strength of established companies have the potential to contribute to 
the solution of these challenges. Moreover, I agree with António Guterres, Secretary 
General of the United Nations, who recently pronounced climate change as the “most 
systematic threat of humankind” (Sengupta, 2018). Hence, with this study I seek to utilize 
Clayton M. Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation to analyse how climate change 
can be “disrupted”. More specifically, this study analyses how innovative solutions of 
entrepreneurial firms with a profound impact on climate change are diffused in 
partnerships with incumbent firms within complex industry frameworks such as the 
energy industry. Furthermore, from a managerial perspective, this thesis intends to 
support leaders of start-ups and established firms to capture the scientifically proven 
benefits of coopetition (i.e. Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Pereira and Leitao, 2016). 
Specifically for entrepreneurs, this study explicates the possibility of avoiding “battles 
with giants” by engaging in coopetitive partnerships with them.  
1.2 Research Gap and Research Questions 
Based on a comprehensive review of existing literature in the field of disruptive 
innovation theory, coopetition as well as blockchain-technology, I discovered several 
suggestions of leading authors for future research. Christensen et al. (2018) specifically 
calls for more research on partnerships between disruptive start-ups and disrupted 
incumbents as a diffusion strategy of and a response strategy to disruptive innovation. 
This is confirmed by authors in the area of coopetition theory such as Bouncken et al. 
(2015) and Ritala et al. (2016). Moreover, Rusko et al. (2018) describe the emerging 
blockchain technology as a specifically interesting area to explore the phenomenon of 
coopetitive partnerships in this specific constellation.  
Considering the potential of coopetitive partnerships among start-ups and incumbents for 
practice and society in light of the detected research problem, I claim that a research gap 
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is present in the conjunction of disruptive innovation theory and coopetition. To be more 
specific, I seek to address the lacuna from the perspective of the disruptive start-up. This 
is in agreement with the recent study of Christensen et al. (2018), which calls for 
additional research on the specificities in disruption processes. With this study, I aspire 
not only to further elucidate these specificities, but also to highlight how coopetition can 
be a proactive strategy of start-ups to disrupt industries in collaboration with incumbents. 
I plan to close this gap by developing a holistic framework, drawing on previous studies 
as well as new empirical findings. To guide my research, I define the following research 
question (RQ) and four supporting sub-questions (SQ):  
RQ: How are start-ups disrupting a highly regulated industry through coopetitive 
partnerships with incumbent companies? 
SQ1: How does the commercial environment impact the strategies of disruptive 
start-ups? 
SQ2: Why do disruptive start-ups and incumbent companies pursue coopetitive 
partnerships? 
SQ3: How are coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and 
incumbent companies performed? 
SQ4: How do coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and 
incumbent companies promote the diffusion process of disruptive innovation? 
While the overarching research-question directly addresses the identified research gap, 
the four sub-questions provide a structure to systematically analyse multiple aspects of 
coopetition. The research question with its sub-questions further determine the research 
design and influence the development of an appropriate methodological approach.  
1.3 Research Design 
Corresponding with the nature of the research questions, I chose to base the study on a 
qualitative research design. More specifically, I decided to conduct a multiple case study, 
as described by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003). This case study approach is especially 
applicable for this study since I aim to further explore the phenomenon of coopetition and 
to add new theory to the research stream.  
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To establish comparative grounds among the cases, I chose four suitable case companies 
in a highly systematic approach, by utilizing the concepts of population and theoretical 
sampling for reducing extraneous variation. The four case companies represent the 
leading start-ups with blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy trading applications. To 
ensure the representation of diverse geographical environments, the case companies are 
based in Australia, Estonia, Singapore, and the United States. These entrepreneurial firms 
are particularly suitable for the purpose of this study, as their energy trading platforms 
have the potential to render the business models of incumbent energy retailers obsolete 
in the long-term. Nonetheless, the start-ups collaborate with the incumbent energy 
retailers to diffuse their innovation. Per definition, this represents a coopetitive 
partnership. 
As my study focusses the start-up’s perspective to coopetitive partnerships, I chose to 
conduct interviews with key employees in the case companies’ strategy and business 
development departments to collect applicable primary data. To obtain an additional 
perspective, I decided to interview Michael Barnard as an expert in the field of emerging 
digital technologies in the energy industry. To ensure validity and reliability, I was further 
able to triangulate these findings with available secondary data published by the start-ups 
and incumbent companies in press releases, whitepapers and blogs. To systematically 
analyse the collected primary and secondary data, I developed a four-step procedure based 
on those outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003), utilizing the inductive coding 
approach as described by Thomas (2006) as well as visualizations as recommended by 
Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Even though I ensure the quality of my research through a carefully developed and highly 
systematic methodological approach, certain limitations apply to this study. First, this 
study takes place in the energy industry and, as demonstrated by the findings, the 
commercial environment has a significant impact on each party and the coopetition. 
Hence, the findings are restricted to environments with similar characteristics like the 
energy industry. Second, I focus on the start-up’s perspective and thus, the incumbent’s 
perspective has yet to be explored further. Third, some of the empirical findings are based 
on ex-ante data, meaning explanations of the interviewees about future strategic actions. 
Consequently, the effectivity and performance results of these decisions cannot be 
evaluated.  
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
Since the structure aims to ensure the coherence and logic of this study, I decided to divide 
this thesis into five distinct chapters. After the introduction, I review existing literature in 
the relevant fields. As required by the research problem, I selected the research areas of 
disruptive innovation theory, coopetition as well as blockchain-technology for a detailed 
review. Subsequently, I synthesize the findings of this literature review in a preliminary 
theoretical framework that guides the development of a suitable methodological 
approach. Taking the philosophical positioning of this study into account, the 
methodological approach is elucidated in the third chapter, which also specifies the data 
collection and analysis procedures. In the last part of this chapter, I evaluate the quality 
of this methodology and consider ethical concerns. 
Having the theoretical framework and the methodology in place, the fourth chapter 
introduces the empirical findings, divided into three parts. In the first part, the cases are 
analysed separately to establish an in-depth understanding of each individual case. In the 
next part, I compare the four cases, identify similarities as well as differences, and 
eventually discuss emerging patterns. Based on these empirical findings, I modify the 
theoretical framework in the next step and answer the research questions. In the final part 
of this thesis, I conclude with the main findings, theoretical contributions, and managerial 
implications. Additionally, I state the limitations of this study and illustrate promising 
areas for future research.  
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, I review the findings of previous research to develop a theoretical 
framework for the empirical part of this study, which addresses the identified research 
gaps. The literature review follows a systematic and logical approach. In the first part, the 
disruptive innovation theory is introduced to explain the process of disruption and the 
managerial implications for start-ups and incumbents. Since alliances among competing 
firms represent one valuable option to respond to disruptive innovations or to disrupt 
markets actively, the literature about these alliances called “coopetition” is discussed in 
the second part. At the end of this second part, the previous findings of coopetitive 
alliances between start-ups and incumbents are explicated, as the empirical study aims to 
contribute to this more specific field. In the third part of the literature review, blockchain-
technology is introduced with a particular focus on its impact on businesses. The review 
of the literature in this field is especially important, since authors widely agree on 
blockchain’s significant influence on business models and potentially disruptive impact 
on industries. Hence, this chapter is closely linked to the first two. At the end of the 
literature review, the findings are summarized and a theoretical framework for the 
empirical part is presented.     
2.1 Theory of Disruptive Innovation 
Since this study engages with the scholarly discussion in the framework of disruptive 
innovations, an extensive review of the existing literature is required. After the origins of 
this concept are introduced, this chapter will describe how disruptions evolve, what start-
ups’ strategies are to disrupt industries and which response strategies incumbents can 
choose to counter these disruptions. Since regulation and digitisation have a strong impact 
on disruptive innovations, two subchapters are dedicated to analysing the roles of those.  
The disruptive innovation theory was introduced by Christensen (1997), when he 
distinguished “sustaining” and “disruptive” innovations based on a comprehensive case 
study of the disk drive industry. While he suggests that sustaining innovations enhance 
the performance of a certain product and target primarily mainstream customers, 
innovations of disruptive nature are developed along other value propositions and focus 
new or different customer segments. The result of disruptive innovation is a product 
underperforming in the mainstream market at the time of inauguration, but outperforming 
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the mainstream product in certain attributes such as price, simplicity, and convenience 
(Christensen, 1997). 
The foundations of Christensen’s theory are based on findings of previous research 
conducted in the areas of strategy and organizational theory (Bower, 1970; Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1978). Especially the explanation of continuities and discontinuities in 
technological innovation by Dosi (1982) were fundamental. His study of technological 
change coined the terms “incremental” and “radical” innovation. The former one 
represents an innovation within a certain technological paradigm, whereas the latter one 
goes beyond that, introducing a newly emerged paradigm. The introduction of the term 
“architectural innovation” by Henderson and Clark (1990) reflects another important 
basis of the disruptive innovation theory. They claim that architectural innovations, 
similarly to disruptive innovations, can have a devastating impact on incumbents since 
they undermine their value propositions.  
While the initial implications of the disruptive innovation theory are still valid today, 
different authors proposed improvements and refinements to Christensen’s theory 
(Danneels, 2004; Markides, 2006; Nagy et al., 2016). Most notably, Markides (2006) 
claims that disruptive innovations need to be further grouped into three categories: 
disruptive technological, product and business-model innovation. His reasoning builds on 
the dissimilar target markets, challenges and managerial implications, which each of the 
three comprises. As an example, business-model innovations usually focus on expanding 
existing markets, while radical product innovations target new markets resulting from a 
supply push. Admittedly, this implies different challenges for managers, which again  
require specialized coping strategies (Markides, 2006). 
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2.1.1 Evolvement of Disruptions 
Disruption can be explained in a three-
step process (see Figure 1). In the first 
step, an underperforming product is 
introduced, which aims at new markets 
with new value propositions. In the 
second step, the performance in 
regards to traditional attributes is 
improved through investments, so that 
it in the third step outperforms and 
replaces the incumbent product in the 
mainstream market (Christensen, 1997). This subchapter will explain these three steps in 
more detail so that a holistic picture about the process can be attained. 
In the first step, an underperforming product aims at overshot customers. Overshot 
customers refuse to pay a premium for a higher performance-level, which does not further 
enhance the perceived value of the product (Christensen et al., 2004; Adner and Zemsky, 
2006). Additionally, the newly introduced characteristics such as convenience disrupt 
customer behaviour, encouraging previous non-customers to buy (Markides, 2006). In 
this early stage, the motivation/ability framework can be utilized to discover potential 
disruptions. In this framework, Christensen (2004) indicates that disruptions are more 
likely in industries, where incentives and capabilities to innovate are considerable. These 
factors are influenced by both typical market factors, and non-market factors such as 
standards, norms, and government regulations. 
In the second step, differences between new entrant and incumbent company evolve on 
both sides of this framework. Since the entrant is improving its product in this stage, 
asymmetries in motivation and ability evolve. Consequently, the incumbent companies 
identify the new competition in the low-end market, and either attempt to compete in this 
segment or to fly up-market. Incumbent companies predominantly choose the latter 
option, because they struggle to compete with new entrants as described by Christensen’s 
RPV-theory. This theory depicts that a company’s resources, processes and values shape 
its competitiveness in a certain area. Since the incumbent’s resources, processes, and 
values are not aligned with the new opportunity, they rather abandon the lower segment 
and aim at more premium customers instead (Christensen et al., 2004). Gilbert and Bower 
Figure 1: Evolvement of Disruptive Innovations, Source: 
Christensen et al. (2004, p. XVI) 
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(2002) support this observation, while exemplifying this issue with the disruption of 
Kodak, and further demonstrate that framing plays an important role in the second stage 
of the disruption process.  
In the third step, the new product outperforms the incumbent one in regards to the 
traditional attributes, so that the competition consequently takes place in the premium 
segment as well, where the incumbent company cannot move upmarket. Since the new 
product is additionally superior in regards to other attributes such as convenience and 
price, and since the resources, processes and values of the incumbent company remain 
unadapted to compete with the new entrant, the incumbent product rapidly loses market 
share (Christensen et al., 2004).  
Although this trajectory has been confirmed by several case studies conducted in the last 
two decades (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Tedlow, 2000; Ansari et al., 2016), 
research has identified several success factors. In the early days of the scholarly 
discussion, the extent of the technological change was described as the reason, why the 
incumbent’s situation deteriorates (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 
1990). However, Christensen claims that the issue rather lies in the disability of a firm to 
amend its strategy and to appropriately allocate their resources than in technological 
incompetence (Christensen and Bower, 1996). In addition to that factor, he proposes that 
competitive value networks – the organizational design of a company – can be decisive 
for success and failure as well. Both factors are based on Christensen’s case study of the 
disk drive industry (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995).  
In conclusion, the three-step process of disruption builds the basis for every future 
research in this field, and it is crucial to consider that success depends not just on 
technological, but also on managerial capabilities of a firm. For this reason, the next 
chapter will explain the disruptive strategies of start-ups, before the potential response 
strategies of incumbents are explained. 
2.1.2 Disruptive Strategies of Start-Ups 
Undoubtedly, start-ups differ from big companies in a variety of ways: they possess 
different resources, face different challenges and address these challenges in a particular 
way. Therefore, this section will first introduce the challenges start-ups are facing, before 
ways of formulating disruptive strategies are explained. Subsequently, two 
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commercialization strategies are illustrated, and viewed in the context of the start-up’s 
environment. 
Less than ten percent of all start-ups survive the first years after founding or provide 
positive financial returns to its founders at some point (Bhide, 2000). This is mainly due 
to the unique challenges start-ups are facing, which can be classified into three different 
areas. Firstly, the lack of capital may stem the growth of start-ups. Even though venture 
capital firms provide funding, they require a fast and high return on investment (Bergset 
and Fichter, 2015). Secondly, early-stage entrepreneurs are confronted with high 
economical, technological and regulatory uncertainty. This uncertainty further increases 
because limited resources prohibit comprehensive market research ahead of founding the 
venture. Lastly, start-ups frequently lack crucial skills and know-how to manage 
unforeseeable circumstances (Bhide, 2000). Despite these unique challenges, start-ups 
incorporate certain characteristics threatening especially incumbent companies’ 
positions. Young firms are able to innovate more freely and creatively because they do 
not need to justify their approaches or report to superiors. Additionally, they frequently 
do not follow a planned strategy, but rather coordinate their actions as emerging 
circumstances demand (Downes, 2013). 
While a higher degree of freedom might spur disruptive innovation, the flexible strategy 
is essential to increase competitiveness throughout the process of disruptive innovation. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) distinguish two processes of strategy formulation: 
deliberate and emergent strategies. A deliberate strategy is formulated in advance based 
on holistic data about a firm’s markets and implemented top-down. In contrast to this, an 
emergent strategy evolves from day-to-day decisions through a bottom-up approach. 
When circumstances are likely to change rapidly, strategies tend to be formulated bottom-
up to maintain flexibility. Especially in the early stage of a venture, the emergent strategy 
permits the necessary freedom. At a later stage, the switch to a more deliberate strategy 
is required to enable the growth of the disruptive start-up (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
Ansari et al. (2016) confirm this view in a study about disruption in the U.S. television 
ecosystem. This study showed that TIVO as a start-up was forced to adjust its strategy 
continuously to secure incumbents’ support and to minimize spill-over effects of actions 
on other ecosystem partners.  
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As Figure 2 illustrates, 
usually both types of strat-
egy formulation can be 
recognized at the same 
time within one company 
in a process of continuous 
adjustment. They conflu-
ence in the resource allo-
cation process, which then 
determines the actual strat-
egy through investment in certain new products, services, processes, or acquisitions. 
These funded initiatives can be defined as strategic actions (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
In this context, it is also important to link these two different planning processes to the 
two types of innovation. Deliberate planning favours sustaining innovations. Here, 
assumptions are established in the first step, the strategy is developed based on the 
assumptions in the second step before the strategy is implemented in the third step. 
However, an emergent strategy in combination with discovery-driven planning aids 
disruptive innovations. Discovery-driven planning requires the introduction of financial 
targets as the starting point in the first step. Next, the critical assumptions are developed, 
which need to be fulfilled to reach these targets. Finally, the assumptions are tested, before 
the strategy is implemented through aligned investments (Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  
In regards to the actual commercialization strategy of innovations by start-ups, two 
different forms can be distinguished according to Gans and Stern (2003): the competition- 
and the cooperation-strategy. The competition-strategy depicts that the start-up builds a 
new value chain and penetrates the market independently. Consequently, high 
investments need to be made, and new customers attracted, even though the resources are 
scarce. On the other side, Christensen (1997), as well as Henderson and Clark (1990), 
argue that the competition strategy offers the opportunity to develop technological 
capabilities more effectively. In contrast, the cooperation-strategy leverages an 
established value chain in collaboration with an incumbent company. Hence, the initial 
investments are lower, and the customer base of the incumbent can be leveraged. 
However, the disclosure of intellectual property to an incumbent company can lead to 
tensions. The inherent paradox of disclosure evolves from the need to disclose 
Figure 2: Strategy Formulation Process, Source: Christensen and Raynor 
(2003, p. 215) 
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information to an opposed party in a negotiation, but the disclosure of this information 
weakens the disclosing party’s position (Arrow, 1962).  
Based on previous findings from Teece (1986), Gans and Stern (2003) argue that the 
choice of the commercialization strategy is dependent on the commercialization 
environment. This environment can be separated into the excludability environment and 
the complementary asset environment. The former one illustrates the ability of the start-
up to preclude incumbents from imitating the innovation. This can be achieved either by 
IP protection or by technological complexity. The other factor, the complementary asset 
environment, is defined by the level the incumbent’s assets influence the value 
proposition of the start-ups’ innovation (Gans and Stern, 2003). 
  
Figure 3: Impact of Commercialization Environment on Commercialization Strategy, Source: Gans and Stern (2003, 
p. 341, modified) 
Figure 3 links the commercialization strategies with commercialization environments. 
Four different competitive dynamics evolve: “the attacker’s advantage”, “ideas factory”, 
“reputation-based trading” and “greenfield competition” (Gans and Stern, 2003, p. 340). 
While “greenfield competition” is most favourable for disruptive start-ups, it is virtually 
impossible to diffuse disruptive innovations independently in case of an environment 
termed “ideas factory”. In the latter case, the established company owns the assets 
required to commercialize the innovation, and thus start-ups tend to focus on research 
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while commercializing their innovations through partnerships with incumbent companies 
(Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2000). In this scenario, the primary question is not 
which commercialization strategy is chosen, but how and when the cooperation is 
executed. Instead of disrupting the established firms, the start-ups reinforce the value 
proposition of these companies. Gans and Stern (2003) further claim that before the 
cooperation is entered, the feasibility of the technology needs to be demonstrated. On the 
other side, incumbents utilize the ideas of disruptive start-ups to enhance their 
competitive advantage. 
2.1.3 Response Strategies of Incumbent Companies 
After the strategies of start-ups in the context of disruptive innovation were explained in 
the previous chapter, this chapter introduces possible response strategies of incumbent 
companies to react to entrants with disruptive potential.  
Scholars agree upon the notion that incumbent companies frequently struggle to remain 
competitive in the event of disruption in their industry (i.e. Christensen and Rosenbloom, 
1995; Dedehayir et al., 2017; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Nevertheless, appropriate strategic choices can help them 
to remain competitive while facing disruptive new market entrants. Christensen (1997) 
claims that the reason for the failure of incumbent companies is a bias towards certain 
management practises. These companies’ innovations focus primarily on the traditional 
target customers, so that consequently the needs of these customers primarily impact the 
new product development. This assumes that customers can always pronounce their 
needs, which is not necessarily true. However, disruptive innovations focus on the latent 
needs of customers such as convenience, which cannot be clearly expressed by customers. 
Furthermore, shareholders of incumbents typically demand high growth, forcing the 
company only to target larger markets, and to neglect smaller ones with enormous, but 
highly uncertain growth potential (Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  
In the same study, the author gives advice for managers as well. Nevertheless, before 
implementing response strategies straight away, the potential impact of a disruption has 
to be analysed. On the one hand, the tools described in Chapter 2.1.1 such as the RPV-
theory or the motivation/ability-framework can be utilized to attain a better understanding 
of an industry’s future (Christensen et al., 2004). On the other hand, additional concepts 
should be taken into account to analyse the extent of a disruption on a particular company. 
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The model of the “extendable core”, which was introduced by Wessel and Christensen 
(2012), systematically evaluates the influence of a disruption on a company’s business 
model in a three-step process. In the beginning, the value proposition of the disruptor and 
the relative value proposition of the own company need to be diagnosed, before in the 
final step the extendable core is analysed. The extendable core of the potentially 
disruptive new entrant is described as “the aspect of its business model that allows the 
disruptor to maintain its performance advantage as it creeps upmarket in search of more 
and more customers” (Wessel and Christensen, 2012, p. 58). This core can be analysed 
by assessing different barriers of disruption in the areas momentum, technology-
implementation, environment, and business-model.  
 
A large share of the research in the scholarly discussion about disruptive innovations has 
focussed on incumbent’s response strategies (Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Markides and 
Oyon, 2010; Markman and Waldron, 2014; Wessel and Christensen, 2012). Figure 4 
clusters the different strategies into four groups by the direction of the response and by 
the action plan chosen to remain competitive.  
The first option can be defined as “Ignorance”. Despite the disruptive impact of an 
innovation, a company is not always forced to react, as already explained in the context 
of the extendable core. As Charitou and Markides (2003) proved with a case study of the 
airline industry, disruptors sometimes might capture market shares quickly, but never 
capture the whole market. Furthermore, a disruption might target the incumbent’s 
industry, but not its market. Consequently, the target customer of the incumbent is not 
affected by the new entrant, even though the new entrant attracts new customers. These 
two scenarios do not necessarily require the incumbent to react, so that the focus can be 
Figure 4: Response Strategies of Incumbents, Source: Own Creation 
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kept and intensified on the traditional business (Charitou and Markides, 2003; 
Christensen, 1997).  
Adner and Snow (2010) introduced “Avoidance” as the second option, arguing that an 
incumbent company can evade a disruption by proactively repositioning their offering in 
the market. They base their argumentation on the heterogeneity of customer demands, 
which allow the repositioning of the traditional offering into a niche, where the new 
entrant is not (yet) competitive. As another strategic action, some researchers have 
proofed that incumbents can avoid disruption for a certain period of time by aggressively 
investing into traditional capabilities (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Chen et al., 2010; 
Utterback, 1994). 
The third option “Embracement” summarizes different strategic actions, which focus on 
adopting the disruptive innovation in a particular way. Christensen (1997) recommends 
that incumbents should create and spin-off a start-up, which is equipped with the required 
resources and autonomies to develop solutions to face the disruption. The proposed action 
of O'Reilly and Tushman (2016) builds up on this strategy, but rather suggests 
organizational ambidexterity as a solution, meaning that dual structures should enable a 
focus on both traditional and new markets. This approach contradicts with the 
argumentation of Christensen and Raynor (2003), which highlight that an independent 
organizational unit is necessary to capture the value of disruptive innovations.  
Furthermore, a disruptive innovation can be embraced by co-opting with these new 
entrants. Markides and Geroski (2004) indicate that – especially in regard to disruptive 
product-innovations – established companies should not attempt to develop disruptive 
products themselves, but rather invest into promising firms and create a network of start-
ups. When the market matures, the incumbent can acquire the remaining shares of the 
entrant to consolidate the market and scale-up the operations. This perspective is 
confirmed by a number of scholars (Christensen and Alton, 2011; Kapoor and Klueter, 
2015). Instead of the acquisition of start-ups, incumbents can also choose to license their 
technology or to collaborate with them in the form of a strategic partnership (Marx et al., 
2014). The latter option illustrates a paradox, since both companies would collaborate 
and compete simultaneously. This relationship is further elucidated in Chapter 2.2.   
The fourth option to react for incumbents is a “Hybrid-Strategy”. This means that they 
embrace the disruptive innovation partially but focus on sustaining innovation at the same 
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time (Furr and Snow, 2015). This strategy is especially applicable in uncertain market 
conditions when, for example, a market transitions into the next generation of a certain 
technology. The effectiveness of this strategy has been corroborated by case studies in 
the mobile network and the digital camera industry. In these studies, it was shown that 
established companies choose to partially base their innovations on new technology, but 
at the same time improve the established technology along the traditional performance 
trajectory (Ansari and Garud, 2009; Sandström et al., 2009).   
While this chapter confirms that disruptive innovations pose a threat for incumbent 
companies, it is shown that different strategic alternatives exist to face the disruption. The 
response strategy is to be chosen depending on a firm’s resources and position in a market, 
the characteristics of the disruptor, as well as the motivation and ability to react (Charitou 
and Markides, 2003). As Christensen (1997) showed that both the motivation and ability 
to react are heavily influenced by governmental decisions, the next chapter will elucidate 
the effect of regulations on both factors.    
2.1.4 Role of Regulation in Disruption 
Since the empirical part of this study is based on case studies in the energy industry, which 
reflects a heavily regulated industry, the literature about the impact of regulations on 
disruptive innovations builds an important foundation for this research (Stenzel and 
Frenzel, 2008). While the motivation/ability-framework was already introduced in 
Chapter 2.1.1, this chapter will explicate the impact of government regulation on each 
side of the framework. At the end of this chapter, the concept will be utilized to explain 
strategic actions in a case study.  
Motivation and ability directly influence the con-
ditions for developing innovative products, ser-
vices or business models. If both are available, the 
circumstances support innovations. In compari-
son to established companies, which focus on sus-
taining innovations, start-ups are more prone to 
attack the incumbents with disruptive innova-
tions. Thus, favourable circumstances foster dis-
ruption and make markets less predictable for all 
players. As Figure 5 shows, a two-by-two-matrix, 
Figure 5: Motivation/Ability-Framework, 
Source: Christensen et al. (2004) 
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with scores for motivation and ability along the axes, classifies the factors into four dif-
ferent environments (Christensen et al., 2004). In addition to market factors such as size, 
growth and access, nonmarket factors can heavily affect the circumstances. More 
specifically, these factors include industry standards, technological advancements, and 
most importantly, government regulations. Governments can utilize levers such as tax 
treatments, rate regulations, and competition policies to intervene with the goal to create 
an environment, which promotes innovation. This environment was coined by 
Christensen et al. (2004) as “The Hotbed” – the setting where both motivation and ability 
are high, so that nothing prohibits sustaining and disruptive innovation.  
Even though one factor might be underperforming in an industry, the government can 
take regulatory actions to counter this situation. Influencing the motivation frequently 
proves to be complicated, since not the lack of motivation directly, but the underlying 
root causes need to be addressed. And even if these are identified, taking regulatory 
actions to intervene in the market might entail unintended ramifications. However, 
enhancing the other side of the framework, the ability factor, through government levers 
is less difficult – especially if legal barriers are the key bottleneck. If the governments 
adjust these regulations in favour of innovations, new entrants will appear in the market 
attacking the incumbent companies (Christensen et al., 2004).  
Graffy and Kihm (2014) corroborate the influence, which regulations can have on 
innovations, with their study on companies in the electric utility market. They argue that 
regulations in the energy industry are not meant to be seen as legal protections for 
incumbent companies, because the environment can still change rapidly through new 
policies allowing start-ups to enter the market with disruptive business models. Moreover, 
they claim that even in markets where innovative ability is constraint by opposing 
regulations, disruptive strategies can prove successful, since industries do not remain 
completely stagnant due to underlying economic, social and environmental pressures 
(Graffy and Kihm, 2014). Furthermore, in regulated markets companies have the 
possibility to collaborate with regulators to adjust policies in favour of their ability to 
innovate. As Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) indicate in their case study of Spanish utility 
companies, incumbents can proactively impact governmental regulation to align them 
with their technological strategy. This finding adds an additional perspective to 
Christensen’s explanations: not only can regulators amend regulations to favour 
innovation, but firms can also collaborate with governments to develop advantageous 
 19 
 
regulatory frameworks. This finding applies particularly to emergent markets, as shown 
by the case study of the renewable energy industry (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008). 
2.1.5 Role of Digitisation in Disruption  
As the empirical part of this study takes place in the energy industry, which is heavily 
affected not only by regulations, but also by digitisation, a sound understanding of the 
relationship between disruption and digitisation is necessary. Hence, I first introduce the 
general process of digital disruption, before I explain the specificities of digital platforms 
and subsequently the options for incumbents to react. 
Digitisation has the potential to disrupt all industries, and nine out of ten company leaders 
admit that they are already engaged in digitisation, while only 16% of all companies have 
taken measures to prepare for potential digital disruption (Bonnet et al., 2015; Bughin 
and van Zeebroeck, 2017). “Digital Disruption” evolved as a term for a process, in which 
digital innovations systematically erode value propositions of companies (Tan et al., 
2015). Furthermore, Skog et al. (2018) highlight that digital disruption processes create 
and capture value by recombining resources and disintermediating interactions, leading 
to wide-ranging effects on the competitive landscape. The special disruptive potential of 
digital innovations can be illustrated by three factors. Firstly, digitisation enables capital-
light business models with highly competitive cost-structures, easing the financing and 
increasing the flexibility of these ventures (Bughin and van Zeebroeck, 2017; Wessel, 
2017). Secondly, the pace of disruptive digital innovation is accelerated due to its 
programmable nature (Yoo et al., 2012). And thirdly, digitization renders 
disintermediation through platforms possible, entailing significant effects on incumbents’ 
business (Hagiu and Altman, 2017; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
According to research from 
Van Alstyne et al. (2016), the 
emergence of digital platforms 
has even more powerful impli-
cations on the incumbent com-
petition, as these platforms im-
ply new rules of strategy. The 
study lists four distinct players 
which form the platform ecosystem: owners, providers, producers and consumers. Own-
Figure 6: Structure of Digital Platforms, Source: Van Alstyne et al. 
(2016, p. 6) 
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ers possess the back-end of the platform, acting as developers and governing body, 
whereas providers possess the front-end, meaning the user interface and the customer 
relationship. Furthermore, the platform enables transactions between producers and con-
sumers, as visualized in Figure 6.  
The implications of platforms are wide-ranging, decreasing the significance of supply-
side economies of scale while increasing the significance of demand-side economies of 
scale – commonly termed as “network effects”. Business models based on digital 
platforms concentrate on maximizing the participants interacting with each other, instead 
of accomplishing pure sales growth (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). The threat for incumbents 
further intensifies, since venture capital firms indicate strong support for platform 
business models and since these start-ups frequently benefit from “spontaneous private 
deregulation” (Edelman and Geradin, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2014). In contrast to the 
explanations of Christensen et al. (2004) about the role of regulation in the last section, 
Edelman and Geradin (2016) indicate that innovative platforms have the potential to 
render existing regulations and policies obsolete. As seen in the rise of companies such 
as Uber and Airbnb, new entrants are frequently overlooked by regulator due to their size, 
but because of their rapid growth these firms eventually become “virtually unstoppable 
and even praiseworthy” (Edelman and Geradin, 2016, p. 85). 
Because of these unique characteristics of digital disruption as well as platforms, Bughin 
and van Zeebroeck (2017) propose a modified disruption process, containing two loops. 
During the first loop, a start-up enters the market with a digital innovation threatening the 
position of the incumbent. In the second loop, the established companies react to the 
disruptive threat by co-opting the digital innovation. This leads to increased competition 
not only between the entrant and the incumbent, but also among the incumbents. Skog et 
al. (2018) confirm this notion, depicting that digital disruption leads to intensified 
competition between all market participants.  
Due to these implications, it is important to specify options for incumbents to react. 
Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017) hint that it is advisable for incumbents to react to the 
threat of digital disruption at scale, meaning not just implementing digital initiatives but 
incorporating digitisation as a strategic priority. This view is affirmed by Skog et al. 
(2018), although they concede that the rapidity of digital disruption poses an additional 
threat, making it even more difficult for incumbents to react. Moreover, to fend off new 
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entrants with platform business models, previous research concordantly recommends 
established firms to explore these models within their own frameworks (Hagiu and 
Altman, 2017; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). While Edelman and Geradin (2016) confirm 
this notion, they exemplify improving existing products and retreating from the market 
as alternatives, which corroborates the options listed in Chapter 2.1.3. Edelman and 
Geradin (2016) further add legal actions as a fourth option, in case the new entrant 
violates existing laws.  
 
During the review of literature in the field disruptive innovation, it becomes clear that 
previous research has focussed primarily on the process of disruption, the strategies of 
start-ups to disrupt industries and the response strategies of incumbent companies. 
Although researchers increasingly focus on the roles of regulation and especially of 
digitisation in this domain, the literature is still scarce. Consequently, Yu and Hang (2010) 
call for intensifying the combination of disruptive innovation research with other fields. 
Furthermore, they indicate the technological perspective as another path for future 
research. Christensen et al. (2018) add that future research should also analyse the 
performance trajectories of disruptive innovations as well as identifying response 
strategies of incumbents in more detail. More specifically, they suggest that co-opting 
and partnering with start-ups requires more attention. Since the collaboration of start-ups 
and incumbents results in a paradoxical relationship of concurrent competition and 
collaboration, the theoretical foundations of this phenomenon, called “coopetition”, is 
explained in the next chapter (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000).   
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2.2 Coopetition 
This chapter introduces the concept of “Coopetition”, which combines cooperative and 
competitive behaviour of firms within one and the same relationship (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000). At the beginning of this chapter, I illustrate the historical emergence of the 
concept, before the three different research fields in coopetition - “process”, “outcomes” 
and “evaluation” - are separately discussed in subchapters. Subsequently, the special case 
of coopetition between incumbent companies and high-tech start-ups is discussed, since 
this reflects the more specific subject of this study’s empirical part. 
Although different definitions of coopetition exist, scholars widely agree that coopetition 
describes a phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation taking place 
between distinct firms to create value (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Bouncken et al., 2015; 
Gnyawali and Park, 2009). The concept stems from the fields of strategy and innovation, 
where scholars first recognized the phenomenon in 1987 (Hamel, 1991; von Hippel, 
1987). Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) coined the term “coopetition” and its 
academic framework by applying game theory to visualize the impact of this paradoxical 
relationship on value creation and appropriation. They defined the term broadly as a 
relationship, which contains both cooperative and competitive parts. Although scholars 
agree that the academic field of coopetition is still in its infancy, and a conclusive 
definition has yet to evolve, the definition of Bengtsson and Kock (2000) is widely 
recognized (de Resende et al., 2018; Ritala et al., 2016; Rusko et al., 2018). They define 
it as “the dyadic and paradoxical relationship that emerges when two firms cooperate in 
some activities […] and at the same time compete with each other in other activities” 
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000, p. 412). 
2.2.1 Process: Critical Factors for Success of Coopetition 
The process in which coopetition is occurring is complex and paradoxical. Hence, a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature in this field is fundamental. Firstly, this 
subchapter categorizes coopetitive relationships in the context of two frameworks to 
explain the complexity. Secondly, the interactions and tensions are explained to highlight 
the paradox. Thirdly, the knowledge sharing and protection mechanisms in coopetition 
are amplified to introduce the practical side of coopetition. Throughout these three 
sections, the critical success factors for coopetition are extracted, before an overview is 
given to summarize these factors.  
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As already explained, coopetition con-
sists of simultaneous cooperation and 
competition, but not each coopetitive re-
lationship is equal since they vary in the 
level of intensity and maturity. On the 
one hand, different coopetitive relation-
ships can be classified depending on the 
intensity of cooperation and competition 
(see Figure 7), entailing specific mana-
gerial implications for the resulting cate-
gories (Luo et al., 2016; Park et al., 
2014). Coopetition can be either cooper-
ation-dominated, competition-dominated, or equally balanced between both sides. While 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) argue that coopetition is the most advantageous relationship 
between firms, Luo et al. (2016) add that the positive consequences can only be captured 
if both cooperation and competition are balanced. Balance is achieved if both sides are 
equally intense. Exemplifying the impact of undesired levels of competition can substan-
tiate this claim: on the one hand, opportunistic behaviour of one party is likely to occur if 
competition is too intense. On the other hand, the pressure for efficiency and effectivity 
is limited if competition is too light. Undoubtedly, the opposite can be attested for the 
intensity of cooperation. Consequently, the first critical success factor can be defined as 
the management of coopetitive balance (Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018). In this context, 
research has additionally shown that balance is influenced by the customer proximity of 
activities. While high levels of cooperation frequently occur in activities such as R&D, 
marketing and sales activities are usually dominated by competition among the partners 
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). 
In contrast to the classification by intensity, Petter et al. (2017) introduced the categori-
zation of coopetitive networks by maturity. More specifically, they argue to cluster these 
by the maturity of inter-relationship and internal factors. With the help of their “Cooper-
ation x Competencies Diagram”, coopetitive relationships can be clustered in nine quad-
rants. These nine quadrants can again be grouped into three maturity levels with 
Figure 7: Intensity of Coopetition, Source: Gnyawali et al. 
(2018, p. 2521) 
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individual managerial implications for 
each level (see Figure 8).  The inter-
relationship maturity level (represented 
on the horizontal axis) can be measured 
by factors such as complementarity of 
synergies, the distance of corporate 
cultures, as well as mutual trust and 
commitment. The internal maturity is 
influenced primarily by innovation 
competencies and intangible assets of 
each party (Petter et al., 2014). Petter et 
al. (2017) claim that coopetition has the 
highest impact on a firm’s competitiveness if both levels reach maturity. The critical 
influence of the individual factors on the success of a coopetitive relationship has been 
validated comprehensively by the research community. While Bengtsson and Kock 
(2000) and Hora et al. (2018) prove that it is important that the synergies of allied firms 
are complementary and that innovation competencies play an important role, Lin and Sun 
(2010) and Niu (2015) affirm that low cultural distance helps to maintain a positive 
relationship between the partners involved in a coopetition. Moreover, Jaouen (2009) 
supports that intangible assets such as brand recognition and patents are critical for the 
success of coopetition.  
Besides clustering the different types of coopetition, research in this area has also 
extensively focussed the inherent interactions and tensions. Tensions evolve, because of 
the diverging interests as a result of concurrent cooperation and competition (Gnyawali 
et al., 2016). Competition implies that a person prioritizes its own goals acting 
individually. In contrast, cooperation means that individuals collectively follow a 
common goal. Both relationships characterize coopetition, since competitors join forces 
to create value and compete to capture value. These opposing logics potentially lead to 
role conflicts in the value creation phase, and to opportunistic behaviour in the value 
appropriation phase (Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2013). Thus, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) claim that a particular activity needs to be either 
fully cooperative or fully competitive. They further suggest two ways separation could 
take place: based on value chain or business units. While the former one builds on 
Figure 8: Evolution of Coopetitive Networks, Source: Petter 
et al. (2017, p. 49) 
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functional aspects, the latter one considers markets and product areas for the separation. 
As tensions can result in conflicts, rivalry and even hostility between the partners, 
management of coopetitive tensions can be defined as another critical success factor 
(Chen et al., 2007; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). More specifically this factor conflates 
relationship management, the navigation of value creation intent, and the protection of 
each partner’s core - the knowledge and skills which are not supposed to be shared 
(Gnyawali et al., 2016; Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018).  
Since these knowledge sharing and protection mechanisms are essential to a coopetition’s 
success, proactive knowledge management reflects another critical success factor. On 
the one hand, the complementary knowledge of each firm is important for joint value 
creation. On the other hand, protection mechanisms need to be integrated into value 
creation processes to prevent leakage of core knowledge (Bouncken et al., 2015). Since 
scholars agree that inter-organizational management of knowledge is challenging 
(Chevallier et al., 2016; Estrada et al., 2016; Salvetat et al., 2013), it is important to define 
in detail “what to share, with whom, when and under which conditions” (Levy and 
Powell, 2003, p. 4). Knowledge can be differentiated into two categories: general and 
specific. While general knowledge describes knowledge about industries, markets or 
fields such as marketing, sales or logistics, specific knowledge includes internal 
information, confidential product information or experiences (Gast et al., 2019; Gnyawali 
et al., 2006). While coopetitors share general, non-classified knowledge, specific 
knowledge is usually kept confidential (Enberg, 2012). Jensen and Meckling (1992) argue 
that this behaviour can be attributed to the fact that general knowledge can be acquired 
easily, whereas specific knowledge is crucial to a firm’s competitiveness. 
Previous research has furthermore shown that companies predominantly rely on legal 
protection mechanisms including contracts such as non-disclosure agreements (Salvetat 
et al., 2013). These contracts articulate the areas of knowledge sharing to facilitate a 
mutual understanding of the coopetition and to prevent opportunistic behaviour of one 
party (Lacoste, 2014). To further mitigate the risk of knowledge leakage, firms 
additionally implement informal protection mechanisms such as internal policies 
(Fernandez and Chiambaretto, 2016). In practice, this can be executed by proactively 
restraining the contact between key employees of the partners and limiting direct 
communication between firms, as well as by preventing meetings in own facilities (Gast 
et al., 2019). The extensive research in this area in connection with these findings 
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highlight the critical influence of proactive knowledge management on the success of 
coopetitive partnerships.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The identified critical success factors (CSF) are summarized in Figure 9. While all of 
them are important for the joint value creation of the coopetition partners, some of them 
primarily influence the success before the coopetition starts, while others can only be 
impacted during the coopetition. In this context, it is important to add that the success 
factors play a different role depending on the constellation of the coopetition. While some 
might be highly important for relationships among incumbent companies, they might be 
less significant for cooperative alliances between incumbents and disruptive start-ups, as 
Chapter 2.2.4 will assess.  
2.2.2 Outcomes: Impact of Coopetition on Innovation Performance 
Besides analysing the process of coopetition, a considerable amount of research has been 
conducted to analyse the impact of coopetitive partnerships on innovation outcomes 
(Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Bouncken et al., 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007; 
Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala, 2012). In the beginning, the 
possible outcomes of coopetition are introduced. Next, this chapter will discuss the 
findings of previous research, which tested the influence of coopetition on innovation in 
general and, more specifically, on incremental and radical innovation. Finally, the reasons 
for these findings will be briefly explained.  
At the end of a coopetition, two different outcomes are possible: value creation or value 
destruction. Both can take place on firm-level, meaning for each firm separately, and at a 
joint level, meaning summarized for all parties. Whether value is created or destructed 
Figure 9: Critical Success Factors of Coopetition, Source: Own Creation 
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depends largely on the availability of the previously described critical success factors 
(Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018). The creation of value is primarily executed through the 
connection of the complementary skillsets of each involved parties (Gnyawali and Park, 
2011). Gnyawali and Charleton (2018) outline that navigation of the value creation intent 
is an important part of the management of coopetitive tensions, because an unequal value 
creation on firm-level could result in a deteriorating relationship with eventually 
detrimental outcomes on the joint-level. As a consequence, value destruction could occur, 
whereby costs (i.e. loss of investments, litigation costs) offset benefits.  
The positive relationship between coopetitive alliances and innovation outcomes of firms 
has been extensively analysed. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have 
demonstrated a positive correlation. Table 1 summarizes the findings of these studies and 
gives a brief overview of the previous research.   
Author Finding 
Bengtsson and 
Kock (2000) 
They suggested that balanced levels of cooperation and compe-
tition in a relationship positively affect the technological innova-
tion outcomes.   
Bouncken and 
Kraus (2013) 
They hint that radical innovation may benefit from knowledge 
sharing, so that coopetition is particularly beneficial in case of 
high technological uncertainty.  
Bouncken et al. 
(2018) 
They analysed the effectivity of coopetition in different phases: 
pre-launch and launch. They conclude that for incremental inno-
vation, coopetition is beneficial in both phases, but for radical 
innovation only in the launch-phase.  
Nieto and 
Santamaría (2007) 
Their quantitative studies analysed the novelty of innovations 
with different kind of collaborators – clients, suppliers, research 
institutes and competitors. They found a negative correlation be-
tween novelty and collaboration with competitors, while collab-
orations with other players indicated positive correlation.  
Park et al. (2014) Their study indicates that coopetition with medium-intense com-
petition is more productive in regard to innovation outcome than 
very light or low intensities in competition.   
Pereira and Leitao 
(2016) 
They provide quantitative evidence for the significantly positive 
impact of coopetitive partnerships on a firm’s product innovation 
outcomes.  
Quintana-García 
and Benavides-
Velasco (2004) 
Based on their quantitative study of coopetition in the biophar-
maceutical industry, they found evidence that coopetition posi-
tively influences the innovation capabilities of firms.  
Soriano (2016) They claim that high levels of simultaneously intense competi-
tion and collaboration outperform other kinds of firms in regard 
to innovation.   
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Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen (2009) 
Their study supports that coopetition between partners in high-
tech sectors is likely to result in radical innovations.  
Ritala (2012) His quantitative study indicates that coopetition has a better in-
novation outcome in highly uncertain markets. Furthermore, he 
claims that coopetition is more beneficial with less intense com-
petition. 
Ritala and Sainio 
(2014) 
Their quantitative study suggests a negative correlation between 
coopetition and technological radicalness, but a positive correla-
tion between coopetition and business-model radicalness.  
Yami and Nemeh 
(2017) 
They conducted research with high-tech companies and also dis-
tinguished radical and incremental innovation in their findings. 
They argue that multiple coopetition is more effective for radical 
innovation, while dyadic coopetition for incremental innovation.  
Table 1: Previous Findings of Coopetition and Innovation, Source: own creation 
While the overview uniformly confirms the positive relationship between coopetition and 
innovation performance of a firm, authors have analysed different specificities in their 
studies. One perspective has focussed on the impact of different intensity levels of 
cooperation and competition on innovation outcomes. Soriano (2016) claim that high-
levels of simultaneous cooperation and competition maximize a firm’s innovation 
performance, while Park et al. (2014) and Ritala (2012) repudiate this claim. Instead, they 
argue that low or moderate levels of coopetition are more beneficial for innovation 
outcome. Another perspective has categorized innovation based on their novelty in two 
groups – incremental and radical – and analysed the impact of coopetition on those 
individually. The study of Nieto and Santamaría (2007) introduced the negative link 
between coopetition and novelty of innovation. Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009) 
first integrated the concept of radical innovation in this research area, claiming that 
coopetition in high-tech industries is likely to result in radical innovation. This claim was 
refined by Ritala and Sainio (2014), specifying the positive relationship only for business-
model radicalness, while a negative effect on technological radicalness was shown.  
The studies of Bouncken et al. (2018), as well as of Yami and Nemeh (2017), offer 
explanations for the partially contrary findings. The former one finds that radical 
innovation only profits from collaboration with competitors in the later stages of the 
product development process due to the reduced uncertainty. However, incremental 
innovation benefits from coopetition also in earlier stages, since the inherent uncertainty 
is typically lower for this type of innovation.  
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Yami and Nemeh (2017) further specify the 
impact of coopetition on incremental and rad-
ical innovation, taking the role of social capital 
into account (see Figure 10). Social capital 
means the role of trust and commitment in the 
context of inter-organizational relationships. 
This factor was already identified as a critical 
success factor for coopetition in the previous 
chapter. Their case study of the ICT-sector in-
dividually analysed multiple and dyadic rela-
tionships, because they exhibit divergent char-
acteristics. As a result, Yami and Nemeh (2017) demonstrate that dyadic coopetitive part-
nerships are more beneficial for incremental innovation, while coopetition among 
multiple partners is most effective for radical innovation. The explanation for this 
observation lies in the distance to the client. Since incremental innovations are developed 
typically with high proximity to the end customer, the level of trust between the partners 
in the coopetition needs to be higher, so that dyadic relationships for this kind of projects 
are preferred (Yami and Nemeh, 2017).  
The overall confirmed positive impact of coopetition on innovation outcome is due to 
different reasons. It is argued that the main cause for this observation is the combination 
of complementary knowledge, skills, and resources to decrease knowledge asymmetries 
(Brolos, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2009). As a further explanation, the different benefits 
of coopetition will be outlined in the next chapter 
2.2.3 Evaluation: Risks and Benefits 
As already introduced, it is argued that “Coopetition” describes the most beneficial 
relationship between competitors (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). This chapter will 
summarize the benefits to illustrate the advantages. Furthermore, the risks are explicated 
to highlight both sides of coopetition.  
The overall aim of coopetitive relationships is to strengthen each party’s competitiveness 
(Levy and Powell, 2003; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). The most important 
benefit this particular kind of alliance entails are synergies. Synergies can be achieved by 
combining complementary resources to overcome knowledge gaps, enhancing the 
Figure 10: Social Capital x Value Creation Matrix, 
Source: Yami & Nemeh (2017, p. 258) 
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capability to develop new products. Furthermore, synergies can be achieved by splitting 
investment costs, exploiting economies of scale, and pooling R&D activities (Bengtsson 
and Kock, 2000; Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). In regard to 
business development, Petter et al. (2014) add that the capability to identify and capture 
opportunities is improved through the collaboration, while the risks can be divided among 
the parties.  
The previous chapter already briefly introduced some risks, which go along with 
coopetition. Firstly, role conflicts evolving from this paradoxical relationship can result 
in confusion of employees, since they are following divergent goals. Secondly, 
opportunistic behaviour from one party can result in a deteriorating relationship. Thirdly, 
the parties are less flexible, since they need to align their operations with those of the 
other parties involved in the alliance (Baumard, 2009; Dowling et al., 1996). 
Because of these important advantages and disadvantages, Bouncken and Fredrich (2012) 
portray coopetition as a “double-edged sword” (p. 2060). Whereas alliances with 
competitors have the potential to spur growth, enhance innovation capabilities, and 
eventually improve the competitiveness, they may also be detrimental for a company in 
case of opportunism or management mistakes (Bouncken et al., 2015). Previous research 
on ways to increase the benefits and to mitigate the risks was introduced in Chapter 2.2.1 
in the form of eight critical success factors.  
2.2.4 Specification: Coopetition between Incumbents and Start-Ups 
After I comprehensively discussed the findings of previous research in the scholarly 
discussion about coopetition in general, this chapter introduces the specificities of 
coopetition among incumbents and entrepreneurial firms. Since studies in the area of 
coopetition predominantly focus on partnerships among competing multinationals, 
coopetition involving smaller firms has been widely neglected by research. Only a few 
authors considered smaller or entrepreneurial firms. Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) 
provide an explanation under which circumstances coopetition with start-ups is preferred 
to that with other incumbents. Lechner et al. (2016) analyse coopetition among start-ups 
in the IT-sector, while Soppe et al. (2014) investigate coopetition within the German start-
up space. Furthermore, findings of studies of Ansari et al. (2016) and Hora et al. (2018) 
are particularly interesting as a basis for the empirical part of this thesis, since they 
conducted research on coopetition between incumbent companies and start-ups. In the 
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following, I elaborate more on the findings of these studies, categorized in four areas: 
impact of circumstances, motives, benefits, and management.  
The first step of coopetition is the choice of the partner. Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) 
developed a framework, claiming that the choice whether to coopete with a new entrant 
or an incumbent company is dependent on two factors: asset complementarity and 
knowledge complementarity (see Figure 11). The study depicts that in case the 
incumbents resources in the form of assets are replaced by new technologies, it is more 
effective to collaborate with equally large competitors. In contrast, in case the intellectual 
property of the established company is rendered obsolete by the technological advances, 
collaborations with competing new entrants are more effective. Circling back to the 
previous chapter, Gans and Stern (2003) confirm this reaction to core-knowledge 
discontinuities. Furthermore, several studies corroborate the claim that incumbents can 
counter these conditions most effectively by collaborating with these new entrants, 
accessing their innovative knowledge and exploiting complementary synergies (i.e. 
Teece, 1992; Williamson, 1991).  
 
Figure 11: Impact of Circumstances on Cooperation and Competition, Source: Cozzolino (2018, p. 3059) 
Adding to the presented framework, Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) argue that the 
stability of the collaboration between incumbent and new entrant diminishes over time. 
The study further claims that the decline in stability correlates with the reduced degree of 
complementarity of assets and knowledge. This reasoning is affirmed by studies from 
Dyer et al. (2018) as well as Hamel (1991). 
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Apart from exploiting complementarities of assets and knowledge, start-ups and 
incumbent companies also pursue individual aims for engaging in coopetition. Hora et al. 
(2018) find that start-ups primarily seek to boost their growth by overcoming resource 
constraints, as well as to increase their publicity. In contrast, incumbents intend to benefit 
from a start-up’s innovation capabilities and intellectual property of new technologies. 
As a consequence of the high complementarity, this coopetition between start-ups and 
incumbents is particularly beneficial for each party, creating value both on the joint- and 
on the firm-level (Freeman and Engel, 2007; Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015). 
Obviously, the choice of partners is influenced by this complementarity, but additional 
factors are taken into account by each party. Hora et al. (2018) claim that entrepreneurial 
firms aim to maintain their independence and to have aligned visions with the incumbent. 
However, for the incumbent company, the start-up’s strategic fit is primarily determined 
by its products, experience, and know-how. These factors have been widely affirmed by 
research on coopetition among multinationals (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Petter et al., 
2014). Nevertheless, the management of tensions in coopetition between start-up and 
incumbent needs to respect one more circumstance. Whereas for equal coopetition 
partners only need to manage dyadic tensions as a result of the paradoxical relationship, 
Ansari et al. (2016) introduce the concept of intertemporal tensions in the context of 
unequal coopetition. Intertemporal tensions describe a conflict between short-term pain 
and long-term gain. More specifically, their study found that the costs and efforts for 
incumbents to collaborate with start-ups will occur in the short-term, but the benefits will 
only be visible in the long-term. Moreover, their study concluded that the fundamental 
benefit of this inequal coopetition for the established company is the survival of the 
industry disruption. Marx et al. (2014) corroborate the claim of Ansari et al. (2016) and 
Hora et al. (2018) that strategic partnerships with disruptive start-ups – a coopetition per 
definition – can be beneficial for incumbents, 
This chapter began with defining the term “coopetition” before it highlighted eight critical 
success factors, while discussing academic findings of the process of coopetition. In the 
second part, this chapter gave an overview of the empirical results of studies, which 
conducted research on the relationship between coopetition and innovation outcome. It 
was shown that a positive relationship is widely confirmed, although certain authors argue 
that coopetition is more beneficial for incremental than for radical innovation. The third 
section outlined the risks and benefits inherent in this sort of relationship, before the last 
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section focussed on the literature on coopetition between start-ups and incumbents, 
linking this scholarly discussion with the one about disruptive innovation theory.  
The review of literature on coopetition reveals several discoveries. First and foremost, it 
becomes clear that the field is still in an early stage, since both qualitative and quantitative 
literature is sparse, and a uniform definition has yet to evolve. Both firm-level and 
industry-level drivers of coopetition require further exploration (Soppe et al., 2014). 
Secondly, the field is increasingly focussed by researchers, resulting in rapidly 
developing knowledge about the phenomenon itself (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014). 
Thirdly, although the combination of innovation and coopetition is one of the most 
important research streams in this academic discussion, studies almost exclusively 
distinguish incremental and radical innovation, omitting the distinction between 
sustaining and disruptive innovation.  
These three discoveries led the authors to formulate several future research opportunities. 
Clearly, one opportunity is concentrating studies on coopetition among start-ups, as well 
as between start-ups and incumbent companies (Bouncken et al., 2015; Ritala et al., 
2016). Another opportunity represents the further exploration of the impact of the 
commercial environment on coopetitive partnerships (Soppe et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
future research can utilize the distinction in sustaining and disruptive innovation made by 
Christensen (1997) and analyse how coopetition promotes the diffusion of disruptive 
innovation. Lastly, the field coopetition and disruptive innovation can be combined even 
more by further exploring coopetition as an incumbent’s reaction to disruptive innovation 
(Rusko et al., 2018). Since it is argued that blockchain-technology is an example of such 
a disruptive innovation, the next chapter will introduce its technological background and 
its potential impact on businesses (Swan, 2015).   
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2.3 Blockchain-Technology 
The term “Blockchain” describes the information technology underlying Bitcoin – the 
first cryptographic currency introduced by Nakamoto (2008). Although this emergent 
technology has been undergoing rapid innovation since its introduction, its three 
fundamental parts persist: a distributed ledger, cryptographically secured data, and a 
consensus-mechanism, which enables trust among untrusted parties (Hou et al., 2018; 
Swan, 2015). As both academics and professionals widely agree on the disruptive 
potential of blockchain technology for a variety of industries (Chen, 2018; Hukkinen et 
al., 2017; Morkunas et al., 2019; Swan, 2015), this chapter elucidates its evolution, and 
takes the technological as well as the business perspective on this new type of information 
technology.   
2.3.1 Evolution of Blockchain-Technology 
The term “blockchain” evolved because viewed on a higher-level, this system bundles 
multiple transactions into a block, which is encrypted through a secure algorithm and 
subsequently linked to the foregoing block, resulting in a chain of blocks (Nakamoto, 
2008). Its evolution can be grouped into three stages (Swan, 2015).  
The first stage was Bitcoin, published in 2008, which enabled the intermediation of 
payments by using a cryptographic currency. The Bitcoin-blockchain does not feature a 
programming language. Consequently, its use cases for companies are limited. In the 
second stage, Buterin (2013) changed this by developing Ethereum, a blockchain 
featuring smart contracts. Smart contracts can be viewed as programmable contracts, 
which are triggered by certain actions of network participants. Since smart contracts 
enable the programming of decentralized applications, first use cases for instance in the 
financial services industry were identified. The third stage is characterized by the 
emergence of new, specialized types of blockchain in recent years, promoting use cases 
in different industries (Swan, 2015). Examples of this are Ripple, a solution for the 
banking industry, or Hyperledger Fabric, a flexible solution for a variety of industries and 
applications. In particular, the latter example has attracted attention since its introduction, 
as it is developed by the Linux Foundation in collaboration with leading software 
companies such as Cisco, IBM, and SAP. Additionally, Walmart and JP Morgan Chase 
are currently piloting use cases with this blockchain (Ripple Labs, 2016; The Linux 
Foundation, 2019).  
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Although the actual potential of the technology is controversially discussed in recent 
years, technology experts such as Gartner see blockchain as one of the five most important 
industry trends (Panetta, 2018). This is supported by Ponciano (2017), who estimated that 
approximately $4.5 billion were invested in the technology solely in 2017. Additionally, 
the number of patent applications has grown by 200% in 2017, according to Noonan 
(2018). Nevertheless, experts agree that the technology has yet to reach mainstream 
adoption. In fact, Furlonger (2018) showed that only 1% of the surveyed CIOs are 
conducting adoption projects, while Kandaswamy and Furlonger (2018) argue that large-
scale use cases will be introduced earliest in 2022. The long-term potential of blockchain 
is quantified by Gartner to be $3 trillion by 2030, achieved through cost savings and 
revenue gains (Kandaswamy and Furlonger, 2018). To discuss the potentially disruptive 
use cases, the technological foundations are outlined in the next chapter.  
2.3.2 Technological Perspective 
This chapter lays the technological foundation, while it firstly introduces the core 
technology, secondly the different types of blockchain and lastly the inherent 
technological challenges. The brief explanation of this area is important to understand the 
disruptive potential of the technology.  
Blockchain is characterized by three distinct parts, which build the core technology: a 
distributed ledger, an encryption algorithm and a consensus mechanism (Hou et al., 2018, 
p. 2061). The distributed ledger describes a decentralized database, which is shared across 
all parties connected to the system (= nodes) so that each participant possesses an identical 
duplicate of the ledger. The encryption algorithm builds the second part of the blockchain 
to ensure a maximal level of security and consists out of two parts. On the one hand, a 
hash algorithm encrypts information through a principle called “hashing”, so that only 
restricted parties can decrypt and see a particular piece of information. On the other hand, 
an asymmetric encryption algorithm enables the creation of unique keys, which are then 
required to decrypt the information and to sign transactions (Hou et al., 2018). The third 
part reflects a consensus mechanism, which enables trust among untrusted parties. When 
the transaction data of a block is changed by a certain node, this change is copied to the 
ledgers of other nodes These nodes then prove whether this change is legitimate. The 
consensus mechanism underlying Bitcoin, called “Proof-of-Work”,  only approves 
transactions, if more than 50% of the nodes confirm the transaction. Hereby, the share is 
measured based on the computational power (Nakamoto, 2008). Consequently, the 
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consensus mechanism plays a significant role for to defend malicious attacks, since it is 
very unlikely that one hacker can capture the majority of the system (Azevedo, 2018, pp. 
33–34).   
Although the terms “cryptocurrency” and “blockchain” are often confused, a 
cryptocurrency does not represent a fourth core part of the technology, since not all 
blockchains comprise a native currency (Chen, 2018). More recently published 
blockchain-frameworks such as Hyperledger Fabric optionally include tokens, which are 
based on a smart contract (Massey et al., 2018). Tokens can not only represent a currency, 
but a number of digital assets such as securities, properties, or loyalty points (Buterin, 
2013). These tokens can then be traded between parties without an intermediary. Because 
the supply of tokens is limited, they are also anti-inflationary (Chen, 2018). Tokens can 
have different functions, and as a consequence, they can impact a business model in 
various ways (see Chapter 2.3.3).  
Different types of blockchain exist, but their three key features usually remain unchanged: 
decentralization, consensus trust, security and reliability (Hou et al., 2018). Differences 
exist in scope and in the role of permissions. In regard to scope, blockchains can be either 
public or private. On public blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, all parties are 
allowed to interact with each other (Buterin, 2015). However, on private blockchains only 
pre-selected people or groups can join the network and access the system. In regard to the 
role of permissions, permissioned and permission-less blockchains can be distinguished. 
Whereas permission-less blockchains imply equal rights for all parties, permissioned 
blockchains impose certain restrictions on users, so that only certain individuals can read 
and alter the ledger. The most well-known blockchains – Bitcoin and Ethereum – reflect 
public permission-less blockchains. However, private and permissioned blockchains 
were developed to comply with industry regulations and to promote use cases for different 
industries (Azevedo, 2018, p. 33). As an example, in the banking industry, it is required 
that the transacting parties can be identified. This is in contrast to Bitcoin, which includes 
anonymity as one central principle (Xu et al., 2017).  
Although blockchain-technology has high potential, it is still in an early stage. 
Consequently, a variety of technical challenges hamper mainstream adoption so far. Most 
importantly, the different kinds of blockchain are still facing a trilemma. This trilemma 
forces a trade-off between scalability, security, and decentralization, so that only two out 
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of three can be achieved so far (Zhao, 2018). Additionally, the speed of confirming 
transactions, low flexibility, low standardization, and high energy consumption are 
discussed as major drawbacks (Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016). However, these challenges 
are addressed by several institutions, and alternative blockchains have been developed to 
overcome some of the aforementioned issues (Schatsky et al., 2018). Firstly, new 
consensus mechanisms such as Proof-of-Stake, Proof-of-Elapsed-Time, and Practical 
Byzantine Fault Tolerance, led to significant performance improvements while 
maintaining decentralization and security. Additionally, these new consensus 
mechanisms displaced “Proof-of-Work” – the mechanism responsible for the high 
electricity consumption of Bitcoin (Eyal et al., 2016). Secondly, consortia among leading 
high-tech companies were formed to accelerate the standardization of blockchain. The 
goal of standardization is to enable the interaction between different blockchains and to 
reduce implementation costs (Morkunas et al., 2019). Thirdly, regulations are improving 
to foster blockchain initiatives. For instance, the U.S. government has amended laws to 
promote the development of medical applications based on blockchain-technology 
(Pawczuk et al., 2018). Because these positive developments frequently enable new use 
cases in different industries, the next chapter will focus on the impact of blockchain on 
businesses.  
2.3.3 Business Perspective 
Use cases for blockchain can be identified based on the characteristics presented during 
the analysis of the technological perspective. Hukkinen et al. (2017) list factors, which 
are important for an impactful use case of blockchain. Obviously, a shared database needs 
to be required, where multiple parties can simultaneously edit content. Furthermore, they 
argue that trust needs to be absent and intermediation undesired. However, they identify 
the requirement to maintain consensus regarding the content of the records as key for 
disruptive use cases. Klein et al. (2018) confirmed these factors, and summarized these 
in a three-step framework. 
To analyse the influence of blockchain-technology on companies, Morkunas et al. (2019) 
systematically analysed its impact on different parts of a business model. They concluded 
that the distributed ledger technology will have a significant impact on key resources, key 
partnerships, customer segments, value propositions as well as cost structures of firms. 
The impact of blockchain-technology on key resources is twofold. On the one hand, 
blockchain-based business models are less capital-intensive, since they can utilize peer-
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to-peer platforms. These platforms usually require less capital than traditional ownership 
models. On the other hand, business models, which are based on blockchains can utilize 
an easier access to capital. Blockchain start-ups have the possibility to fund their projects 
through initial coin offerings (ICOs). During an ICO, tokens with a certain utility are sold 
to individuals, who can then trade these tokens. These tokens can reflect different kinds 
of digitized assets such as currencies, properties, as well as energy. Opposite to shares 
sold in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), the tokens sold in an ICO do not represent equity, 
but usually have a certain utility. In 2016, blockchain start-ups have raised more funding 
through ICOs than through any other method. Investments in tokens by leading financial 
services companies such as Goldman Sachs and NASDAQ underline the impact of ICOs 
(Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). This new method of fundraising decreases the dependence 
of start-ups from intermediaries such as investment banks and venture capital firms 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2018; Mollick, 2014). However, Massey et al. 
(2018) concede that the regulatory framework for ICOs is still in a very early stage in 
most countries. Consequently, governmental decisions will significantly decide whether 
ICOs will remain an effective way of fundraising for start-ups in the future.   
As another part of a business model, key partnerships are primarily influenced by 
disintermediation through blockchain-technology. Intermediaries such as banks or 
currency exchanges can become less important through this technology. Furthermore, 
Morkunas et al. (2019) claims that new partnerships can be enabled through the emergent 
technology, primarily with software-companies. In regard to the customer segments, 
Larios-Hernández (2017) argues that new markets can be reached. As an example, he 
names developing countries, who currently have limited access to financial services. 
Blockchain further can have a significant impact on the value proposition a company has. 
The new technology can provide new products and services, which were not possible to 
create before. Additionally, existing products and services can be enhanced through to 
introduce new value propositions for the customer. Lastly, the technology can have an 
impact on the cost structure of businesses (Morkunas et al., 2019). More specifically, 
blockchain has the potential to achieve savings in the area of transaction costs, which are 
estimated to be around $20 billion per year in the financial services industry alone 
(Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). 
The previous analysis shows that different parts of a business model are significantly 
influenced by blockchain. Additionally, a few studies have been conducted to analyse 
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which type of innovation blockchain represents. While Morkunas et al. (2019) claim that 
blockchain-projects led to either incremental, architectural or radical innovations in 
dependence of the application purpose, Hukkinen et al. (2017) and Swan (2015) portray 
blockchain as disruptive. In brief, research about which type of innovation blockchain 
constitutes is still inconclusive.  
This chapter discussed the existing literature in the field of blockchain-technology. In the 
first step, its evolution was described, before the technological and business perspective 
were taken to analyse this emergent technology in the second and third step. The review 
has highlighted that the potential of blockchain is intensively and controversially 
discussed by both research and practice. However, the majority of this literature has 
focussed on technological developments and business models based on blockchain. 
Research has widely neglected the diffusion process of blockchain-based innovations so 
far. Even though the disruptive potential of blockchain has been superficially introduced 
by multiple authors, academic research has yet to explore how new entrants can disrupt 
industries with blockchain-based products, services, or business-models.  
2.4 Development of Theoretical Framework 
In the scope of the literature review, I introduced the disruptive innovation theory first, 
before coopetition was discussed as a strategy to diffuse innovations. In the last part, I  
focussed on elucidating the disruptive potential of blockchain technology. The 
comprehensive review of previous research enables me to identify gaps. 
I discover the most important gap in the literature in the conjunction of disruptive 
innovation theory and coopetition as a diffusion strategy of and a response strategy to 
disruptive innovations (Christensen et al., 2018). Leading authors in the field of 
coopetition more specifically portray collaborations between disruptive start-ups and 
incumbents as a promising research path (Bouncken et al., 2015; Ritala et al., 2016). 
Largely omitted by previous research is also the impact of industry characteristics on 
coopetitive behaviour (Soppe et al., 2014). Additionally, Rusko et al. (2018) particularly 
pronounce the disruptive potential of blockchain as one area to explore coopetitive 
behaviour. Based on these identified research gaps, I develop a theoretical framework, 
which summarizes conclusions developed from existing theory (see Figure 12). As this 
study aims to fill the described research gaps, I revise this theoretical framework based 
on my empirical findings in Chapter 4.3.  
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Figure 12: Theoretical Framework, Source: own creation 
To guide my research and to develop an appropriate methodological approach, I defined 
the following research question (RQ):  
RQ: How are start-ups disrupting a highly regulated industry through coopetitive 
partnerships with incumbent companies? 
For analysing the different parts of the theoretical framework in a more structured way, I 
deduce four sub-questions (SQ):   
SQ1: How does the commercial environment impact the strategies of disruptive 
start-ups? 
SQ2: Why do disruptive start-ups and incumbent companies pursue coopetitive 
partnerships? 
SQ3: How are coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and 
incumbent companies performed? 
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SQ4: How do coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and 
incumbent companies promote the diffusion process of disruptive innovation? 
To fill the research gaps and to answer the contemplated research questions, I develop a 
systematic methodological approach in the next chapter. This systematic approach aims 
to maximize the validity and reliability of the findings through a logical and traceable 
data collection and analysis.  
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3 Methodology  
This chapter explains the methodological foundations of my research. In the beginning, I 
describe my onto-epistemological viewpoint to position my thesis philosophically, which 
fundamentally shapes the methodology. Next, I introduce the basics of the multiple case 
study approach, before I explain its three crucial parts – case selection, data collection 
and data analysis – in more detail. Lastly, I establish measures for the quality evaluation 
and introduce ethical principles for research.  
3.1 Philosophical Positioning 
The choice of the research strategy, as well as the applicable methods, are dependent on 
the inquiry paradigms of the researcher. The paradigm is based on ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions, which reflect the author’s views of 
“what is real, what can be known, and how these social facts can be faithfully rendered” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 4). Consequently, I am going to answer these three 
questions, so that the research strategy can be developed accordingly. From an ontological 
point of view, I understand the reality as subjective, meaning that each individual 
perceives the reality differently. However, from an epistemological standpoint, I describe 
myself as modified objectivist in accordance with the definition of Guba and Lincoln 
(1994, p. 110). On the one hand, I argue that the reality can only be accessed through 
personal observations. On the other hand, I think that the aim of research is to maintain a 
maximum level of objectivity through critical reflections and replications.  
Of the four research paradigms defined by Guba and Lincoln (1994), I believe that the 
post-positivistic paradigm is most aligned with my aims and perspectives. This paradigm 
emphasizes especially the critical utilization of diverse data sources as well as the data 
collection in natural settings as important to “contribute to grounded theory” (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). My ontological and epistemological perspectives, as well as the 
identified research paradigm led me to the identification of qualitative research as the 
most suitable research strategy for this study. Furthermore, Eriksson and Kovalainen 
(2008) explain that qualitative research is particularly well-suited for research areas, 
where prior insights are still scarce. Since the literature in the field of coopetition between 
disruptive start-ups and incumbents is still scarce, the exploratory nature of this study 
additionally justifies the utilization of qualitative techniques.  
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Even though qualitative research can be conducted in a variety of forms such as 
experiments or observations, I argue that the case study approach suits best to the aims of 
this study. Firstly, case studies follow the onto-epistemological assumptions of the post-
positivistic paradigm, meaning that it is aligned with the philosophical positioning of my 
thesis. Secondly, as the prevalent method in qualitative research, case studies are 
especially well suited for exploratory purposes (Piekkari et al., 2009). This strengthens 
my choice, because this study intends to explore a specific area of coopetition, which is 
still largely omitted by previous research. Thirdly, the nature of my overall research 
question and of the four sub-questions suggest case studies as the best research approach, 
because case studies predominantly focus on answering the “how” and “why” (Yin, 1981, 
p. 100). Finally, Yin (1981) explains that case studies allow research on complex 
relationships, while it prevents the overgeneralization of contexts. Hence, the case study 
approach is the preferred method of leading scholars in the field of coopetition as well as 
disruptive innovation (i.e. Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Christensen, 1997; Hora et al., 
2018).  
3.2 Multiple Case Study Approach 
Two different designs for case studies exist: single case and multiple case design. While 
single case studies are only based on one case, multiple case studies are based on a group 
of cases (Yin, 1981). Piekkari et al. (2009) show that trade-offs exist between the number 
of cases and the richness of each case. While authors such as Yin (1981) or Eisenhardt 
(1989) claim that multiple case studies are preferred to single case studies, Dyer et al. 
(1991) disprove this view, introducing evidence which substantiates the advantages of 
single case studies. Stoecker (1991) additionally introduced the distinction between 
intensive and extensive case studies. Whereas intensive case studies only consider one or 
a few cases, extensive case studies take more distinct cases into account. Although these 
different types of case studies and its propositions are extensively discussed in academic 
research, the choice is primarily dependent on the aims of the study as well as its onto-
epistemological assumptions. Single or intense case studies are preferred for 
understanding a specific case in great detail. In contrast, multiple or extensive case studies 
are applicable to identify patterns across different cases, and to generate and replicate 
theory (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).  
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Based on the applicability of the different designs, I choose to conduct a multiple case 
study in an extensive design for several reasons. To start with, I choose four cases since 
the purpose of this study is to add to the literature in this field by identifying patterns 
through a cross-case analysis. Furthermore, the consideration of multiple cases allows the 
substantiation of the deduced theory, since triangulation and replication can be utilized to 
bolster the validity of the findings. Lastly, since coopetition is a highly complex and 
paradoxical phenomenon as described in Chapter 2.2, I believe that understanding a single 
case in-depth is not sufficient to offer a comprehensive explanation and to answer the 
research questions.  
The empirical part of this study utilizes the multiple case study approach as outlined by 
Eisenhardt (1989), as it suits well to the above-stated aims and as it is predominant in the 
research community with more than 17,000 citations. The highly systematic and logical 
procedure is elucidated in the next sections, focussing on the case selection, data 
collection and data analysis.  
3.2.1 Case Selection 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), two things are crucial for selecting suitable cases for a 
study: the concept of population and the theoretical sampling. The former describes the 
sample group, from which the case companies are chosen. The definition of the 
population aims to reduce “extraneous variation”, which enables the cross-case analysis 
to find patterns in a later stage of this study (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). In contrast to 
random sampling, theoretical sampling describes the choice of cases based on facts.  
To determine the population from which the cases for this research are chosen and to 
establish comparative grounds as a basis of the approach outlined by Eisenhardt (1989), 
I deduced several requirements from my research question. Since this study investigates 
coopetition between disruptive start-ups and incumbents, I determine that (1) the case 
companies need to represent start-ups with a disruptive product or business-model and 
that (2) these start-ups need to collaborate with incumbents to diffuse their innovation. 
Due to the high disruptive potential of blockchain-technology (see Chapter 2.3), several 
industries are shortlisted, where this innovation potentially has a disruptive impact. 
Subsequently, I scrutinize whether these start-ups pursue partnerships with incumbents to 
diffuse their innovation. This leads me to define the population for the theoretical 
sampling as follows: start-ups in the energy industry developing peer-to-peer energy 
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trading platforms and collaborating with incumbents, which are likely to be disrupted by 
the innovation. This clear population definition minimizes extraneous variation to ensure 
comparability of the cases. As an elementary understanding of the energy industry is 
required to grasp the disruptive potential of these start-ups and the structure of the 
coopetitive partnerships, I will briefly introduce the basics in this section. 
In the last decades, the energy industry has largely remained the same. The industry has 
been highly government-driven, so that regulations determined the strategic and operative 
actions of market participants. Since policies are country-specific, the industry landscape 
strongly differs across countries. In general, five major stakeholders operating in the 
industry can be identified (Merz, 2016). On the production side, energy generators and 
prosumers supply electricity to the grid. While in the past, large-scale energy generators 
with centralized power plants dominated the market, in recent years electricity is 
increasingly provided by decentralized players. These smaller-scale producers, termed 
“prosumers” as they simultaneously produce and consume, generate electricity, for 
instance, through photovoltaic-systems. Traditionally, consumers were only located on 
the consumption side of the market. Like in other conventional industries such as retail 
and leisure, the production and consumption side are connected by intermediary players. 
Energy retailers buy electricity from the producers on the wholesale market and 
eventually sell it to consumers for a premium. Grid operators (also called Transmission 
and Distribution System Operators or Utility Companies) are responsible for supplying 
the energy from producers to consumers. These operate the electricity grid and ensure 
continuity of energy supply to the consumers. Although other market participants exist, I 
consciously decided not to introduce them as they are not relevant for the purpose of this 
study. In this context, it is important to note that individual governmental regulations 
impact the industry landscape and the roles of the participants fundamentally. I discuss 
this impact extensively in the empirical findings.  
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While the left side of Figure 13 summarizes the connections of the different industry 
player in the value chain of the energy industry, the right side illustrates the value chain 
disintermediated by peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading platforms. Similar to other P2P 
platforms such as Airbnb or Uber, P2P energy trading platforms aim to allow the direct 
connection of production and consumption side. As shown, the P2P energy trading 
platforms diminish the value proposition of the energy retailers, as their role in the system 
is replaced by the platform. With this new energy trading platform, peers can directly 
trade energy with each other, without the need for an energy retailer as an intermediary. 
This imposes the threat of their business model becoming obsolete on energy retailers. 
This development can be termed disruptive as it corresponds with what Christensen et al. 
(2004) describe as “development of rules allowing migration of producer toward end-
user” (pp. 17-18). In fact, the emergent platforms allow the producers and prosumers to 
move closer to the end customer, disrupting the business model of energy retailers. 
Nevertheless, the energy industry is a special case, because the grid operators will remain 
involved as intermediaries for maintaining the grid, even though the energy trading will 
happen directly from peer-to-peer. As the industry expert Michael Barnard explained: 
“the only way P2P trading could work is if the utility agrees that it works”.  
The second disruptive development evolves from the fact that P2P energy trading 
platforms allow producers and prosumers to directly trade their surplus energy with 
consumers. Hence, consumers can consciously decide from which producer and 
consequently from which energy source they procure their electricity. In reality, this  
means, for instance, that neighbours could purchase energy directly from each other. As 
Figure 13: Disintermediation of the Energy Industry by Platforms, Source: Hasse (2018, modified) 
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a result, consumers can base their purchasing decision not only on conventional product 
characteristics such as price and quantity, but also on new traits such as locality and 
sustainability. Even other criteria could be made possible as the Business Development 
Manager of Start-Up U explained: “It does not have to be local clean energy. It can also 
be energy that was produced by people of a certain think-group”. This highly corresponds 
with the definition of disruptive innovation by Christensen (1997): “disruptive 
technologies underperform established products in mainstream markets, but they have 
other features that a few fringe (and generally new) customer value” (p. 11).  
Because of these two disruptive characteristics, I argue that P2P energy trading platforms 
are a disruptive innovation in the energy industry. Furthermore, I claim that these 
platforms pose the greatest disruptive threat to energy retailers. Threatened by the start-
ups’ innovation, the energy retailers may respond to the disruption with retaliation. 
However, I discover that both parties collaborate. This simultaneously occurring 
cooperation and competition represent the phenomenon of coopetition (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000). Therefore, I define start-ups which develop or deploy this platform, and 
which collaborate with energy retailers as the population for the theoretical sampling. An 
overview of this space is gained by utilizing both material from market research institutes 
as well as peer-reviewed literature (i.e. Andoni et al., 2019; Barnard, 2018).  
After the population is defined, the cases for the study need to be selected. While no 
optimal number of cases exists, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that between four and ten cases 
are sufficient. Furthermore, due to the constrained number of cases, it is recommended to 
only choose the ones, which are likely to generate new knowledge about a specific 
phenomenon. More specifically, Yin (2009) distinguishes three different types of cases 
for individual purposes: “critical” cases for the testing of hypotheses and theories, 
“extreme” cases for describing unique circumstances, and “revelatory” cases for 
developing new theory. As the aim of this study is to add novel insights to existing 
literature, I decide to choose “revelatory cases”. Furthermore, certain criteria are 
established for the case selection to minimize extraneous variation:  
(1) The start-up has a blockchain-based P2P energy trading platform as a main 
product.  
(2)  The start-up is not older than 10 years and has a proof-of-concept (POC) or 
minimum viable product (MVP).  
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(3) The start-up collaborates with incumbent companies classified as energy 
retailers or utility companies (termination is dependent on regulatory 
environment).  
After these criteria have shortlisted a number of companies, I decide to choose four 
companies to ensure that the trade-off between case number and richness as described by 
Piekkari et al. (2009) is marginal (see Appendix 1 for shortlist). To reflect different 
geographic environments in my case study, I decided to choose start-ups from Australia, 
Estonia, Singapore, and the United States. Furthermore, based on publications and 
industry reports, I select the four leading companies in this segment. To adhere to high 
ethical standards of research and to maintain the anonymity of the case companies, I 
decided to pseudonymize their names. According to the location of their headquarter, I 
call the case companies Start-Up A, Start-Up E, Start-Up S, and Start-Up U. Each start-
up, its strategy as well as its coopetitive partnerships are separately introduced in Chapter 
4.1. The choice of these four case companies is in line with the recommendations of 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1981) and enables an appropriate data collection and analysis 
in the next steps, maximizing both validity and generalizability.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
One particular strength of the multiple case study method is the simultaneous collection 
and analysis of data. (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, I describe these two parts of the chosen 
process in the following sections. In the data collection phase, it is particularly 
recommended to utilize diverse methods and sources. Methods such as interviews and 
archival sources are primarily considered for case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jick 
(1979) emphasizes that triangulation - the use of several points of reference - enhances 
the validity of findings. However, Yin (1981) hints that the magnitude of data from 
various sources for each case may constitute a significant challenge for the researcher. 
Before I started the data collection, I planned what kind of data was needed and how this 
data could be collected. Based on the research question and the four sub-questions, I 
concluded that data about the start-ups themselves, their environment, their strategy and 
their coopetitive partnerships with incumbents was required. To get more acquainted with 
these areas, I collected publicly available information in the form of whitepapers, reports 
and blog entries first. In fact, due to the high public interest in these start-ups, 
comprehensive first insights could be attained. 
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Nevertheless, as publishing information may impact the price of the tokens sold by the 
start-ups in their favour, I chose to conduct interviews myself to obtain a more balanced 
perspective. For the interviews, I decided to approach both the strategy or business 
development leader of the aforementioned start-ups and industry experts. With this 
approach, I was able to gain insight into two important perspectives. Firstly, the 
perspective from the start-up by interviewing the employees who are directly involved in 
the coopetitive partnerships. Secondly, a neutral perspective from the outside by 
interviewing industry experts, who possess the overview about the whole industry. 
However, this is in contrast to the argumentation of Tidström and Rajala (2016), who 
claim that it is preferable to interview both parties involved in coopetitive partnerships. 
Even though I do agree in general with this opinion, I argue that this is not necessarily 
applicable for this study, because the overall research question primarily aims on the 
perspective of the start-up. Moreover, I claim that I am able to attain rich information 
about the incumbents’ perspective through the secondary data analysis as well as the 
interviews I conducted. 
As aforementioned, due to the novelty and potential of peer-to-peer energy trading 
platforms, the public interest in these start-ups is very high. Additionally, due to their 
limited resources and strong growth, the availability of employees for interviews is 
limited. Nevertheless, I was able to arrange interviews with leaders of each start-ups’ 
strategy or business development department. Overall five comprehensive interviews 
with these employees were conducted. Additionally, I arranged selective follow-up talks 
so that questions are answered, which came up during the ongoing analysis. This approach 
might seem to contrast with the claim of Jick (1979) who argues for multiple points of 
reference. Nonetheless, I was able to triangulate the findings of the conducted interviews 
with several datapoints: In addition to the five start-up interviews, seven published 
interviews with the leaders of each start-up are taken into account, since they elucidate 
their perspectives on similar topics as well as confirm the statements of their employees. 
Furthermore, I chose to interview Michael Barnard as an industry expert, who has rich 
experience as a blockchain consultant in the energy industry and worked for the leading 
information-technology company in this segment. 
All interviews were conducted in semi-structured form, leaving room for flexibility and 
targeted follow-up questions, as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). The guideline of 
the interview focused on three topics: the start-ups themselves, their strategies and their 
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collaborations with incumbents. However, a slightly different guideline was applied for 
the interview with the industry expert, as it aimed to give another perspective (see 
Appendix 2 and 3 for interview guidelines). Since the interviewees were spread globally 
from Australia to Canada, all interviews were conducted via a digital application. Upon 
the agreement of the experts, all interviews were recorded with a voice recording 
application, which eased the transcription and enhanced the verifiability of the obtained 
information. The length of the interviews was between 50 minutes and two hours.  
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the data collection can be stopped once saturation is 
reached. This means that the incremental learning from additional interviews is minimal. 
As I conducted six comprehensive interviews and several follow-up discussions with the 
strategy managers of leading start-ups as well as an industry expert in addition to 
secondary data, I claim that I reached saturation. Overall, the six conducted interviews in 
addition to the seven publicly available interviews (see Table 2) and other available 
secondary data, fulfil the quality aspects of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1981).  
Overview about Interviews 
Interviews with Start-Ups 
Electrify Strategy Leader 
LO3 Energy Business Development Leader 
Power Ledger Business Development Leader 
WePower Chief Marketing Officer 
WePower Chief Information Officer 
WePower Marketing Manager 
  
Archive Interviews with Start-Ups 
Electrify  Chief Operating Officer (Youtube) 
Electrify Chief Operating Officer (Youtube) 
LO3 Energy Business Development Leader (Soundcloud) 
Power Ledger Co-Founder, Managing Director (Youtube) 
Power Ledger Co-Founder, Managing Director (Youtube) 
WePower Co-Founder, CEO (Youtube) 
WePower Co-Founder, CEO (Youtube) 
  
Interviews with Industry Experts 
Michael 
Barnard 
Experience: Blockchain Expert with a focus on Renewable Energy 
Industry 
Table 2: List of Interviewees for the Data Collection, Source: own creation 
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3.2.3 Data Analysis 
The data analysis represents the second part of the introduced iterative process of case 
study research. To create the data analysis plan for my research, I primarily draw on 
procedures outlined by Eisenhardt (1989), Thomas (2006) and Yin (2003). According to 
the recommendation of Eisenhardt (1989), I decided to collect and analyse data 
simultaneously to fully leverage the advantages of flexible data collection. Through this 
overlap, I was able to focus on special opportunities in more detail. Hence, I noted down 
seemingly surprising or unusual findings during the interview, so that I could ask targeted 
follow-up questions to deepen my understanding of these statements. 
Scholars agree that analysing data of case studies is the most important as well as the 
most challenging and least codified part of this type of qualitative research. Therefore, it 
is essential to follow a clear analytical strategy, to utilize an applicable technique and to 
create a logical procedure. As an analytical strategy, I decided to primarily follow one of 
the three strategies outlined by Yin (2003), which is labelled ‘relying on theoretical 
propositions’ (pp. 112). Not only is this the generally preferred strategy, but also does it 
fit to this study in particular. This study is guided by a theoretical framework derived 
from the review of existing literature. The identified research gaps are again reflected in 
the main research question and its four sub-questions. Furthermore, I claim that the 
strategy of Yin (2003) is most suitable for my research because my data collection plan 
was also developed on these research questions. For the analytical technique, I selected 
‘cross-case synthesis’ as outlined by Yin (2003, pp. 133–134). This technique 
fundamentally describes the process of combining several cases to derive one concept of 
those. Based on the described analytical strategy and technique, I argue that the analytical 
procedure outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) fits best to my objectives, as it draws on strategic 
and technical foundations of Yin. Moreover, this procedure is aligned with the 
epistemological perspective underlying this research. The four-step process is briefly 
visualized in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Data Analysis Plan, Source: Eisenhardt (1989, modified) 
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In the first step, each case was analysed separately to develop a deeper understanding of 
each case. To deal with the high volume of data, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) suggest 
to create case records for the individual cases. Thus, I created a file for each case, which 
contains all primary and secondary data, grouped both by theme and by source to enhance 
manageability. The preliminary themes were derived from the sub-questions of this 
research: (1) commercial environment, (2) motivation of start-ups and incumbents, (3) 
coopetition process as well as (4) impact on innovation diffusion.  
Next, I chose to code the data drawing on the general inductive approach conceptualized 
by Thomas (2006). This approach summarizes the raw data, so that conclusions can be 
drawn and verified. The coding is conducted in five steps. In the beginning, the raw data 
files are prepared, before the texts are read in-depths to identify the sections relevant for 
the research question. Afterwards, the categories are developed building upon the specific 
passages. Lastly, the overlap between categories is reduced, so that clear constructs can 
be derived. I selected the inductive procedure because it is a straight-forward technique 
coherent with the patterns introduced by Miles and Huberman (1994) and consistent with 
my onto-epistemological assumptions as a critical realist. The case files were created and 
coded with a scientific software called “Atlas.ti” to enhance the manageability of the 
magnitude of data. The coding results in 14 categories with an overall 84 codes (see 
Appendices 4, 5 and 6).   
In the second step of the data analysis, I utilized the themes and categories developed in 
the previous step to compare the cases and to identify patterns. To ensure a good cross-
case comparison and to avoid biases, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that a systematic tactic 
should be applied. In accordance with this recommendation, I used the categories to 
search for similarities and differences among the cases. To establish an overview of the 
different cases, I followed the suggestion of Miles and Huberman (1994) to display the 
insights in matrices. Additionally, I applied semi-quantitative analyses to count the 
frequencies of codes for different factors. This is in line with the recommendation of 
Eisenhardt (1989) to utilize different kinds of evidence and to combine different types of 
data. Coherent with the notion of Petter et al. (2014), I follow a systematic process in 
conducting the analyses. The frequency count is based on the answers of the interviewees 
to very specific questions regarding motivation and critical success factors. While I 
refrain from claiming that the counted frequencies are accurate due to the dissimilar 
lengths of the interviews, I argue that this analysis supports the primary objective of my 
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coding approach to “allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant, or 
significant themes inherent in raw data” (Thomas, 2006, p. 238). Hence, the primary 
insight given by these charts for the cross-case analysis is the identification of “elements 
that remained constant across the four cases” (Sutton and Callahan, 1987, p. 411). The 
precise frequencies only play a secondary role, as the risk of distortion due to the 
dissimilar length of the interviews persists. Overall, this structured approach in comparing 
across the four cases increased the probability to extract novel theory from the raw data 
with both high validity and reliability. 
Next, the emerging patterns were identified and discussed for each of the themes. Based 
on the previously identified similarities and differences, I explained the emerging 
patterns, before I unfolded findings of previous research, which either support or 
contradict with those. Eisenhardt (1989) highlights that researchers should not only take 
literature into account which corresponds with the new findings, but also literature which 
contradicts those. Taking opposing literature into account firstly creates the opportunity 
to gain deeper insight into the emergent theory. Secondly, it enhances the credibility and 
the generalizability of the new findings, since opposing arguments are considered pre-
emptively. In the last step, I created a construct based on the discussed emergent patterns, 
modifying the initial theoretical framework. With the help of this theoretical framework, 
I aim to answer the research questions of my thesis.  
According to Eisenhardt (1989) the data analysis process can be stopped once saturation 
is reached. In this context, saturation means that the incremental enhancement of the 
emergent theory or concept is minimal. I decided to end the data analysis when I was 
confident that the fit of the novel concept with the collected evidence is appropriate, so 
that validity and reliability can be ensured. To establish a general understanding of these 
evaluation criteria, the next section introduces quality aspects and ethical concerns of 
scientific research.  
3.3 Evaluation and Ethical Concerns 
The highly structured approach described in the preceding sections aims to maximize the 
quality of the research and to adhere to ethical concerns. A high level of quality and ethics 
is important to be maintained not just during the data collection phase, but throughout the 
whole research process (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).  
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Although no general measures exist to assess the quality of this kind of research, several 
authors have introduced different evaluation criteria. In correspondence with my onto-
epistemological perspective, I chose to evaluate my study with the criteria suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 548) and Yin (2003, p. 34), which are summarized in Table X.  
Yin (2003)  
Construct Validity Establishing the right operational measures for the studied 
concepts 
Internal Validity Establishing a causal relationship, in which certain causes lead 
to certain effects 
External Validity Establishing the field for which the results of the research can 
be generalized  
Reliability Showing that repeating the research procedures such as data 
collection and analysis lead to same results   
Eisenhardt (1989)  
Fit with Data Showing a structured analytical approach, which connects 
evidence with findings and pre-empts rival explanations 
Newness Showing new insights, which enhance existing theories or even 
break frames 
Table 3: Evaluation Criteria of Scientific Research, Source: Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) 
Through triangulation by using multiple data sources in the form of primary and 
secondary data, I ensure high construct validity. Furthermore, the highly structured data 
analysis as described in the previous section increase internal validity. The internal 
validity is additionally enhanced because I took contrary literature into account and 
address rival explanations. The external validity is maximized by following the iterative 
data collection and analysis procedure as outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) as well as 
pursuing a logical approach in the cross-case analysis. Additionally, as I selected the 
leading blockchain-in-energy start-ups as case companies, I was able to increase the 
generalizability. Lastly, I maintained reliability by developing a study protocol consisting 
of the interview guides, the transcribed interviews, and the coding scheme, which enables 
within-case- and cross-case-analysis. 
As defined by Eisenhardt (1989), I assure a good fit of the emerging patterns and 
constructs with the data, since I followed a rigorous tactic. Before I started searching for 
cross-case patterns, I identified themes as well as code groups, which guided the pattern 
identification. This tactic again maximizes the probability that reliable and accurate 
theory emerges. To additionally increase the likelihood of generating novel findings, I 
meticulously analysed previous research in the field of disruptive innovation and 
 55 
 
coopetition theory to focus my study on the identified research gaps. Because of this 
focus, I was able to generate new insights, which add to the existing theory.  
Several organizations such as the IFER (International Foundation for Ethical Research) 
and the ISA (International Sociological Association) have developed guidelines and 
codes to define ethical research. According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) ethics in 
research are applicable not only for the data collection process, but for every step in the 
research process and for every kind of research. All issues ranging from the research ideas 
over empirical operations to the writing process and publication need to take research 
ethics into account.  
One important topic in research ethics is informed consent. This means that the 
participants of the study should be aware of the fundamentals of the research. This goes 
in line with the principle of voluntary participation. I took these two factors into account, 
since I informed all participants about the research topic and the voluntary participation 
in advance both in the written communication and at the beginning of each interview.  
Furthermore, confidentiality is an important ethical topic in research. As aforementioned, 
to increase the reliability I prepared study protocols consisting for instance of interview 
transcriptions. This might seem to contradict with the principle of confidentiality, but I 
argue that I ensure this principle, because I mentioned at the beginning of each interview, 
that the study does not target to obtain any confidential company data. Furthermore, I 
asked the interviewees to not respond in case they are uncomfortable with answering a 
certain question. Moreover, I asked every participant at the beginning of the interview, 
whether they accept to be recorded.  
The fourth principle is professional integrity, which implies that analysis and arguments 
are written in a logical way. This is critical, so that outsiders can easily observe the 
coherence within the thesis. My highly structured research design does only fulfil quality 
aspects but is also essential to ensure this professional integrity. Lastly, I ensured ethical 
behaviour and avoid practises such as silencing and plagiarism by carefully citing the 
original sources as well as by rephrasing statements of other authors (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008). 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the methodological approach of my research. In 
the beginning I highlighted the importance as well as explained my philosophical 
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standpoint. Subsequently, I defined the crucial steps of the multiple case study approach, 
before I focussed on quality and ethics. Through the comprehensive explanation of the 
methodology underlying this research, I intend to establish an understanding of my 
chosen research design and to achieve verifiability of the findings. These findings will be 
explained in the next chapter.  
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4 Empirical Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
After the theoretical and methodological foundations for this study were built in the 
preceding chapters, this section presents the empirical findings of my research. In 
accordance with the systematic four-step approach outlined on page 51, I begin with 
presenting the four cases separately to allow the within-case analysis. Subsequently, I 
proceed with the cross-case analysis, explicating similarities and differences among the 
cases, before I thematically identify emerging patterns. To ensure a logically coherent 
presentation and discussion of these patterns, I organise the sections by the four themes 
of the theoretical framework. In the last step of my analytical approach, I inductively 
modify the theoretical framework of this thesis based on the identified and discussed 
patterns.  
4.1 Presentation of Case Companies 
In the first step of the analysis, I present the findings of each case individually, while each 
chapter is structured in the same way. First, I introduce general background information 
about the case company, before I explain the commercial environment it is operating in 
and its strategy. In the next step, I amplify the start-ups’ motivations for initiating the 
partnership with an incumbent company and the actual collaboration process. Lastly, I 
present the diffusion process of the start-up’s disruptive innovation.   
4.1.1 Start-Up A 
Founded in 2016, the Australian Start-Up A emerged as a leader in the field of P2P energy 
trading. Since its inception, the start-up has grown to more than 30 employees by 2019, 
developed various blockchain applications for the energy industry and won a global start-
up competition with its innovative solution offering. Furthermore, the enterprise raised 
approximately USD 24 million through its token sale in 2018. Its most mature application 
is a P2P energy trading marketplace, which enables prosumers and consumers to connect 
and trade energy. Based in Southwest Australia, the start-up operates not only 
domestically, but also internationally in Japan, Southeast Asia and the United States. 
Start-Up A recognizes the commercial environment, especially the complex regulatory 
frameworks, as its most important challenge. The Co-Founder and Managing Director 
explains that “it is not so much a tech challenge, but a cognitive challenge. No one we 
have talked to has said it will not or should not work”. The start-ups’ Business 
Development Leader (= BDL) further elaborates “P2P trading is not even considered by 
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the regulations, meaning the ‘how to’ rules are yet to be written. In an industry as heavily 
regulated as the energy industry, rules are king”. While this statement shows the 
significance of the commercial environment in the energy industry, the BDL highlights 
that the non-existence of policies represents a substantial market entry barrier for Start-
Up A. 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, regulations vary across different energy 
markets, particularly regulated and deregulated markets can be distinguished. 
Interestingly, Start-Up A operates in both environments. Although most of the firm’s 
projects are executed in Australia, a deregulated energy market, the firm has started to 
expand to Southeast Asia, a highly regulated energy market. For the regulated 
environment, the BDL of Start-Up A explicates that “not all energy markets are 
contestable. In some markets, there is no more than one retailer”. Here, he alludes to the 
state-owned utility company, which centrally acts as an intermediary between 
consumption and production side, so that competitive energy retailers are not required. In 
these regulatory frameworks, the model “energy retailer” is not stipulated, thus not 
allowing energy retailers to enter the market. In contrast, in deregulated environments, 
competitive energy retailers exist. For this environment he outlines the challenge that 
“emerging as a competitor, you are up against organizations with a lot of capital. If you 
enter the market as a retailer in a contestable market, then the other retailers will more 
than likely see you as a threat and it’s very unlikely that you would get […] market share”. 
Furthermore, he emphasizes that in both environments access to electricity distribution 
and transmission systems as well as to production and consumption data is required for 
successfully deploying their P2P energy trading platform.  
To cope with those different commercial environments, Start-Up A develops two distinct 
solutions. When it is operating in a regulated environment, the start-up’s platform is 
tailored to the needs of energy retailers, so that these can enhance their existing product 
offering. For deregulated environments, the start-up directly targets consumers with its 
platform solution. However, as even in Australia, one of the most deregulated energy 
markets, the regulations have yet to evolve for P2P energy trading, the latter concept is 
so far only applicable for microgrids behind the meter. In simple terms, a microgrid 
behind the meter is the electricity system within one building, household or company. 
Nevertheless, to deploy its solution also at the main electricity grid, the BDL states that 
short-term his firm aims “to fit in with the existing rules and regulations to solve problems 
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in the electricity sector today without waiting for further regulatory change”. Supporting 
this statement, he explicates that “holding your breath and waiting for regulatory change 
is not so good”.  
The interviewee further points out that the start-up is continuously in conversations with 
regulators, to give recommendations on how energy markets can be structured in the 
future. However, he admits that “regulatory change is very difficult” and even 
“extraordinarily difficult if not impossible if you are a small company”. He amplifies the 
process of the discussions with regulators: “they are very cautious in regard to new 
regulations. And they want to make sure that all parties in the market are at least aware 
or in agreement with the new regulations”. As policy changes in the energy industry 
possibly result in spill-over effects, which potentially benefit or harm one party 
disproportionally, these changes are difficult to accomplish. 
While as aforementioned the short-term strategy of Start-Up A is to fit in with existing 
regulations, the long-term strategy is to “migrate that [the P2P platform] towards more of 
an energy market that we see. A more democratic form of resilient sustainable and 
renewable energy”. He compares this strategic approach to Christensen’s disruptive 
innovation theory:  
“They [the other blockchain-in-energy start-ups] are trying to boil the ocean so to speak, 
while they are creating a whole market solution. Where we are taking the Clayton 
Christensen approach to disruptive innovation, which is bottom-up: solve a few small 
problems and keep the low-hanging fruits and then grow the company from there.” 
(BDL, Start-Up A)  
This comparison illustrates the firm’s evolving approach to strategy. At the beginning it 
is solving a few small problems of the energy market in collaboration with their partners. 
Eventually, they aim to offer a more holistic solution. The CEO of Start-Up A noted their 
solution is effectively “cutting out the middle-man to save consumers, and to maximise 
the returns for producers”, but at the same time, his start-up does not aim to undermine 
the value proposition of energy retailers. Instead, they chose to partner up with these 
companies to enhance their product offering. 
The company is currently involved in several coopetitive partnerships. To maintain a 
systematic analytical approach, I decide to focus on one collaboration in a deregulated 
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market and one in a regulated market. In the deregulated Japanese market, Start-Up A 
collaborates with the biggest Japanese energy retailer (Incumbent A1). In the highly 
regulated Southeast Asian market, the firm joins forces with a centralized state-owned 
utility company (Incumbent A2). Interestingly, in both environments, the start-up chooses 
to fully co-operate with the incumbent companies and to follow a “Software-as-a-
Service”-approach to commercializing their technology. Consequently, the Australian 
start-up becomes a software supplier, while the established company as a customer 
improves its existing products with the start-up’s technology to provide a better solution 
to the end-customer.  
The start-up pursues different motives with the collaborative commercialization strategy. 
First and foremost, the Co-Founder and Managing Director emphasizes the accelerated 
growth as one rationale: “we needed to grow the company to millions to have the reach 
that we want to have”. He adds that publicity and credibility is an equally important 
motive: “the fact that [Incumbent A1] is exploring [Start-Up A’s] platform as a solution 
is a massive indication that the industry has accepted that change is inevitable”. The BDL 
of Start-Up A further says that the incumbent’s knowledge of “where the market is 
moving” and the learnings from the collaborative technology testing are very valuable for 
the next development steps of his start-up. Lastly, through the collaboration the start-up 
can increase its focus on developing the technology, while the incumbent takes over 
routine tasks such as regulatory approvals.  
“While it is still fairly early days for this technology, we are keen to explore the 
potential benefits that P2P energy trading could offer our customers. [Start-Up A] is one 
of a number of emerging technologies we are currently exploring, which we believe 
could help us meet the changing needs of our customers.” (Executive General Manager, 
Incumbent A1) 
This statement of Incumbent A1’s Executive General Manager emphasizes that the 
exploration of the new technology is the predominant motivation behind the collaboration 
with the start-up. Furthermore, the established energy retailer seeks to build innovation 
capability and technological know-how through this collaboration to eventually 
differentiate in an increasingly fierce competition in the energy industry. For instance, the 
president of Incumbent A1 outlines that Start-Up A’s “P2P platform will optimize the 
offering for all of the participants”.   
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Currently, the start-up is deploying its first commercialization projects, but throughout 
the way the BDL experienced that he “generally found that those organizations 
[incumbent energy retailers] are slow to move in regard to innovation”. He metaphorically 
explains the collaborative innovation diffusion process:  
“I do not know if you know about moving an object over a surface with a lot of friction. 
To move the object, you need to overcome the static friction, and then the object is 
rolling and that requires much less force. And I would say having this initial discussion 
that’s the force to overcome friction. And then the deploying of the technology […] is 
the rolling of the object.” (BDL, Start-Up A) 
With this metaphor, he refers to the increased adoption after the collaboration with the 
incumbent company is started. The partnership enables the start-up to overcome the 
obstacles to commercialize the disruptive technology. Regarding the disruption of the 
energy industry through blockchain, the Co-Founder and Managing Director of Start-Up 
A confirms that “the industry needs to be disrupted in a managed a progressive way, rather 
than in a completely dysfunctional way”, emphasizing the importance of electric power 
supply for households and organizations.  
4.1.2 Start-Up E 
Start-Up E, as the second case company, was founded in 2017, is based in Estonia, and 
raised approximately USD 40 million through its initial coin offering in 2018. Since its 
inception, the start-up has grown to more than 25 employees and has mainly been 
focussed on the Baltic, Nordic and Australian energy markets. Initially, the enterprise 
aimed to introduce a blockchain-based renewable energy procurement, investment and 
trading platform to empower individual consumers to take control over their energy 
purchasing decisions. Today, Start-Up E’s solution is narrower, focussing on P2P energy 
trading among commercial customers in the form of power purchase agreements. In 
simple terms, a power purchase agreement is a contract between energy producer and 
consumer. As a deeper understanding of these agreements is not necessary for this study, 
I refrain from defining these in more detail. 
Operating primarily in deregulated energy markets, Start-Up E faces similar challenges 
as Start-Up A explained for these environments. The Chief Marketing Officer (= CMO) 
of Start-Up E states that “the regulations are rather different across the markets, but it is 
not something that we cannot work with”. In this context, he further highlights the 
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complexity of energy markets, which further increases in the case of internationalized 
operations. However, he emphasizes that the regulations are not the biggest challenge for 
Start-Up E, because it follows a very agile approach in its go-to-market approach, so that 
the software solution can be easily adapted to different regulations. In contrast, the firm’s 
Co-Founder and CEO views access to infrastructure as a highly significant challenge, 
depicting that “infrastructure is very hard thing to get. You can have a very good idea, 
but then you do not have the infrastructure to try it out”. Here, he alludes to the hard- and 
software, which is required to trial his company’s applications, but owned by incumbent 
firms.  
The impact of these challenges can be observed in Start-Up E’s strategy. As contemplated 
before, the firm originally aimed to develop a holistic blockchain-based solution for the 
energy industry. This comprehensive solution intended to support energy procurement, 
investment and trading, while it targeted both consumers and commercial customers. 
According to the start-up’s first whitepaper, the initial strategy was to obtain the required 
licenses on its own to set up an energy retailer and deploy the platform by themselves. 
Hence, the goal was to enter the market with a complete solution for the energy market. 
While the CMO underscores that this still remains that ultimate vision, Start-Up E now 
pursues a divergent go-to-market approach. Instead of becoming a full-service provider 
straight away, which onboards both producers and consumers, the firm decided to “be 
mainly a technology provider” at the current stage. This means that Start-Up E now 
supplies its technology to established players in the energy industry such as energy 
retailers or energy consultants. The CMO justifies this strategy alteration with faster 
adoption of their solution if his start-up enters as a technology provider. He states that “if 
we are entering the market as a technology provider, we tend to develop partners quite 
naturally, because the same kind of partners would be our distribution channels and our 
clients”. This statement elucidates the effect that if the start-up enters the market by 
themselves offering the solution to consumers, they compete with the incumbent 
companies. Start-Up E chooses not to compete with these players and instead enters the 
market as a technology provider, so that these players become the start-up’s customers.  
However, the Chief Information Officer (= CIO) metaphorically illustrates the decision 
to become a software supplier with “we do not want to eat the whole cake at once”, 
underlining the gradual expansion of his firm’s software application. The CMO adds that 
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“it is not like we are moving away [from becoming a full-service provider], but we have 
postponed our start as a full-service provider to start getting adoption as a technology 
provider for the companies that already do this kind of deals [energy retailers and energy 
consultants]”. Here, the interviewees explain that after the time-to-market was reduced 
because of the market entry as technology provider, their firm aims to become full-service 
provider in the long term. As full-service provider, the start-up offers its platform directly 
to end-customers without a partner, empowering consumers to trade energy among each 
other without an intermediary. In fact, the firm states in its whitepaper that it “will 
continue the journey to achieve the goal of becoming a next-generation virtual utility 
enabling the transition to sustainable energy from corporate renewable power purchase 
agreements”. Consequently, the supplier-customer relationship will shift towards a 
competitive relationship in the future. 
Because of the chosen short-term strategy, Start-Up E publicly announced multiple 
partnerships. For instance, they collaborate with a state-owned grid operator in Estonia, 
a Baltic electricity retailer as well as a leading electricity retailer in Australia. In line with 
the scope of my study, I choose to analyse the partnership with the Baltic electricity 
retailer (Incumbent E) in more detail, as this is the most mature collaboration the start-up 
is involved in. Through the collaborations, the start-up aims to reduces its time to market 
as well as to install the credibility of its blockchain-based solution. Furthermore, Start-
Up E emphasizes that the exchange of market knowledge with incumbent companies is 
crucial for its technology development as well as commercialization. A Board Member 
of Incumbent E explicates that, besides exploring the possibilities of the emerging 
blockchain-technology, his company aims to differentiate its offering from the 
competition: “we aim to use digital technologies to help customers make better everyday 
energy decisions”. Additionally, he emphasizes that his firm seeks to profit from the 
innovativeness of Start-Up E as well as to automatize internal processes with the new 
technology. 
In regard to the general structure of the collaboration, the CMO explicates that “it highly 
depends on the internal structure of the company. Whether the company has some 
particular and specific innovation department, which task is to hunt down on start-ups 
and […] to come up with projects together with start-ups”. He further explains that the 
central point of contact for the start-up is the leader of the innovation department of the 
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incumbent. Concerning the practicalities of the partnership, the CMO explains that his 
start-up contributes to the partnership with its “unique approach to the technology”. Here, 
he refers to the general platform functionalities as well as the energy tokenization 
technology by itself. He further adds that the general market approach of the start-up is 
very valuable in the collaboration, as Start-Up E “is quite fortunate to have many people 
from different backgrounds”. In contrast, Incumbent E provides “tremendous insights into 
how our (Start-Up E’s) tech could be relevant for them” (CMO, Start-Up E). Additionally, 
the incumbent elucidates its processes, needs and market insights for the start-up. Here, I 
observe that the contributed resources mirror the depicted customer-supplier relationship: 
while Start-Up E as a supplier provides the actual technology, Incumbent E as a customer 
solely offers insight into its needs and the market in general. Currently, the start-up is 
deploying large-scale trials of its technology with the incumbent partners, so that the 
commercialization can be begun in the next stage. 
In regard to the innovation diffusion, Incumbent E’s Head of Innovation explains that 
“[Start-Up E] is disruptive. It makes renewable energy more affordable and accessible by 
using blockchain technology”, highlighting the high potential of the software solution. 
The CMO of Start-Up E further elucidates that “the partnerships influence our direction 
mostly within the frames of that particular partnership. It is not necessary that the core 
product has to be changed everywhere”. Here, my observation that both firms collaborate 
similar to a traditional customer-supplier relationship is substantiated, because of the 
commoditization of the software sold by the start-up.  
4.1.3 Start-Up S 
Founded in 2017, the Singapore-based Start-Up S develops a blockchain-based P2P 
energy trading marketplace, leveraging blockchain and internet of things to transact large 
volumes of energy. Since its foundation, the start-up has grown to a team of more than 
20 employees and recently raised approximately USD 30 million in its initial coin 
offering, selling utility tokens which can be used to pay transaction fees on the firm’s 
platform in the future.  
Similar to Start-Up A, Start-Up S is operating primarily in Southeast Asia as well as Japan 
and thus faces challenges in both regulated and deregulated energy markets. In general, 
the Strategy Leader (= SL) of Start-Up S explicated, that “the regulations have not 
evolved to the stage where they could especially prohibit something”. Here, he refers to 
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the uncertainty around P2P energy trading as a liability of the concept novelty. He further 
compares his start-up’s approach with those of others in the different area:  
“A lot of these innovations [P2P energy trading applications] have been happening out 
of the U.S. and Europe, and of course you have [Start-Up A] in Australia, but a lot of 
them came from markets that were very, very different – really liberalised. What we 
wanted to do was to develop a model that could actually work [in a regulated market]” 
(SL, Start-Up S) 
With this statement, the SL emphasizes his start-up’s focus on the highly regulated 
Southeast Asian energy market. He continues “in the Southeast Asian region, in general 
I would say that the utilities are backward but very forward-looking”. This commercial 
environment fundamentally shapes the strategic approach of the firm, because a very 
novel product encounters a very traditional market. Thus, the start-up has decided to enter 
the market in cooperation with a leading utility company as a partner. The SL justifies 
this approach explaining that it “is very difficult for a small start-up to come in and 
navigate this environment, because […] retailers do not really exist in these industries”. 
As the concept of energy retailers has yet to be defined by regulators for these industries, 
the start-up cannot enter the market without a partner. On the other side, centralized utility 
companies are “looking for innovation they can deploy within their frameworks, where 
the utility is still the central player” (SL, Start-Up S). Hence, the SL believes that today 
these centralized utilities are the best party to run the energy trading platform.  
“60% of world’s population lives in Asia and almost half of this population live in 
cities; and they are all connected to central power grids. Japan liberalised its power grid 
in 2016, China has done so in parts and Singapore will be the first in Southeast-Asia. As 
more countries liberalise their electricity markets, consumers will get greater choice in 
choosing their electricity retailers and the way they want to consume energy” 
(Whitepaper, Start-Up S) 
In the long-term, Start-Up S pursues a deviating strategy and I observed that the gradual 
liberalisation of the Southeast Asian energy industry is one key reason for this. As these 
markets become more accessible, the regulatory framework for energy retailers evolves 
and as a consequence, the start-up is allowed to enter the market without a partner. This 
enables Start-Up S to pursue its final vision, which is “a very utility-like position”. The 
eventual goal is that Start-Up S “either runs the platform out of the local company or 
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through some special purpose vehicle with the utility partners”. The SL emphasizes that 
how they reach this ultimate vision is a “journey-thing”, but eventually his firm wants to 
open the P2P energy trading platform to “as many participants as possible to perform this 
matching function almost unbiasedly”. 
Currently, the Start-Up is involved in a partnership with a large utility company 
(Incumbent S), which permits the testing of its solution. Besides the access to 
infrastructure and the regulatory compliance, the SL elucidates that an important rationale 
behind this partnership is the exploitation of “economies of scale” of the incumbent by 
leveraging its existing customer base. The interviewee explains that exchanging 
knowledge about “cultural, regulatory and operational practices in foreign markets” with 
the incumbent also plays a role. Lastly, he underlines that increased market power as well 
as learning from cooperative trials benefit the development of Start-Up S. For the 
incumbent’s motivation, he claims that its “interest in the application of the new 
technology […] which will have huge ramifications across global deregulated energy 
markets” is the key factor for initiating the partnership. The president of Incumbent S 
confirms that “amid a changing, more deregulated landscape, we look forward to bringing 
joint innovation to the market and making a positive difference in communities”. 
Incumbent S further seeks to increase its operational efficiency through the application. 
In regard to this collaboration, the SL exemplifies that at the current stage “everybody in 
[Start-Up S] is working on it”. He continues that from the incumbent’s side “it is their 
innovation-team within one of their subsidiaries”. Like in Start-Up E’s strategy, Start-Up 
S contributes with its unique combination of knowledge, which comprises energy 
industry, information technology as well as management experts. The incumbent has a 
large customer base, which is leveraged for the collaboratively testing and 
commercializing the technology. Furthermore, the partnership allows Start-Up S “to tap 
into the operational teams of Incumbent S to understand how they are doing things”. 
Incumbent S aims to gain access to the extraordinary skills and knowledge base of the 
start-up. The SL of Start-Up S explains that Incumbent S has two alternative ways to gain 
access to this. First, they have the possibility to outsource the development to a software 
company. However, standard IT developers struggle with building a software which is 
tailored to the needs of the incumbent. Second, the incumbent could build an internal 
team to develop the software. Here, according to the SL of Start-Up S, it is very difficult 
for utility companies to group the different sources which are needed for the development 
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of blockchain-based P2P energy trading platforms. As Start-Up S combines knowledge 
about the energy industry with software know-how, Incumbent S seeks to profit from this 
combination.  
As the key goal for the start-up is to learn about processes of the incumbent, the SL 
explains that his software development team is “very flexible to follow their [Incumbent 
S’s] requirements. He further adds that “it is a very big milestone to deploy successfully 
within [Incumbent S’s] customer base. I think it is very critical because they are the 
biggest partner that we have”. This highlights the importance of the collaboration in the 
current phase. I find that the partnership, in this case, is highly cooperative up to this 
point, the testing of the technology, while in the long-term the strategy of Start-Up S 
appears to become more competitive.  
4.1.4 Start-Up U 
The last case company,  Start-Up U is based in the United States and develops a variety 
of applications for the energy industry such as API, smart meter and blockchain. Although 
it was founded in 2012, I decide to include it in this study, because it represents the 
pioneer in this field and shifted its focus to blockchain-based P2P energy trading not 
before 2015. Most notably, Start-Up U as the first company successfully piloted such an 
application and consequently enabled the first P2P energy transaction in 2016. The start-
up is financially backed by strategic partners such as energy companies and venture 
capital firms, while it has grown to a team of more than 20 employees.  
The core markets of the start-up are Northern America and Europe. The energy markets 
in both regions are largely deregulated, although in some parts of the U.S. they have yet 
to open up for competition among energy retailers. For both environments, regulated and 
deregulated, the BDL of Start-Up U emphasizes that “regulators are not set up for P2P 
transactive energy business models”, which represents a significant challenge for his 
start-up to enter the market. He further elaborates on the key distinction between regulated 
and deregulated environments. For a highly regulated market in the U.S., he exemplifies 
that “utilities earn a regulated rate of return based on the capital they invest to expand, 
operate and maintain their capacity to distribute and in many cases to generate electrical 
energy”. Hence, if start-ups enter this market on their own, they would only achieve a 
financial return based on the capital they invest into infrastructure. As none of the case 
companies intends to invest heavily in infrastructure, the non-partnership entry strategy 
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is not financially viable under these circumstances. Interestingly, Start-Up U is involved 
in discussions with the governmental institutions to explore concepts for the future of the 
energy industry. In this context, the interviewee elucidates that “we certainly do want to 
influence that [the regulations] to the extent we can. However, we are a small company 
with limited resources”. Nevertheless, he hints that “the future is going to be way more 
competitive in the energy industry”, as governments increasingly liberalise energy 
markets. 
“For us as a start-up, we need to have a near-term business model and I can describe to 
you what the ultimate vision is, but realistically, we need to stay alive as long as we get 
there. Where is the commercial value for a company like us today and where is it 
leading to? The regulatory aspect is definitely the biggest challenge at the moment.” 
(BDL, Start-Up U) 
This quote points out the impact of the commercial environment on the strategy of the 
start-up. As the regulations have yet to evolve to the stage where the case company can 
directly pursue its vision, it needs to create value for customers immediately to generate 
financial returns. As a result, Start-Up U follows the “Software-as-a-Service” model in 
the short-term, offering a blockchain-based software solution to incumbent energy 
retailers, allowing these companies to improve their existing offering. Hence, Start-Up U 
chooses not to become an energy retailer themselves. The BDL justifies this decision: 
“being an energy retailer is not an attractive model […]: Energy retailers are in the fight 
for the cheapest electricity right now, so the margins are very thin, and it is tough to 
differentiate”. This implies that with this strategy the start-up avoids entering a mature 
and highly competitive market and instead focusses on collaborating with established 
companies in this market, which are exposed to increasingly fierce competition and thus 
seek to differentiate their offering. 
However, the BDL expects that the “commercial value of [Start-Up U] will change as 
regulation changes”, alluding to his start-up’s long-term strategy and vision. As he 
anticipates that the commercial environment becomes increasingly favourable for 
innovative P2P energy trading solutions, Start-Up U aims to gradually expand its software 
solution. Features such as distributed energy and occasional pricing are progressively 
added to the software, allowing the firm eventually to offer a “Utility-as-a-Platform” 
concept. With this solution, the case company aspires to transform the value proposition 
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of incumbent energy retailers into a platform to empower individual consumers to expand 
the control of their electricity purchasing decisions. This concept has major implications 
for the relationship with its partners. Start-Up U is deploying its platform collaboratively 
with the incumbent company. While the start-up provides the technical solution, the 
incumbent can utilize the platform to sell its energy and to offer its customers more 
options.  
In accordance with its short-term strategy, Start-Up U is involved in several partnerships 
with incumbent companies in the energy industry. For my research, I focus on the most 
extensive and mature partnership of the firm with a leading British electricity retailer 
(Incumbent U). So far, the partners have collaboratively conducted pilots of the P2P 
energy trading platform and are currently in the phase of launching a large-scale trial in 
Southwest England. The interviewee of Start-Up U conveys multiple motivations for 
entering the partnership. Most importantly, his firm has the possibility of extensive 
publicity by collaborating with a leading energy retailers, explaining that the partnership 
is of “large national and international interest”. A second rationale for the start-up is the 
acceleration of its growth:   
 “We think that as a company we want to grow fast and probably in multiple markets. 
So, we think that we need partnerships, because otherwise we could not do that in 
multiple markets at the same time.” (BDL, Start-Up U) 
The BDL further hints that his firm requires a “retail license to sell electricity” as well as 
access to the electricity grid to transact electricity – two resources the incumbent 
possesses ownership of. Through the partnership with this party, the start-up can access 
these resources. Furthermore, the case company seeks to profit from Incumbent U’s 
knowledge “of the local markets and their customer base” (BDL). Lastly, the interviewee 
highlights that the learnings made in the cooperative trials enable the continuous 
improvement of the software. Due to the inhomogeneity of the partners, the incumbent 
has other rationales for initiating the collaboration: 
“The question we want to answer through this pilot is whether blockchain can deliver 
significant value to the system as a whole. We don’t know, being brutally honest, if 
blockchain can deliver value” (Program Director, Incumbent U) 
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This statement indicates the main motivation of Incumbent U: exploring an emerging and 
potentially disruptive technology. Besides this, the CEO of Incumbent U argues that the 
partnership is “allowing us to find new and better ways to delivering energy to our 
customers”, alluding to differentiating his firm’s offering in a highly competitive 
environment. In this context, the BDL of Start-Up U explicates that the incumbents “have 
a really big interest of moving more into a service-based business model”. Hence, these 
established players are “trying to figure out what a platform business model would look 
like for them” (BDL, Start-Up U). These statements emphasize that the start-up envisions 
to deploy the “Utility-as-a-Service” platform collaboratively rather than competing with 
the incumbent firm. 
In regard to the partnership itself, the BDL claims that “existing models have to change” 
and that “companies that are interested in cannibalizing themselves tend to be the partners 
[Start-Up U] works best with”. In fact, he admits that the concept of P2P energy trading 
is not profitable with the energy retailers’ current business model. He illustrates that the 
start-up’s partner needs to face “a short-term pain to get a long-term gain”. For the 
structure of the partnership, the interviewee explains that “the way that the relationships 
are structured is that we have an additional pilot that is sort of the kick-off”. He further 
elaborates on the structure:  
 “The average partnership is between us and a competitive retailer or a vertically 
integrated utility if we are working in certain markets in the U.S., but most of the 
markets we are working in are competitive.” (BDL, Start-Up U) 
During the relationships with incumbent companies, the BDL deems open 
communication and knowledge sharing very important, exemplifying that his team 
“thought about whether we want to incorporate billing into our platform. In working with 
our partners, we found out that billing is actually their only touchpoint with their 
customers and so we would be disintermediation the relationship with their customers”. 
As software development teams go through “multiple iterations as the technology 
improves” (BDL, Start-Up U), the feedback from the established firm is crucial. In 
addition, he argues that knowledge protection does not play a key role in the collaboration 
with Incumbent U: “Think about how fast blockchain is changing and how much 
infrastructure investments there is, we likely will be transitioning to new blockchains in 
the future”. Lastly, the BDL describes that an aligned vision of both partners builds the 
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basis for the collaboration, so that both the start-up and incumbent move into the same 
direction.  
The interviewee confirms that “the collaboration is critical, because it is our path to 
market. So, if the relationship does not work, the business model will not work”. The 
CEO and Co-Founder of Start-Up U underscore that “this is not a revolution or a 
disruption. It is an evolution”. 
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4.2 Cross-Case Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, I continue with the second and third step of my analytical approach. By 
conducting a cross-case analysis, I identify the similarities as well as differences across 
the four presented cases and enfold the respective literature to discuss the emerging 
patterns. Coherent with my theoretical framework, I structure this part into four themes: 
commercial environment, motivations, the process of coopetition and innovation 
diffusion. Even though the case companies develop a comparable product, they have 
dissimilar backgrounds and pursue deviating strategies (see Table 4).  
 Start-Up A Start-Up E Start-Up S Start-Up U 
H
Q Australia Estonia Singapore United States 
Y
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r 
2016 2017 2017 2012 
Te
am
 
30+ 25+ 20+ 20+ 
Fu
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ng
 
USD 24 million USD 40 million USD 30 million Not disclosed 
St
ag
e 
Commercialization Large-scale trial Small-scale pilot Large-scale trial 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
ts
 
Australia, Japan 
(deregulated) 
 
U.S.  
(partially regulated) 
 
Southeast Asia 
(regulated) 
Australia, Baltics, 
Nordics 
(deregulated) 
Japan 
(deregulated) 
 
Southeast Asia 
(regulated) 
Central/Western 
Europe 
(deregulated) 
 
U.S.  
(partially regulated) 
Sh
o
rt
-
te
rm
 
st
ra
te
gy
 Software-as-a-
Service model for 
energy retailers 
Technology-provider 
for incumbent 
energy retailers 
Software-providers 
for incumbent 
energy retailers 
Consulting firm 
providing Software-
as-a-Service for 
energy retailers 
Lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
st
ra
te
gy
 
Expansion of 
software to more 
holistic solution for 
future energy market 
Full-service provider 
with platform for 
producer and 
consumer 
Utility-like role with 
platform solution for 
producer and 
consumer 
Utility-as-a-Platform 
solution deployed 
with incumbent 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
s 
Leading utility 
company in Japan 
and in Singapore 
Energy retailer in 
Baltics, leading 
energy retailer in 
Australia 
Leading utility 
company in Japan 
and in Singapore 
Leading energy 
retailer in U.K. 
(among others) 
Table 4: Overview about Case Companies, Source: own creation 
 73 
 
As Table 4 illustrates, key differences exist among the case companies. Firstly, the four 
start-ups are based in very diverse geographical locations, and consequently operate in 
different markets and environments. As the environment can be categorized in regulated 
and deregulated, I believe that its impact on the start-ups’ strategy can be elucidated. 
Secondly, the four firms are in different stages of its go-to-market approach. While Start-
Up A is already commercializing its technology, the other start-ups have yet to reach this 
stage. Start-Up E and Start-Up U are currently finalizing large-scale trials to proceed with 
the commercialization soon. The different stages allow the analysis of motivations 
throughout the go-to-market path. Lastly, I identified that while all case companies follow 
a two-phase strategic approach, the strategies in each phase a dissimilar with implications 
on the coopetitive partnerships. In the next sections, I comprehensively analyse and 
discuss my empirical findings to eventually modify the theoretical framework, so that the 
research questions can be answered.  
4.2.1 Commercial Environment 
This chapter analyses and discusses my findings of the impact of the commercial 
environment on the case companies’ strategies and coopetitive partnerships. As presented 
for each case separately in the preceding chapter, all four case companies highlight the 
significance of the commercial environment for their strategy. I find that the commercial 
environment in the energy industry is characterized by two key factors: regulatory and 
infrastructural environment. Although these two areas are partially interconnected, I first 
describe each factor individually, before I illustrate conjunctive elements and its impact. 
Regulatory Environment 
I find that the four case companies concordantly agree that the regulatory environment in 
the energy industry represents a major challenge. Even though the start-ups’ product, 
blockchain-based P2P energy trading, is not explicitly prohibited by any regulations, they 
are forced to cope with the liability. This applies to both regulated (i.e. Southeast Asia) 
and deregulated energy markets (i.e. Australia or Central/Western Europe). In according 
to the explanations of the case companies, the interviewed industry expert illustrates the 
importance of rules by comparing the energy industry with the healthcare industry:  
“As we think about disruption and as we think about the two industries of healthcare 
and energy, there are different reasons, why they are behind on digitization and 
information technology. In one case it is a massive physical infrastructure that works 
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when it is stupid. That is electricity and energy flows. In the other, it is an incredibly 
complex domain, where digitization runs into enormous complexity of the human body 
and medical treatments.” (Michael Barnard, Industry Expert) 
Here, he alludes to the importance of reliable power supply for households and industries, 
and that regulations aim to ensure this uninterrupted supply. In the context of the other 
interviewee’s accounts, Barnard’s explanations confirm that these regulations represent a 
major market entry barrier for the start-ups, as the impact of their solutions on the 
reliability of the energy system have yet to be explored.  
In addition to the challenge represented by non-existing regulations, I find that also 
existing regulations impede the market entry of disruptive start-ups. In this context, it is 
important to differentiate based on the level of regulation into regulated and deregulated 
markets. For regulated markets, the interviewees of Start-Up A and Start-Up U depict that 
regulations render the financial and legal viability of the start-ups’ business model 
impossible. Most noticeably, the three start-ups which have operations in regulated 
environments outlined that competitive retailers do not exist in these regulatory 
frameworks, as their value proposition is executed by state-owned utility companies. 
Hence, these regulations preclude innovative start-ups entirely from disrupting the 
industry, since they cannot enter the market without partnering with the incumbent state-
owned utility company.  
In regulated environments, energy retailers exist, and fierce competition exists among 
them. However, even in these markets, I discovered that start-ups face significant 
regulatory challenges to enter the market. First and foremost, all interviewees explained 
that energy retail licenses are required for the deployment of P2P energy trading concepts 
on the electricity grid. Interestingly, different strategies to comply with this legal 
requirement were exemplified. Start-Up A and Start-Up U partner with incumbent 
companies which own such a license, and thus adjust their go-to-market approach due to 
this legal requirement. Start-Up S follows the same approach but emphasizes that for the 
internationalization it is planned to increasingly acquire retail licenses without a partner. 
Start-Up E explains that its partners usually own these licenses, but in the future,  it also 
plans to acquire these on their own. While the case companies follow slightly deviating 
approaches in obtaining the license, they concur that the existing regulations complicate 
their commercialization strategy.  
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While all start-ups accept the existing regulations with their business models, two of the 
start-ups (Start-Up A and Start-Up U) proactively engage in discussion with regulators. 
Although both firms admit that regulatory change is very difficult to achieve as a start-
up, I observed that through the conversations the regulators are becoming increasingly 
aware of the innovative P2P energy trading platforms. For instance, the Managing 
Director and Co-Founder of Start-Up A explains that “governments and regulators around 
the world are taking a closer and more detailed view, but not from the perspective of 
shutting it down”. 
Infrastructural Environment 
Despite the regulatory environment presumably has the most significant impact on start-
ups operating in the energy industry, the infrastructural environment also plays a crucial 
role. The four case companies have highlighted that the exclusivity of certain resources 
in the energy industry represents a major challenge. More specifically, they emphasized 
the need for access to two infrastructural components to test and deploy the P2P energy 
trading platforms: the electricity grid and the smart meters. While the electricity grid is 
usually owned by the state-owned utility company or by distribution/transmission system 
operators, the energy consumption data of smart meters is usually owned by the state-
owned utility company or incumbent energy retailers. No matter which party the owner 
is, the start-ups require access to it to develop, pilot and eventually deploy their solution.  
However, a clear link between regulatory and infrastructural environment is evident. On 
the one hand, the ownership of the infrastructural resources is determined by 
governmental policies. On the other hand, changes in the infrastructures, for instance 
through the advent of wind and solar farms, require changes in the regulatory landscape. 
I observe that the former connection is significant for the case companies. The current 
ownership of the infrastructure is a major reason for all four case companies to cooperate 
with incumbent energy retailers, as they already possess the access or the ownership to 
the necessary components.  
Impact of Commercial Environment 
The reason why I dedicate a whole subchapter to the commercial environment is its 
significant impact on the start-ups strategy and thus on the coopetitive partnerships. As 
Figure 15 visualizes, I find that in the short-term all start-ups aim to fit in with the existing 
regulatory and infrastructural environment to be able to create immediate value for 
 76 
 
customers. However, as the start-ups anticipate that the commercial environment and thus 
its value will change in the future, they pursue a deviating strategy in the long-term. 
Hence, I identified that all start-ups follow a two-phase strategy.  
 
Figure 15: Impact of Commercial Environment on Start-Ups' Strategies, Source: own creation 
Each strategy consists of a short-term commercialization-strategy and a long-term 
expansion-strategy. I find that the key factor for the distinction is the commercial 
environment. The interviewee of Start-Up A illustrates this with the following quote:  
“Innovation is outpacing regulation - what is new and innovative is either fitting in or 
trying to fit into existing regulation. Or you need regulatory change and getting 
regulatory change is very difficult”. (BDL, Start-Up A) 
All four start-ups aim to fit into existing regulations. They achieve this by entering the 
market with a B2B-model, offering their technology or software-solution to incumbent 
energy retailers to comply with existing regulations. However, I discover for the second 
phase that the start-ups gradually adjust their strategy towards more independence from 
the incumbent. While two of the Start-Ups (Start-Up A and Start-Up U) emphasize that 
their vision for the long-term involves collaborating with incumbent energy retailers, the 
other two start-ups have a deviating vision. Start-Up E plans to become a full-service 
provider with a platform solution, which directly connects producers and consumers. As 
a result of this model, the value proposition of the incumbent energy retailers would be 
rendered obsolete. Start-Up S aims to proceed with a hybrid-model in the second phase, 
entering certain markets as an energy retailer themselves and partnering with incumbent 
energy retailers in other markets.  
Based on the described similarities and differences among the cases, I identify several 
cross-case patterns. First, the uncertain commercial environment represents a major 
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challenge for the start-ups because it is difficult to navigate when necessary regulations 
have yet to evolve. Enfolding previous literature, Bhide (2000) confirms this finding, 
claiming that regulatory and technological uncertainty has an aggravating impact on the 
profit potential of start-ups operating in a niche. He further indicates a link between the 
novelty of a start-up’s product and the uncertainty of the environment. Other studies 
confirm this link by showing a negative correlation between innovativeness and start-up 
survival (Brown et al., 2012; Hyytinen et al., 2015; Markides, 2006). However, the 
research in this field is inconclusive as multiple studies have found evidence for a positive 
connection between these two factors (i.e. Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Wagner and 
Cockburn, 2010). 
Second, I find the emerging pattern that the regulatory and infrastructural environment 
significantly influence the market entry of these start-ups. I observed that these two 
factors can force new entrants to collaborate with incumbent companies to commercialize 
their innovation. Christensen et al. (2004) underscore the impact of regulations on 
disruptive innovations. More specifically, they explain that governments can utilize levers 
to target the two factors motivation and ability to eventually promote innovation. In the 
case of the four start-ups, first and foremost competition policies hinder them from 
entering the market without a partner. However, the start-ups anticipate the intervention 
of governments, which will support their ability to diffuse their disruptive innovation. 
Graffy and Kihm (2014) further show that governmental policies can prevent incumbents 
from being disrupted, but are not to be seen as a permanent protection. Lastly, previous 
literature supports my finding that a reciprocal relationship exists between commercial 
environment and companies (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008). While the start-ups adjust to the 
circumstances, some of them also engage in governmental discussion to eventually adjust 
the regulations. Besides the regulatory environment, previous literature also corroborates 
that infrastructure is another major factor impacting the commercialization strategy of 
disruptive start-ups (Gans and Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). In line with my findings, the 
existing literature explains that assets, which are possessed by the incumbent and hard to 
duplicate for the new entrant, represent a significant market entry barrier. 
Third, I discover that all of the four case companies follow a two-phase strategy. In the 
first phase, they choose to follow a partnership approach. In the second phase, they pursue 
a deviating strategy by progressively adapting to the changing commercial environment. 
Throughout the two phases, the interviewees emphasized the need for flexibility and 
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adaptability. Christensen and Raynor (2003) confirm this need especially for the early 
stages of the innovation commercialization. This necessity for flexibility is further 
increased for the case companies, since they choose to coopetitively diffuse their 
disruptive innovation with incumbent partners (Ansari et al., 2016). Further studies have 
affirmed the need for an adjustable strategy to maintain coopetitive balance and to avoid 
tensions throughout the process of collaboration (Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018). 
This chapter highlights the commercial environment, in particular regulatory compliance 
and access to infrastructure as two fundamental motivations for start-ups to enter 
partnerships with incumbent companies. However, I find a multitude of additional 
motivations from both the start-ups’ as well as the incumbents’ perspective, which I 
elucidate in the following part of my study.  
 
4.2.2 Motivations for Coopetitive Partnerships 
As the second theme of this study, I choose to analyse and discuss the reasons why start-
ups and incumbents engage in coopetitive partnerships. The motivations of each party are 
particularly interesting because the relationship consists of cooperative as well as 
competitive elements. As outlined in Chapter 3.2, the selected start-ups seek to enter the 
energy industry with an innovation that negatively impacts the value proposition of the 
incumbents at the least or renders their business model obsolete at the worst. However, 
both parties decide to collaborate. In the next sections, I successively analyse the 
motivations of each party, before I synthesize in the end and discuss the emerging cross-
case patterns. 
Perspective of the Start-Up 
Since the interviewees of the four case companies mention a multitude of reasons for 
engaging in partnerships with incumbent companies, I conduct a semi-quantitative 
analysis to create an overview about the frequency for each of the factors (see Figure 16). 
This frequency shows, based on my inductive coding, how often each start-up made 
mention of each rationale.  
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Figure 16: Motivation Factors of Start-Ups, Source: own creation 
The semi-quantitative analysis visualizes the significance of the factors for each of the 
start-ups. By analysing the chart, it becomes clear that three of the eleven identified 
factors are relevant for all four start-ups: publicity and credibility, acceleration and scale-
up and access to infrastructure. The next five factors are relevant for three of the four case 
companies, whereas the last three were only mentioned by two start-ups. In the following, 
I elaborate on the dominant factors to explain why start-ups engage in coopetitive 
partnerships. 
According to the analysis, gaining publicity and credibility through the coopetitive 
partnership is one of the major motivations for the interviewed start-ups. This is coherent 
with the interviewees explanations. As the energy industry is traditionally very slow-
moving, the interviewees aim to initiate discussions around innovative energy trading 
concepts to eventually achieve regulatory changes in their favour. Furthermore, I observe 
that the start-ups aspire to accomplish network effects for its platform by increasing its 
customer base through the gained publicity. In this context, I discover that also the 
blockchain-based business model plays a role. As the CIO of Start-Up E elucidates, at the 
beginning of the foundation of blockchain-based ventures “the focus is put on marketing 
and promoting the ICO itself”. As introduced in Chapter 2.3, start-ups with a blockchain-
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based product are enabled to sell ‘coins’ to finance its growth. Since three of the case 
companies have raised more than USD 20 million through the ICO, I conclude that 
marketing has indeed played a major role in the early stages of the venture. However, as 
these three case companies have passed the ICO-stage and still emphasize the importance 
of publicity through the coopetitive partnership, I argue that this factor is not specific to 
the circumstances of this study.  
The second-most frequently mentioned rationale is acceleration and scale-up. As the 
four start-ups aspire to grow at a fast pace, they want to exploit economies of scale of the 
incumbent company. As aforementioned, by leveraging the coverage of the incumbent 
company, the start-ups seek to accelerate network effects, which again spur the growth of 
its platform. As the Managing Director of Start-Up A emphasizes, the case companies 
“needed to grow the company to millions to have the reach” they want to attain. 
Undoubtedly, accomplishing a growth to that dimension represents a major obstacle for 
start-ups with limited resources. 
As comprehensively explained in the preceding chapter, access to infrastructure is 
crucial for the four case companies and consequently the third-most stated motivation 
factor mentioned by all case companies. Surprisingly, regulatory compliance was only 
mentioned by three of the four firms as a rationale for engaging in partnerships with 
incumbents. Start-Up E portrays the only company which omits to mention this motive. 
Clearly, this is not because this start-up deems regulatory compliance unimportant. 
Instead, they choose a diverging strategic approach. According to the firm’s whitepaper, 
the start-up aims to acquire a retail license by themselves in the long-term, enabling them 
to operate on the electricity grid fully compliant without the necessity for a partner.  
The next factors were mentioned by three of the four case companies. Cooperative 
learning describes the experience and knowledge the start-ups gain from the 
collaborative testing and deployment of the platform with incumbents. Again, Start-Up E 
is the only company not emphasizing this factor. A possible explanation is its current 
development stage. Although the firm already executed small-scale pilots in the past, the 
large-scale pilot is still in a nascent stage. For the next two motivation factors, market 
knowledge and market power, I argue that the opposite is the reason why Start-Up A 
has not indicated its importance. The interviewed expert emphasizes that Start-Up A 
received the most traction in comparison to the other three case companies. This is 
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confirmed by the fact that the firm is currently engaged in a governmental inquiry about 
the Australian electricity market, which reviews the current regulations. Furthermore, the 
enterprise was founded by former staff of leading electricity retailers, reducing the need 
for comprehensive additional market insights. Hence, I claim that this is the reason why 
the firm views the marginal benefit of the partnership in regard to these two factors, 
market knowledge and market power, as marginal.  
The remaining four factors – access to customer base, avoiding battles with giants, 
access to funding and increased focus – are mentioned not more than five times by the 
case companies and thus I deem them insignificant as rationales behind the partnership. 
However, I take them into account in case the previous literature refutes this assertion. 
Perspective of Incumbent Company 
Since the incumbent’s situation is fundamentally different than the start-up’s, the 
established firm pursues divergent interests by engaging in coopetitive partnerships with 
disruptive start-ups. By coding the incumbents’ motivations, six distinct factors emerged. 
As for the start-up’s perspective, I conduct a semi-quantitative analysis to show the 
relative importance of each factor (see Figure 17). To ensure high validity and reliability 
of the findings, I systematically collected data on the most extensive and mature 
partnerships of each start-up.  
 
Figure 17: Motivation Factors of Incumbent, Source: own creation 
According to the semi-quantitative analysis, three motivation factors are stated in all four 
cases. Moreover, two reasons are expressed by three and one reason is only expressed by 
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two of the cases. As the most dominant reason for incumbents engaging in coopetitive 
partnerships with disruptive start-ups, exploration of new technology emerged. As 
described in the literature review, blockchain-technology has received extensive publicity 
in recent months and hence the interest of corporates is sparked to explore the disruptive 
potential. 
The second-most important reason for the incumbent’s engagement in partnerships is 
differentiation from competition. I observe that this factor is predominantly highlighted 
by the partners of Start-Up A and Start-Up U. Based on the cross-case comparison, I 
believe that two possible explanations exist. First, as both of the other start-ups (Start-Up 
E and Start-Up S) have yet to reach the commercialization stage with their technology, 
the incumbent partners might not see the differentiation potential so far. Furthermore, as 
Start-Up S is operating in the Southeast Asian market, a regulated one without 
competition, the incumbent is not exposed to competition and is consequently not forced 
to differentiate their offering. 
Building innovation capability is the third factor, which is important for all of the case 
companies. This factor specifically summarizes the motivation of incumbents to 
proactively adapt to a changing landscape in the energy industry. As the Southeast Asian 
market is a good showcase for a changing environment since it is currently in the process 
of opening up to competition, the following statement of Incumbent S’s president 
summarizes the rationale behind this factor: “amid a changing, more deregulated 
landscape, we look forward to bringing joint innovation to the market and making a 
positive difference in communities”.  
As for the start-up’s motives, I refrain from elaborating on the three least-frequently 
mentioned motivation factors increasing operational efficiency, defining new business 
model and access to technological know-how as they can be deemed less dominant. 
These three were mentioned not more than six times by the incumbent companies. 
However, if the previous literature indicates the importance of some of these factors, I 
discuss this divergence. 
By analysing the motives of start-ups and incumbents across the four cases, three clear 
patterns emerge. First, the benefits linked to the motivation factors of the start-up are 
realized at dissimilar points of time. The two motives access to infrastructure and 
regulatory compliance deal with overcoming market entry barriers before and during the 
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commercialization of the innovation. The other dominant rationales – publicity and 
credibility, acceleration and scale-up, cooperative learning, market knowledge and 
market power – aim to increase the start-ups’ competitiveness and hence the chance for 
the start-up to survive over time. Enfolding existing literature, I discover that publicity 
and acceleration of growth are largely confirmed as a motivation for start-ups engaging 
in partnerships with incumbent companies (Hora et al., 2018; Lechner and Dowling, 
2003). Furthermore, I find that previous research indicates cooperative learning and 
access to scarce resources as additional reasons for entrepreneurial firms entering 
coopetition (Dussauge et al., 2000; Lechner and Dowling, 2003; Soppe et al., 2014). More 
specifically, Soppe et al. (2014) state that “young firms can effectively overcome the lack 
of sufficient resources […]. We propose that this is especially the case in industries with 
highly scarce resources” (p. 560). This statement not only confirms my findings about the 
importance of “access to infrastructure”, but also explicates the significant impact of the 
commercial environment on the go-to-market strategies of new entrants. The findings of 
Gans and Stern (2003) further substantiate access to infrastructure as a reason why start-
ups enter partnerships with established firms.  
Aware that literature about coopetition among start-ups and incumbents is very sparse, I 
decide to take also findings of motivations of coopetition among equally large 
corporations into account. Here, I find that particularly access to complementary assets 
and skills as well as sales growth are highlighted as motivation factors (i.e. Bengtsson 
and Kock, 2000; Brolos, 2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2009). Confirmed only by research 
on strategic alliances, increased market power is not yet described as a major factor by 
research on coopetitive partnerships (Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). However, based on the 
systematic coding and the subsequent semi-quantitative analysis, I claim that increase of 
market power represents a dominant motivation factor for start-ups engaging in 
coopetitive partnerships with incumbents, since the partnership allows them to leverage 
the existing relationships of the larger counterpart.  
Furthermore, previous literature does not suggest regulatory compliance as a major 
motivation factor by start-ups for coopetitive partnerships with incumbents. However, as 
all four case companies clearly define the regulatory uncertainty as a major challenge and 
hence regulatory compliance as a major rationale for coopetition, this contradiction with 
the literature is surprising. Based on this discovery, I argue that regulatory compliance is 
a major motivation factor in this particular commercial environment. In industries, where 
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policies impede the market entry, new entrants can overcome these barriers by 
collaborating with established companies. In this context, I refer to the limitations of the 
study (Chapter 5.3), as this finding is only generalizable for certain environments.  
As the second cross-case pattern, I identify that most of the motives for the incumbents 
focus long-term benefits. For instance, while the technology itself can be explored in the 
short-term, the evolution of a widely scalable solution is likely to take five to ten more 
years according to the research institute Gartner (Panetta, 2018). Hence, the incumbents 
can only differentiate themselves from the competition with blockchain-based P2P energy 
trading platforms in the long-run. The rationale “building innovation capability” also aims 
to improve the incumbent’s offering rather in the long-term. In their research about 
coopetition between start-ups and incumbents, Hora et al. (2018) confirm the importance 
of building innovation capabilities and accessing technological know-how, supporting 
two factors I identified. Moreover, coopetition as a reason for creating a competitive 
advantage has been widely proofed (i.e. Pereira and Leitao, 2016; Soriano, 2016; Rusko 
et al., 2018). Furthermore, Ansari et al. (2016) suggest, based on their study of the 
disruption of the television ecosystem, that incumbents have an interest in exploring a 
disruptive technology, underlining the importance of this factor. As an underlying 
rationale for all the two factors “building innovation capability” and “differentiating from 
competition”, access to complementary skills and knowledge can be identified, which is 
widely proved by previous research on coopetition (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Brolos, 
2009; Gnyawali and Park, 2009).  
Third, by comparing these two emergent patterns, I find a difference in the time frame of 
the realization of the motivation factor’s underlying benefits. More specifically, a time-
lag becomes evident between the realization of the benefits of the coopetition by the start-
up and the incumbent. As introduced, the start-up profits from the coopetition 
immediately by overcoming market entry barriers as well as in the short-term by 
enhancing its competitiveness in a critical stage. In contrast, the incumbent profits 
predominantly in the long-term by improving its offering through the incorporation of the 
disruptive technology, once it reaches a sufficiently mature stage. This defined by one of 
the interviewees as self-cannibalization as these established firms face “a short-term pain 
to get a long-term gain” (BDL, Start-Up U). After reviewing additional literature in light 
of this finding, I conclude that this temporal divergence has been largely omitted by 
previous research. Only Ansari et al. (2016) find that intertemporal divergence, “the 
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potential for future benefits for ecosystem members along with perceptions of immediate 
disruption generated forces for both cooperation and competition between [start-ups] and 
incumbents” (p. 9), have a significant impact on coopetition. The next chapter will further 
explore this intertemporal divergence throughout the process of coopetition, aiming to 
further elucidate and substantiate this novel finding.    
4.2.3 Process of Coopetition 
Coopetitive partnerships represent a complex phenomenon, since they simultaneously 
comprise cooperative as well as competitive elements. Coopetition between start-ups and 
incumbents adds further complexity due to the inhomogeneity of the partners. To amplify 
the process of this partnership, I start this section by describing my findings of cooperative 
and competitive elements as well as its intensities. In this context, I also  illustrate the 
shifting balance between both forces over time and elucidate the reasons for these balance 
shifts. Subsequently, I elaborate on my observations of tensions evolving from 
coopetitive partnerships. Lastly, as the management of these partnerships is highly 
complex due to the inherently paradoxical relationship, I conclude this section with 
elucidating critical success factors.  
4.2.3.1 Coopetitive Balance 
As products and business-models of the four start-ups are relatively homogeneous, I 
discover that the case companies uniformly go through three overarching phases: pre-
commercialization, commercialization and expansion. I utilize these phases to structure 
my explanations about the balance shifts. Figure 18 visualizes the balance between 
cooperative and competitive forces over time for the three distinct phases. I amplify each 
of the phases and the decision points in the following sections. Furthermore, to increase 
the traceability of these empirical findings, Appendix 7 provides an overview of 
cooperative and competitive elements in the different phases. 
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Figure 18: Coopetitive Balance throughout the Partnership, Source: own creation 
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Phase 1: Pre-Commercialization Phase 
For the pre-commercialization phase, the start-ups again uniformly describe five distinct 
phases: ideation, development, prototype, small-scale pilot and large-scale trials. No 
collaboration with established firms takes place before the platform prototype is 
developed. After the prototype is completed, its viability needs to be tested and 
coopetitive partnerships are initiated. This is coherent with my findings from the previous 
chapter about the incumbents’ motivations. These firms primarily aim to explore a 
potentially disruptive technology, and only an existing prototype renders this exploration 
possible. The first step of the partnerships is to conduct small-scale trials to demonstrate 
the functionality and viability of the platform.  
After successfully piloting the prototype on a small-scale, the partners perform a trial on 
a larger scale to test the scalability of the solution. Here, the case companies leverage the 
customer base of the incumbents, approximately 200 to 1000 households, to demonstrate 
the resilience of the innovative blockchain-based solution on a larger scale. As testing the 
technology in large-scale trials represents the last step before commercial deployment, I 
discover that the cooperation intensity at this point reaches its maximum between the 
partners. This is confirmed by the SL of Start-Up S, elucidating that in this phase 
“everybody in [Start-Up S] is working on it”. I see this structure throughout all four cases: 
while all operative employees of the start-ups are working on the collaborations, the 
incumbent is usually involved through their innovation department or with a team of their 
innovation business unit. Undoubtedly, until this stage, the coopetitive partnership is 
heavily imbalanced towards cooperative elements. Merely the inherently disruptive 
nature of the start-ups’ product indirectly represents a competitive element in the first five 
stages (see Chapter 3.2). 
Phase 2: Commercialization Phase 
For the commercialization phase, I find that the interviewees describe different options to 
commercialize their product with each option having certain implications on the 
coopetitive balance. Hence, I define the end of the large scale-trial as the first decision 
point for the start-ups. After this point, the balance of cooperation and competition 
intensity is dependent on the chosen commercialization approach. The interviewees 
outline three diverging approaches: cooperation-dominant, balanced and competition-
dominant, which I outline in the following.  
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Figure 19: Relationship in Cooperation-Dominant Approach, Source: own creation 
In the first option, the cooperation-dominant approach, the start-ups solely act as 
technology provider or consultancy and use their technology to enhance existing products 
of the incumbent companies (see Figure 19). To explain this relationship with the energy 
industry value chain, the incumbents become clients of the start-ups. As supplier, the 
start-ups pursue a Software-as-a-Service model to enhance the existing value proposition 
of the energy retailers, utilizing their innovative technology. Clearly, the intensity of 
cooperative forces preponderates. However, a competitive element is added in this phase, 
since the coopetitive partnerships become non-exclusive in this phase. The CMO of Start-
Up E confirms this, explaining “if we are entering the market as a technology provider, 
we tend to develop partners quite naturally because the same kind of partners would be 
our distribution channels and our clients”. While I find that before the decision point the 
start-ups focus on collaborations with one energy retailer in a certain market, they plan to 
open their services for incumbents competing in the same market.  
 
Figure 20: Relationship in Balanced Approach, Source: own creation 
In contrast, the balanced approach is described as the second described option and 
comprises additional competitive elements. Here, incumbent and start-up join forces as 
equal partners to introduce a novel product to the market (see Figure 20). This platform-
concept is coined by the interviewee of Start-Up U as “Utility-as-a-Platform”. Like other 
platform concepts, this utility-like platform aims to empower third parties to trade a 
certain product or service with each other – in this case electricity. Utility-as-a-Platform, 
 89 
 
in this case, does not mean that the energy retailers or utility companies are replaced by 
the platform. In fact, the established firm keeps a crucial role in this framework. Utilizing 
the role definitions of Van Alstyne et al. (2016), the incumbent becomes the provider of 
the platform, possessing the user interface as well as the customer relationship, while the 
start-up takes the role of the owner, controlling the intellectual property of the software. 
Nevertheless, the energy retailers are forced to cannibalize part of their traditional 
business because the platform allows producers to sell energy directly to consumers. The 
original value proposition of the energy retailers is rendered obsolete, as their function as 
an intermediary between production and consumption side is replaced by the platform. 
However, this platform concept provides an opportunity for a new more service-oriented 
business model for incumbent energy retailers.  
 
Figure 21: Relationship in Competition-Dominant-Approach, Source: own creation 
The third option described by the interviewees is the competition-dominant approach 
to commercialization. Here, the start-ups directly undermine the value proposition of 
established energy retailers by enabling direct intermediation between producers and 
consumers through their platform (see Figure 21). In contrast to the balanced approach, 
the entrepreneurial firms act as both provider and owner of the platforms, operating the 
front-end as well as the back-end. While in the second option, the incumbent keeps the 
client relationship, the start-up completely disintermediates this relationship in the 
competition-dominant approach. In regard to the coopetitive balance, this means that the 
cooperative force dissipates entirely, resulting in a clearly prevailing competitive force. 
Although the interviewees of the four start-ups elaborated on all three of these options, 
they concordantly decided to pursue the cooperation-dominant approach for the 
commercialization of their innovation. In their argumentation, they predominantly refer 
to the rationales I elucidated in the two preceding chapters, especially emphasizing the 
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high market entry barriers due to the regulatory and infrastructural environment. 
Additionally, they underscore their decisions with reasons why they refrain from 
choosing an approach with higher intensity of competitive forces. In particular, the 
Business Development Leaders of Start-Up A and Start-Up U explicate that the 
competition-dominant approach would entail competing with financially superior 
incumbent companies in a highly mature market. Interestingly, the balance shifts in the 
next phase.  
Phase 3: Expansion Phase 
As outlined before, all case companies follow a two-phase strategy, consisting of 
diverging commercialization and expansion strategies. Although the transition from 
commercialization to expansion phase is rather seamless, I observed that the end of the 
commercialization phase represents a second decision point for the start-ups. This 
decision again has major implications on the coopetitive balance. In contrast to the second 
phase, where all start-ups pursue a cooperative-dominant approach, in the third phase the 
strategies comprise stronger competitive forces. I find that in the long run, none of the 
start-ups plans to be solely a technology provider to improve existing products of 
established energy retailers. In fact, all four case companies envision to deploy their 
innovative platform solutions, two of them in collaboration with the incumbent, the other 
two independent of the incumbent. The expansion strategies of Start-Up A and Start-Up 
U envisage a balanced coopetitive partnership, deploying the platform in collaboration 
with the respective incumbent energy retailers. In comparison, the expansion strategies 
of Start-Up E and Start-Up S are competition-dominant, since both companies plan to 
emerge as direct competitors to the incumbent companies in the long-term. Regardless of 
this difference, this shows that the partnerships in all four cases become more competitive 
in the expansion phase.  
To explain this observation, I distinguish two key drivers of this shift: external drivers 
and internal drivers. First, external drivers describe anticipated changes in the regulatory 
and infrastructural environment in favour of the start-up’s solutions. Circling back to 
Chapter 4.2.1, entering the highly regulated energy industry without a partner is very 
difficult due to the regulatory complexity and uncertainty. However, as the regulations 
for the innovative solution begin to emerge, the “how-to rules” (BDL Start-Up A) are 
progressively defined, likely easing the market entry for the start-ups. As access to 
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infrastructure and regulatory compliance were two key motivation factors for start-ups 
for engaging in the coopetitive partnerships, the benefit in regard to these two factors 
decreases as a result of these anticipated regulatory changes in favour innovative 
solutions. Hence, the start-ups become less dependent on the partner, resulting in more 
balanced coopetition.   
Second, internal drivers summarize the gradually diminishing value of the coopetitive 
partnership for the start-up over time. As analysed in the chapter before, the motivation 
factors of start-ups primarily aim to overcome market entry barriers and to secure survival 
in a critical time at the beginning of its development. However, in the early stages of the 
partnership, the start-ups are able to accelerate their growth as well as their traction 
rapidly, resulting in a decreasing marginal benefit of the collaboration over time. As a 
result, the cooperative force decreases after the start-ups have gained a foothold in the 
energy market. Both the external and the internal drivers explain the progressive inline of 
coopetitive balance towards competitive forces, as illustrated in Figure 18 (see p. 86).  
Besides the general shift towards the competitive forces, I identify that the strategy of 
Start-Up E and Start-Up S is shifting more towards the competitive side in comparison to 
the strategy of Start-Up A and Start-Up U. While the latter two firms aim to collaborate 
with the incumbents in a long-term partnership, Start-Up S intends to follow a hybrid 
strategy – deployment in some countries with and in others without a partner – to 
eventually reach a “utility-like position” (SL, Start-Up S). Similarly, Start-Up E aims to 
become a full-service provider in the long-term, offering the platform without a partner 
and consequently pursuing an exclusively competitive strategy in the long-term.  
I discover that the reason for Start-Up A’s and Start-Up U’s choice of the coopetitive 
strategy lies in the commercial environment. As most of the markets in which these two 
start-ups are became liberalised a long-time ago, fierce competition among incumbent 
energy retailers exist. Consequently, having a partner in these markets results in 
significant advantages. First, the incumbents are under the pressure to differentiate 
themselves from the competition. Hence, they are looking for innovative solutions such 
as the ones offered by the case companies. Second, competing with the incumbents would 
result in significant financial challenges for the start-up, as they had to approach 
customers individually. Although the challenges diminish after the start-up grew through 
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the cooperation-dominant commercialization, the advantages of the partnership with an 
established company persist in these markets.    
 “60% of world’s population lives in Asia and almost half of this population live in 
cities; and they are all connected to central power grids. Japan liberalised its power grid 
in 2016, China has done so in parts and Singapore will be the first in Southeast-Asia. As 
more countries liberalise their electricity markets, consumers will get greater choice in 
choosing their electricity retailers and the way they want to consume energy” 
(Whitepaper, Start-Up S) 
This is different for Start-Up S, which is primarily operating in markets which only 
recently became increasingly liberalised. Since in regulated markets usually only 
centralized state-owned utility companies exist, competitive energy retailers have yet to 
enter these markets once it is permitted as a result of deregulation. Thus, the experience 
curve and scale advantages of incumbent firms are not yet existent in these environments, 
which results in reduced benefits of the partnership for the start-up.  
In contrast, Start-Up E chose the competition-dominant long-term strategy for a different 
reason. The Estonian Start-Up focusses with its strategy on commercial customers, and 
as a result, the start-up aims to achieve economies of scale more quickly, since it bypasses 
the need for onboarding each customer individually. However, the cooperation-dominant 
commercialization approach is key to achieve accelerated growth as well as publicity to 
gain traction in the corporate segment. Both factors are key to establish network effects, 
spurring the growth of the platform. To summarize, I observed that the strategic focus on 
corporate customer reduces the benefits of a coopetitive partnership with incumbents and 
hence the start-up views the competition-dominant expansion strategy as most beneficial.  
Analysing the coopetitive balance across the four cases, I identify several patterns. First, 
I observe that three alternative approaches to coopetitive partnerships with distinct 
coopetitive balance exist: cooperation-dominant, balanced and competition-dominant. 
This categorization is in line with previous research. For instance, Gnyawali and 
Charleton (2018) utilize the factor ‘balance’ to classify coopetitive balances and to deduce 
managerial implications for each of the three approaches. Further studies make use of the 
same categorizations, confirming the observed pattern (Luo et al., 2016; Park et al., 
2014). Previous studies additionally link coopetitive balance with innovation outcomes. 
Luo et al. (2016) argue that value can only be created if the coopetition is balanced. While 
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their study analyses coopetitive partnership among equally sized companies, my findings 
contradict with this claim. Especially for partnerships among start-ups and incumbents, I 
discover that the balance naturally shifts over time as a result of several drivers.  
As studies about the balance in this special kind of coopetition is very scarce, I decide to 
broaden the literature I take into account. From the field of commercialization strategies 
for high-tech start-ups, Gans and Stern (2003) argue that new entrants have to decide 
whether to cooperate or compete with incumbents. Similarly, Cozzolino and Rothaermel 
(2018) explain that either cooperation or competition are pursued as options between 
these players. However, based on the described findings, I argue that these results need 
to be extended. Besides cooperation- or competition-dominant, innovative start-ups have 
the possibility to commercialize and expand their offering in a balanced coopetition-
strategy. In line with the findings of Van Alstyne et al. (2016), I indicate that digital 
platforms with its implications on competition are a key enabler for balanced coopetition 
strategies. Contributing their core competencies, start-ups act as owners and incumbents 
as providers, so that the partners coopetitively diffuse the innovation. 
As the second pattern, I discover that the balance between cooperative and competitive 
forces is not stable throughout the coopetition process, but significantly shifts over time. 
The coopetition is initiated after the demonstration of technological viability but is 
heavily imbalanced towards cooperation in the early stages of the partnership. This 
imbalance is maintained in the commercialization phase, before cooperative forces 
dwindle, and competitive forces increase over time in the expansion phase. This confirms 
the findings of Gans and Stern (2003), who indicate that the partnerships are only initiated 
after the underlying technology of the innovation is proven. Furthermore, the observed 
shifting balance underscores the findings of Bengtsson et al. (2010), which portray 
coopetitive balance as a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon.  
This pattern is further in line with the results of the study of Bengtsson and Kock (2000), 
which depict that high levels of cooperation are predominantly found in the early stages 
of product development. The same study further argues that customer proximity of 
activities correlates with increasing competition among the partners. As aforementioned, 
the literature about coopetitive balance in partnerships is still in a very nascent stage. 
Hence, I identified only the study of Ansari et al. (2016) contributing to this research area, 
arguing that balance shifts are a result of mitigating spill-over effects of actions on other 
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ecosystem partners. While my findings corroborate that customer proximity plays a role 
in the shifting balance, I can neither affirm nor contradict the finding of Ansari et al. 
(2016), as coopetition in an ecosystem is not the scope of my thesis.  
As the third pattern in this context, I identified two distinct factors, which influence the 
coopetitive balance: external and internal factors. Taking the perspective of the start-up, 
external as well as internal factors are unfavourable for innovation diffusion at the early 
stages of the partnership. Externally, the regulatory and infrastructural environment 
complicates the market entry and expansion. Internally, the entrepreneurial firms lack 
skills and resources to accelerate its growth, to gain traction and eventually to establish 
network effects. As a result of the unfavourable circumstances, the coopetitive 
partnership is cooperation-dominant in the beginning. Over time, the balance gradually 
shifts again driven by external and internal developments. Externally, the ‘liability of 
newness’ decreases, as the regulators adapt policy frameworks to foster the innovative 
solutions. Internally, the benefits of the collaboration decrease since the marginal benefits 
behind the start-ups’ main motivation factors ‘publicity and credibility’, ‘acceleration and 
growth’ as well as ‘cooperative learning’ progressively diminish. Apart from the 
aforementioned research findings of Ansari et al. (2016) and Bengtsson and Kock (2000), 
existing coopetition research largely falls short of explaining the reasons for the shifting 
balance.  
Only Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) add to this research gap. They argue that the 
balance in the collaboration between an incumbent and new entrant becomes less stable 
over time, highlighting particularly the gradually diminishing value of the partnership 
over time. Confirming my argumentation that external factors influence cooperative and 
competitive forces, Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) explicate the impact of 
“environmental changes” on the coopetition (p. 3074). While the study only indirectly 
connected to the field of coopetition, Teece (1986) validates the importance of 
environmental factors, suggesting that these significantly influence the start-up’s ability 
“to capture the profits generated by an innovation” (p. 287). Also not from the research 
area of coopetition, Gans and Stern (2003) highlight the importance of the environment 
on the commercialization strategies of start-ups, distinguishing excludability and 
complementary asset environment. 
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The significance of the internal factors on the coopetitive balance is confirmed by 
previous research as well. Based on previous findings of Dyer et al. (2018), Cozzolino 
and Rothaermel (2018) propose that resource complementarity decreases throughout the 
process of the collaboration. Hamel (1991) further adds that redundancies in skills and 
knowledge are likely to occur in the collaboration as time progresses, reducing the 
dependence from the partner. These findings largely corroborate the identified motivation 
factors for start-ups engaging in coopetition with incumbents (see Chapter 4.2.2). As I 
elaborated in that context, the start-ups are able to capture the benefits of the competition 
earlier than the incumbent, so that dependence declines over time. 
 
Figure 22: Impact of External and Internal Factors on Coopetitive Balance, Source: own creation 
Summarizing the discussed findings of this section, I developed a schematic overview, 
which illustrates the impact of external and internal factors on the coopetitive balance 
(see Figure 22). As my study in line with previous research shows, if both external and 
internal factors impede innovation diffusion, the coopetitive partnership tends to be 
cooperation-dominant. Circling back to the case companies to exemplify this suggestion, 
at early stages of the partnership the companies lack access to infrastructure and 
regulatory approvals (external factors) as well as resources and knowledge to accelerate 
their growth (internal factors). As time progresses, an enhanced regulatory situation 
(external driver) and a decreased marginal benefit of the partnership (internal driver) 
reduce the cooperative and enlarge the competitive force in the coopetition, resulting in a 
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shifting balance. I further observed that the shifting balance inherits a high potential for 
tensions, which I further explicate in the following section.  
4.2.3.2 Coopetitive Tensions 
Due to the highly complex relationship between inhomogeneous partners, the involved 
parties need to be aware of potential tensions. By analysing the similarities and 
differences across the four cases, I discovered three distinct categories of coopetitive 
tensions: intertemporal divergence, dissimilarity of interests and inhomogeneity of 
cultures.  
As introduced before, across all four cases I discovered an intertemporal divergence 
between the realization of benefits. More specifically, the start-ups are able to capture the 
value of the collaboration more quickly, since they aim to overcome market entry barriers 
and to receive support in a very nascent stage. In contrast, the incumbents need to invest 
resources and partially cannibalize their existing business to be able to capture value in 
the later stages of the collaboration. As the BDL of Start-Up U highlights, the incumbents 
have to take a “short-term pain to get a long-term gain”.  
This further leads to the second coopetitive tension, which I define based on the 
observations of each party’s motivation. The start-ups primarily seek to accelerate 
growth, gain publicity and improve their market knowledge, whereas the incumbent seeks 
to explore a potentially disruptive technology and to build innovation capabilities. 
Clearly, both parties pursue fundamentally diverging interests, which can potentially 
result in coopetitive tensions hindering the value creation and appropriation processes.  
The third tension, the dissimilarity of cultures, stems from the inhomogeneity of the 
parties involved in the collaboration. The SL of Start-Up S particularly exemplifies that 
his firm “would like to move faster and try to deploy earlier and […] do more things”, 
but the incumbent’s corporate culture impedes this agility. He defines the incumbent 
partner as rather “risk averse”, which undoubtedly leads to potential tensions. This notion 
is confirmed by the other case companies. For instance, the Co-Founder and Managing 
Director of Start-Up A elucidates that his firm generally wants to “make a big splash and 
dive into large scale rollouts”, but he acknowledges that “smaller trials can be a better fit 
for potentially trepid energy partners”.   
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Enfolding existing literature, I discover that only the tensions emerging from diverging 
interests have widely been confirmed by literature on coopetition (i.e. Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000; Gnyawali et al., 2016). As an explanation for this tension, Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2013) suggest that this tension stems from role conflicts in the 
value creation phase due to opposing logics. Confirming the risk of conflicting interests 
in coopetition, Ansari et al. (2016) introduce intertemporal divergence as a second source 
for coopetitive tensions, which corroborates the explanation of the interviewees. 
However, I argue that this factor is only prevalent in coopetitive partnerships between 
start-ups and incumbents because the motivations and thus the time frame of benefit 
realization are more similar if the partners are homogenous. Lastly, I discover that 
previous research has not linked the dissimilarity of cultures with coopetitive tensions. 
While Lin and Sun (2010), as well as Petter et al. (2014), argue that a reduced distance 
of both partners’ corporate culture is important for the success of coopetition, I suggest 
to define this particular factor as a significant source for coopetitive tensions – especially 
in collaborations between inhomogeneous partners such as start-ups and incumbents. 
Based on these observations and discussions, I further observe the pattern that the 
potential for tensions is more prevalent in coopetitive partnerships between start-ups and 
incumbents than for those among equally sized parties. Clearly, the interests between 
inhomogeneous partners are diverging to a larger extent, resulting in an enlarged potential 
for intertemporal tensions. Moreover, the dissimilar cultures add to the already increased 
potential. Taking previous research into account, I find that Ansari et al. (2016) and Hora 
et al. (2018) substantiate this suggestion. No studies have been identified, which repudiate 
the claim that tensions in inhomogeneous coopetitive partnerships are more prevailing 
than in homogenous ones.  
Due to the increased potential for tensions, it is particularly crucial in coopetitive 
partnerships between start-ups and incumbents to mitigate risk factors. Hence, I describe 
critical success factors for these partnerships in the subsequent section.  
4.2.3.3 Critical Success Factors 
As the coopetitive partnership is a crucial step in the commercialization and expansion 
strategy of the four start-ups, they rely on the success of the collaboration. To maximize 
the success of the coopetition, several factors play a crucial role. Based on the preceding 
sections, I recognize management of coopetitive balance as well as management of 
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coopetitive tensions as two very crucial factors for success. For the identification of 
further critical success factors, I conduct a semi-quantitative analysis. As Figure 23 
indicates, four factors are highlighted by all case companies and one factor is mentioned 
by three of them. In the following, I elaborate on these dominant factors.  
 
Figure 23: Critical Success Factors, Source: own creation 
The most dominant factor is the complementarity of skills and resources. This factor 
describes that the partnerships allow each partner to obtain access to new skills and 
resources. I find that the interviewees deem their technology as well as their 
innovativeness as the most important resource they contribute to the partnership. From 
the other perspective, the incumbents bring deep market knowledge, an existing customer 
base and the necessary capital into the partnership. The second critical success factor is 
open knowledge sharing. Only sharing of knowledge and experiences enables each party 
to capture the benefits of the collaboration to create value on both the joint- and the firm-
level. While none of the case companies refuses to share knowledge about blockchain-
technology or the functionality of the end product, they uniformly agree that they keep 
their source code confidential as their unique intellectual property. However, Start-Up U 
and Start-Up E explain that knowledge protection does not play a central role in the 
collaboration. Both firms justify the reduced necessity for official knowledge sharing and 
protection guidelines with the fast-paced environment, which rapidly changes the 
underlying technology. 
0 5 10 15
Complementarity of skills & resources
Open knowledge sharing
Clear communication & responsibilities
Aligned vision & objectives
Willingness to innovate
Capability & capacity of partners
Long-term commitment
Frequencies of Codes
Start-Up S Start-Up U Start-Up A Start-Up E
 99 
 
Clear communication and responsibilities foster open knowledge sharing. For this 
reason, the start-ups emphasize that this factor has a strong impact on the coopetition 
success. The following quote underscores that a well-structured collaboration is key to 
success:  
“Open communication throughout the entire process is very important because 
sometimes it means foreseeing the unforeseeable. That means sometimes there are 
things that you could never have seen and what you need to do is have those open 
communication lines in place. At least the process where innovation can be fed back 
into the broader theme. At least that you know who is holding the ball and what is 
next.” (BDL, Start-Up A) 
Aligned vision and objectives is the fourth critical success factor mentioned by all case 
companies. The interviewees particularly emphasize that if a partnership lacks a thorough 
fundament – shared vision and goals – the progress of the collaboration is significantly 
impeded. Aligned objectives are required to ensure that both parties are moving in the 
same direction. The fifth critical success factor represents the willingness to innovate of 
both the start-up as well as the incumbent involved in the coopetition. As the BDL of 
Start-Up A illustrates, “the catalyst for that [the project’s success] is the openness and 
willingness for incumbents to innovate”. Start-Up S does not directly mention this factor 
as critical for success. However, the SL emphasizes that his firm only chooses “very 
forward-looking” partners, indirectly emphasizing the need for a certain degree of 
willingness to innovate from the incumbent’s side. As the remaining two factors, 
capability and capacity of partners as well as a long-term commitment, are not 
uniformly supported by all four case companies and thus not dominant, I refrain from 
elaborating on those in this section.  
By analysing the seven dominant critical success factors, I discover the pattern that these 
factors aim to maximize the utility of the coopetitive partnership at different stages. At 
the beginning of this partnership between start-ups and incumbents, the building of a 
thorough fundament is essential. This fundament is laid by the parties by focussing on 
resource complementarity as well as willingness to innovate during the partner choice. 
During the initiation phase of the partnership, aligning vision and objectives as well as 
installing clear communication structures and responsibilities aim to proactively reduce 
friction and to enable knowledge sharing. During the coopetitive partnership, the 
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continuous management of coopetitive balance and coopetitive tensions is important to 
allow joint value creation. Taking previous research into account, I discover that 
complementarity of resources (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Hora et al., 2018), as well as 
open knowledge sharing and clear communication and responsibilities (Bouncken et al., 
2015; Gast et al., 2019), are widely acknowledged as critical success factors. 
Furthermore, existing literature clearly describes the management of coopetitive balance 
and tensions as important for success (Chen et al., 2007; Gnyawali and Charleton, 2018). 
However, I discover that willingness to innovate and aligned vision and objectives are 
not particularly termed crucial for value creation through coopetition. While Bengtsson 
and Kock (2000) and Hora et al. (2018) indicate innovation capabilities as a significant 
factor, I claim that it has to be extended to innovation capability and willingness. As the 
BDL of Start-Up A explained, willingness is the “catalyst” for innovation. Hence, without 
the willingness, the capability is futile. Even though aligned vision and objectives is only 
indirectly defined by Hora et al. (2018) as important for success, I claim that it represents 
an additional success factor. The alignment between the partners is especially central 
coopetition between inhomogeneous partners, since this facilitates working towards a 
common goal, so that potential tensions are pre-emptively reduced.  
 
Synthesizing the emerging patterns of this section, I summarize that the balance of 
cooperative and competitive forces varies considerably throughout the coopetition 
process, dependent on the chosen commercialization and expansion strategies of the start-
ups. Furthermore, I identify external and internal drivers which significantly impact the 
coopetitive balance over time. Not only the shifting coopetitive balance, but also the 
divergent interests and cultures represent significant risks for the collaboration. However, 
these risks can be mitigated before and during the partnership by leveraging seven 
identified critical success factors. By considering these, the start-ups and incumbents aim 
to create value and diffuse the disruptive innovation. Hence, in the next chapter, I amplify 
the impact of coopetition on the diffusion process of disruptive innovation.  
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4.2.4 Diffusion of Disruptive Innovation through Coopetition 
The eventual goal of the coopetition between start-up and incumbent company is 
diffusion of the P2P trading platform in the energy industry. While the preceding sections 
have already elucidated the motivations for and the process of coopetition, this section 
elucidates the impact of coopetition on innovation diffusion. Interestingly, only minor 
differences among the four cases exist. Based on my empirical findings, I create Figure 
24 to schematically visualize the impact of coopetition on the adoption of the platforms. 
The three phases are coherent with those of the coopetition process: pre-
commercialization, commercialization and expansion phase.  
 
Figure 24: Innovation Diffusion Process through Coopetition, Source: own creation 
In the first phase, until the large-scale trial, the adoption of the start-ups’ products is 
negligible. I find that especially the novelty and complexity of the product in combination 
with the traditionally slow-moving energy industry protract the innovation diffusion in 
the beginning. The BDL of Start-Up A metaphorically illustrates the impact of the 
coopetition in this phase with the following quote:  
“I do not know if you know about moving an object over a surface with a lot of friction. 
To move the object, you need to overcome the static friction, and then the object is 
rolling and that requires much less force. And I would say having this initial discussion 
that’s the force to overcome friction. And then the deploying of the technology […] is 
the rolling of the object.” (BDL, Start-Up A) 
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With this metaphor, he refers to the increased adoption after the collaboration with the 
incumbent company is started. The coopetitive partnership enables the start-up to 
overcome the obstacles to commercialize the disruptive technology. All start-ups agree 
that the innovation diffusion would be slower if not impossible without a partner in this 
phase. While the interviewee of Start-Up S defines it as “critical” (SL), the BDL of Start-
Up U utilizes the word “crucial”.  
In the commercialization phase, the previously described cooperation-dominant 
coopetition accelerates the innovation diffusion. However, in this phase I observe that the 
start-ups do not commercialize their actual solution, but offer the underlying technology 
to incumbent companies, which allows these incumbents to enhance their existing 
offering. The BDL affirms this observation, explaining that his start-up is “taking the 
Clayton Christensen approach to disruptive innovation, which is bottom-up. So, solve a 
few small problems and keep the low-hanging fruits and then grow the company from 
there”. Coherent with the findings described in the last chapter, I discover that the 
marginal impact of the coopetition on the adoption decreases over time. After the major 
obstacles of entering the market are overcome and the new entrant gained foothold in the 
market, the start-up expands its offering and, once the commercial environment allows, 
starts introducing their P2P energy trading platforms.  
Interestingly, I observe that the whole diffusion process of the start-up’s platforms is not 
directly described as ‘disruptive’ by the start-ups. While they see their innovation as 
‘disruptive’, they emphasize that they not aim to ‘disrupt’ the energy industry. The CEO 
and Co-Founder of Start-Up U underscores that “this is not a revolution or a disruption. 
It is an evolution”. The Co-Founder and Managing Director of Start-Up A confirms that 
“the industry needs to be disrupted in a managed a progressive way, rather than in a 
completely dysfunctional way”. 
By analysing the impact of coopetition on the innovation diffusion process, I discover an 
emerging pattern. In coherence with the two-phase strategy pursued by the start-ups, the 
case companies adapt their offering over time. While in the beginning, all of the four case 
companies use their technology to improve the incumbents offering, in the second phase 
they aim to provide a more holistic platform solution. Utilizing the distinction of 
Christensen (1997), it becomes clear that in the first phase the coopetition diffuses a 
sustaining innovation, as it improves the existing offering along the traditional 
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performance trajectory by making it more efficient. However, in the second phase, the 
coopetition diffuses a disruptive innovation, since the platform offers new value 
propositions as outlined in Chapter 3.2.  
After a comprehensive review of additional literature, I only identify the research of 
Ansari et al. (2016) as targeted on the shifting nature of the innovation. Interestingly, their 
study states that the innovation of the case company is “increasingly viewed as a 
sustaining force instead of the initially perceived disruptive influence” (p. 1844), which 
contrasts with my finding. Ansari et al. (2016) further elaborate that the reframing from 
disruptive to sustaining innovation helps to secure the support of incumbent companies. 
I claim that environmental characteristics are the explanations for the opposing findings. 
The research of Ansari et al. (2016) takes place in the television ecosystem, which is 
inherently “systematic and complex, with multiple sides and conflict-ridden relationships 
within and across sites” (p. 1850). As the complexity in combination with the multiple 
sides is the biggest challenge for the disruptive entrant, the case company is forced to 
adjust the perception of its product. In contrast, the biggest challenge for the case 
companies of my study is described as the regulatory circumstances and uncertainty. Due 
to this challenge, the start-ups choose to enter the market with a sustaining innovation to 
overcome the liability of newness by collaborating with incumbent companies. 
Consequently, I argue that the finding of previous literature does not repudiate my 
finding, but rather highlights the importance of the circumstances. For markets with high 
entry barriers due to regulations, I claim that start-ups ease the commercialization by 
entering with a sustaining innovation and thus by accomplishing incumbent’s support.  
 
In this section, I explained similarities and differences across the cases to identify and 
discuss emerging patterns in the next step. These steps represent the second and third 
stage of the methodological approach outlined in Chapter 3.2. The fourth stage of this 
process explained in the subsequent section.  
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4.3 Modification of Theoretical Framework 
Based on conclusions from the literature review, I developed a theoretical framework to 
guide the empirical part of this study. After I systematically executed and described the 
first three stages of the methodological approach in the preceding two sections, this 
section presents the final framework (see Figure 25). This modified framework is the 
result of constant iteration between empirical data, emergent patterns and existing 
literature. In the following, I first introduce the alterations to the theoretical framework, 
before I answer the research questions with the help of this framework. 
 
Figure 25: Revised Theoretical Framework, Source: own creation 
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As a result of the iterative process, I modify several areas of the initial theoretical 
framework. First, I identify a strong reciprocal relationship among commercial 
environment, coopetitive partnership as well as each partner individually. While all case 
companies highlight the commercial environment as a significant challenge, two of them 
are involved in governmental inquiries to contribute to a future policy framework which 
defines the “laws of the game” for their innovative platform solution. Second, the 
comparison of my empirical findings with existing theory suggests that the 
inhomogeneity of the two parties results in increased tensions throughout the coopetition 
process. Not only are the previously identified two sources for tensions more significant, 
but also inheres the clash of the start-up mentality with the traditional mindset of the 
incumbent additional conflict potential. To mitigate this risk, I identified innovation 
willingness as well as aligned vision and objectives as two additional critical success 
factors, which I added to the framework.  
Third, I complement the initial theoretical framework with more specific findings of the 
coopetition process, distinguishing cooperation-dominant, balanced, and competition-
dominant partnerships. While these three options are closely linked with each other, I 
discover that both internal and external factors significantly influence the balance. Lastly, 
I specify the innovation diffusion process by including the shifting nature of the 
innovation in the visualization. Based on the existing literature, the empirical findings 
and the modified theoretical framework, I answer the research questions of this study in 
the following.  
SQ1: How does the commercial environment impact the strategies of disruptive 
start-ups? 
Although the case companies are operating in diverging geographical and regulatory 
environments within the energy industry, all four start-ups highlight the impact of the 
commercial environment on their strategy. More specifically, I observe that the regulatory 
uncertainty, as well as the regulatory barriers, are defined as two factors. In coherence 
with findings of previous research from Bhide (2000), I identify the pattern across the 
four cases that “innovation is outpacing regulation”, as the Business Development Leader 
of Start-Up A illustrated. Besides the non-existing regulations, also the existing 
regulations represent an obstacle for the market entry. As demonstrated by previous 
research, I argue that these regulations can represent a significant market entry barrier 
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and thus a substantial challenge for start-ups to diffuse disruptive innovations (i.e. 
Christensen et al., 2004).  
As a response to the adverse commercial environment, I observe that the four case 
companies pursue a flexible two-phase strategy. In the first phase, the firms plan to enter 
the market through a partnership with an incumbent retailer. In the second phase, the start-
ups amend their strategy in anticipation of favourable regulatory changes. In this context, 
these favourable regulatory changes are defined not only as alternations of existing policy, 
but also the emergence of new policies, which guide the deployment of the start-ups’ 
innovations. The review of existing literature corroborates my findings on the need for 
flexible and adaptable strategies in the early stages of a venture (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). 
SQ2: Why do disruptive start-ups and incumbent companies pursue coopetitive 
partnerships? 
Based on the frequencies of the motivation factors of my inductive coding approach, I 
identify several motivation factors for start-ups and incumbents engaging in coopetition. 
Interestingly, both the motivation factors itself as well as the timeframe of realizing the 
underlying benefits are highly divergent.  
By collaborating with incumbents, disruptive start-ups intend to overcome market entry 
barriers and enhance their competitiveness during the critical early stages of the 
innovation commercialization and expansion. In particular, the young firm aims to gain 
access to infrastructure and regulatory compliance to enter the market. After market entry, 
the start-up seeks to enhance its chance to survive by benefiting from publicity and 
credibility, cooperative learning, as well as the incumbent’s market knowledge and power 
through the coopetitive partnership to accelerate its growth. These factors are confirmed 
by previous studies, only regulatory compliance is an exception here (i.e. Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000; Gnyawali and Park, 2009). However, based on the analysed primary and 
secondary data, I find strong support that this factor is significant, especially in highly 
regulated industries.  
Across the four cases, I observed that the established players primarily aim on long-term 
benefits with engaging in coopetitive partnerships with disruptive start-ups. Exploring a 
new technology and building innovation capabilities are two rationales to avoid being 
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disrupted in the long-term. Once the technology reached a certain degree of maturity, the 
incumbents further intend to differentiate their offering with the help of the innovative 
partner. Synthesizing the two perspectives, it becomes evident that the start-up is able to 
realize benefits of coopetition before the incumbent. Quoting the Business Development 
Leader of Start-Up U, the incumbents have to be interested in “cannibalizing themselves” 
and face “a short-term pain to get a long-term gain”. Although this intertemporal 
divergence is strongly substantiated by my empirical findings, previous literature about 
this phenomenon is scarce. While no study contradicts with this finding, Ansari et al. 
(2016) corroborate the identified time-lag.  
SQ3: How are coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and incumbent 
companies performed? 
Analysing the coopetition process across the four cases, I observe that the balance of 
cooperative and competitive forces significantly shifts over time. In accordance with 
previous research from Gnyawali and Charleton (2018), I categorize cooperation-
dominant, balanced and competition-dominant coopetitive partnerships. While at the 
beginning, the balance is inclined towards the cooperative force, I discover a gradual shift 
towards the competitive force as time progresses and the partnership matures, confirming 
the findings of Bengtsson and Kock (2000).  
Iterating between previous literature, empirical data and emerging patterns, I determine 
two criteria influencing this balance: external and internal factors. The external factor 
summarizes the commercial environment in combination with the aforementioned 
“liability of newness”, which impede the innovation diffusion. The internal factor 
conflates the decreasing marginal benefits of the coopetitive partnership for the start-up 
as time progresses. Here, the reason is that the start-up is able to capture the benefits early 
in the coopetition process, so that, for instance, the resource and skill complementarity 
diminishes over time. Since Ansari et al. (2016) affirm my finding of the shifting balance 
and Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) corroborate the influence of time on the 
coopetition between start-up and incumbent, I claim that this empirical finding closes the 
research gap on the reasons for the shifting balance in these special kind of coopetitive 
partnerships.  
Synthesising these new insights, I introduce a model that depicts that if external and 
internal factors impede the start-up’s innovation diffusion, the coopetitive balance tends 
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to be cooperation-dominated, since the start-up is more dependent on the incumbent than 
the other way around. In contrast, if the internal and external factors favour the start-up’s 
innovation diffusion, the partnerships tend to be more inclined towards the competitive 
force.  
Further answering the third sub-question, I claim that the significantly shifting balance, 
as well as the divergent motivations of each party, increase the potential for coopetitive 
tensions, which is confirmed by previous research (i.e. Ansari et al., 2016; Gnyawali et 
al., 2016). In fact, I add the cultural dissimilarity as an additional source for tensions, 
complementing previous research on coopetitive tensions. As a result of the shifting 
balance and evolving tensions, I identify the management of coopetitive balance and 
tensions as two critical success factors. I further confirm complementarity of resources, 
open knowledge sharing and clear communication and responsibilities as factors crucial 
for coopetition success (i.e. Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Hora et al., 2018). Adding to 
existing theory, I additionally define aligned vision and objectives and willingness to 
innovate to be significant criteria for success.  
SQ4: How do coopetitive partnerships between disruptive start-ups and incumbent 
companies promote the diffusion process of disruptive innovation? 
By leveraging complementary skills and resources as well as cooperative learning during 
the partnership, start-ups and incumbent companies collaboratively overcome market 
entry barriers and promote the innovation diffusion. Interestingly, taking the distinction 
of Christensen (1997), it is not throughout the whole process a disruptive innovation being 
promoted. I identified that the start-ups pursue a cooperation-dominant coopetition during 
the first stage to convince partners of the collaboration. In this phase, the start-ups 
improve the existing offering of the incumbent, which is defined as sustaining innovation. 
As time progresses, start-ups seek to expand their offering to a platform-solution, 
disintermediating the traditional business model, which is defined as disruptive 
innovation. Only the study of the television industry by Ansari et al. (2016) indicate a 
shift between sustaining and disruptive innovation within the same coopetitive innovation 
diffusion process. However, I demonstrate a shift into the opposing direction – from 
sustaining to disruptive nature.  
 
 109 
 
RQ: How are start-ups disrupting a highly regulated industry through coopetitive 
partnerships with incumbent companies? 
Answering the main research question of my thesis, I propose that start-ups disrupt a 
highly regulated industry through coopetitive partnerships with incumbent companies in 
two successive stages. In the first stage, the start-ups engage in cooperation-dominant 
partnerships to improve the existing product offering of the incumbent through sustaining 
innovation. As time progresses and external as well as internal factors become more 
favourable for the start-up’s innovation diffusion, the partnerships become increasingly 
competitive. Consequently, in the second stage, the start-ups expand their product to a 
platform solution, rewriting the rules of cooperation, competition and coopetition, and 
disrupt the industry either independently or in collaboration with the incumbent company.  
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5 Conclusion 
Disruptive start-ups have already transformed the landscape in a variety of industries. 
Among the most prominent examples, Airbnb and Uber redefined the hospitality and taxi 
industries, respectively, through their innovative platform business models, threating the 
value propositions of incumbent companies. However, other industries, such as 
healthcare and energy, have yet to experience such a strong digital transformation. 
According to Michael Barnard, the interviewed expert, this is due to the high entry 
barriers and, in particular, due to the complexity and importance of the functionality of 
these industries for companies, households, and society.  
While overcoming these barriers is undoubtedly difficult for start-ups, their high-tech 
solutions have the potential to significantly impact the most pressing challenges of 
humankind: climate change and universal health. Hence, I started reviewing the literature 
on how start-ups can diffuse these innovations in these environments. This led me to 
identify the research gap in the conjunction of disruptive innovation theory and 
coopetition: partnerships among disruptive start-ups and incumbents in highly regulated 
industries. This area reflects the combination of explicitly stated research gaps by leading 
authors in these fields (Bouncken et al., 2015; Christensen et al., 2018; Ritala et al., 
2016). Consequently, I defined the following as the research question: “How are start-
ups disrupting a highly regulated industry through coopetitive partnerships with 
incumbent companies?”. In the following section, I summarize the main findings, 
theoretical contributions, and managerial implications of this study. Additionally, I 
discuss its limitations and provide suggestions for future research.  
5.1 Main Findings 
Guided by the theoretical framework and the research questions, I am able to summarize 
the key findings of this thesis in three points. First, I identified an intertemporal 
divergence in the realization of benefits, which increases the potential for coopetitive 
tensions among the partners. In particular, the start-up realizes the benefits, underlying 
the motivations for engaging in a coopetitive partnership, in earlier stages than the 
incumbent. The entrepreneurial firm intends to overcome market entry barriers and to 
secure survival in the early venture stages, whereas the incumbent seeks to differentiate 
itself in the long term, avoiding disruption by new entrants. Only the study of Ansari et 
al. (2016) confirms this intertemporal divergence and the resulting potential for tensions. 
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The lack of previous findings of this pattern indicates its specificity to relationships 
between heterogeneous partners, since studies about equally large coopetition partners 
omit the mention of these dissimilar motivations and the resulting time-lag in realization 
of benefits (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Bouncken et al., 2018). 
Second, I developed a model to explain the shifting coopetitive balance between 
cooperative and competitive forces, based on observations of the balance in different 
stages of the coopetition process. I claim that external and internal factors influence the 
coopetitive balance. In accordance with research in the field of coopetition (Cozzolino 
and Rothaermel, 2018) and competition (Gans and Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986), I 
demonstrate that the commercial environment as the external factor has a significant 
impact on the balance. If variables such as regulations and customer behaviour favour the 
innovation of a start-up, I find that the coopetitive partnerships with incumbents are more 
inclined towards the competitive force. In accordance with previous findings in the 
research area of coopetition, I further define that an internal factor plays a role (Cozzolino 
and Rothaermel, 2018). The internal factor consists of the resources and knowledge 
required to accelerate the growth of the start-up. My analysis shows that at the beginning 
of the coopetitive partnership, the internal factors do not favour the start-up’s position, as 
the start-ups require complementary resources and skills from the incumbent. Over time, 
the skillset and resource configuration of the start-up becomes more favourable, resulting 
in a reduced cooperative force.  
As both the external and the internal factor become increasingly favourable for the start-
up over time, I observed that the balance shifts from cooperation-dominant to balanced 
or even competition-dominant. While these two factors have been derived from literature 
on coopetition among partners of equal size, I again discover a key difference in the 
context of heterogeneous partnerships. Across the four case companies of this study, I 
observed that two of them pursue a balanced coopetition in the expansion phase, 
deploying their platform in close collaboration with the incumbent. This is special for the 
heterogeneous coopetition, since, for instance, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) concluded 
contradictory findings on homogeneous coopetition, claiming that marketing and sales 
activities are usually dominated by competition.  
Third, I find that the flexible two-phase strategy of the start-ups combined with the 
coopetitive partnership demands a certain category of innovation. During the first phase, 
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the cooperation-dominant phase, the start-ups utilize their technology to improve the 
existing products of the incumbent – a sustaining innovation per definition. However, in 
later stages of the coopetition, the start-ups expand their offering to a platform solution, 
which represents a disruptive innovation. The transition from sustaining to disruptive 
innovation is not corroborated by previous literature, only Ansari et al. (2016) observed 
an opposite transition. Comparing this again with previous findings on coopetition among 
equally sized firms, I cannot identify any supporting or contradictory findings. Previous 
research in this field does not focus on transitions of sustaining to disruptive innovation, 
but only distinguishes the impact of different kinds of collaboration on innovation 
performance (Soriano, 2016; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Yami and Nemeh, 
2017). 
Synthesizing the three key findings of this study, I draw the conclusion that a clear 
distinction between coopetition among start-ups and incumbents, and coopetition among 
equally-sized partners is required. In the former, dissimilar motivation factors lead to a 
uniquely shifting coopetitive balance, inhere additional coopetitive tensions and require 
particular factors to ensure success. Furthermore, the innovation diffusion process is 
observed to be special in this coopetition type. Hence, I suggest the term “heterogenous 
coopetition” for partnerships between unequally sized partners, such as disruptive start-
ups and incumbents. The theoretical contribution of this novel term is further illustrated 
in the following section.   
5.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This thesis was guided by the gaps and opportunities, which were identified in the 
literature review. It contributes to previous research threefold, since it adds to the fields 
of disruptive innovation theory, coopetition as well as the conjunction of both.  
In the context of disruptive innovation theory, this study follows the call from Christensen 
et al. (2018) and further elucidates certain industry dynamics which significantly impact 
the trajectories of disruptive innovations. More specifically, I illustrated based on cases 
in the energy industry that the regulatory and infrastructural environment represents a 
clear boundary condition for disruptions. The presence of unfavourable external factors 
has the potential to significantly impede or even to completely prohibit the disruption of 
an industry. Furthermore, I contribute novel findings about the disruption strategies of 
start-ups as well as response strategies of the incumbents to existing research in this field. 
 113 
 
In particular, this study shows that disruption and response strategies of both parties can 
be conjoined in the framework of coopetitive partnerships, so that these firms rather 
collaborate than compete with each other. To initiate these collaborations, this study 
shows that the nature of innovations does not have to be either disruptive or sustaining, 
but potentially transitions over time. This is in coherence with the findings of Ansari et 
al. (2016), but I observed an innovation type shift into the opposing direction.  
In the research area of coopetition, this study aimed to contribute to several research gaps. 
First, I explain how the commercial environment impacts the coopetitive balance 
throughout the process of coopetition. Previously defined as a research opportunity by 
Soppe et al. (2014), I depict that the coopetitive balance is dependent on the presence of 
environmental factors. If the environmental factors are favourable for the diffusion of 
innovation, the coopetitive partnership tends to be rather competition-dominated. Second, 
I follow the suggestion of Bouncken et al. (2015) and Ritala et al. (2016) by analysing 
coopetition among start-ups and incumbent companies and consequently identified key 
distinctions for this special kind of coopetition as outlined in the main findings. This led 
me to defining the term “heterogeneous coopetition” for partnerships among unequally 
sized partners, such as disruptive start-ups and incumbent firms. With the introduced 
theoretical framework, I aim to build upon and to combine previous research in this field 
from Ansari et al. (2016), Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) as well as Hora et al. (2018) 
and offer a holistic foundation for future research.  
Undoubtedly, certain similarities exist between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
coopetition. While both types share characteristics in the areas of environmental 
influence, critical success factors, as well as sources for tensions, the fundamental 
inhomogeneity of start-ups and incumbents entail distinctive characteristics of the 
partnership, which demand special consideration. In particular, the dissimilar motivations 
lead to unique shifts in the coopetitive balance, tensions as well as success factors, and 
result in a specific innovation diffusion process. Only if research distinguishes these finer-
grained categories of coopetitive partnerships, advancements can be accomplished.  
The need for these more granular categories becomes particularly evident in the 
theoretical contribution of this study to the conjunction of the field disruptive innovation 
theory and coopetition. I observed that heterogeneous coopetition lead to a specific 
diffusion process of an innovation. To balance the interests of each partner, the start-ups 
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enter the coopetition with a sustaining innovation, which enhances the existing offering 
of the incumbents. The partnership allows coping with market entry barriers and 
accelerates the growth of the entrepreneurial firm at the beginning of the venture. Over 
time, the start-up advances its offering and eventually plans to establish the disruptive 
innovation in the market. As this partnership progresses, the start-up’s dependency of the 
incumbent diminishes, so that the coopetition becomes increasingly competitive.  
In contrast, homogenous coopetition is characterized by high similarities between the 
partners. These similarities surface, for instance, in the motivation factors, which are less 
divergent than in heterogeneous partnerships. This homogeneous motivation factors are 
again reflected in the process of coopetition, since the timing of the realization of benefits 
is less dissimilar. Consequently, this results in other balance shifts, other tensions and a 
different type of innovation diffusion. The identification of the distinctive innovation 
diffusion process as a result of heterogeneous coopetition follows the call for more 
research in the conjunction of disruptive innovation theory and coopetition by Bouncken 
et al. (2015) as well as Ritala et al. (2016) and adds to the previous findings in this field 
by Ansari et al. (2016). 
5.3 Managerial Implications 
Besides contributing to existing theory, this study defines several managerial implications 
for both leaders of start-ups and established firms, which I elucidate in the following. As 
a result of high resource and skill complementarity, previous research already indicates 
that collaboration among start-ups and incumbents is particularly beneficial for the 
involved parties (Freeman and Engel, 2007; Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015). My study 
underscores these findings, while highlighting certain managerial implications 
For leaders of entrepreneurial firms, this study suggests that partnerships with incumbent 
firms can be very valuable. Especially in industries and markets with significant market 
entry barriers, an incumbent partner which is already operating in this environment can 
help the start-up overcoming the initial obstacles. The Business Development Leader of 
Start-Up A illustrates that to “move the object, you need to overcome the static friction, 
and then the object is rolling and that requires much less force”, referring to the challenges 
in the early stages of a start-up. This study suggests that start-ups should first 
collaboratively develop a sustaining innovation with the incumbent company, easing the 
initiation of the coopetitive partnership. During the collaboration, the start-ups can 
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expand their offering to transition to the disruptive innovation and eventually deploy that 
innovation within the initiated coopetitive partnership.  
For leaders of incumbent companies, the coopetitive partnership can be equally beneficial 
because it has the potential to avoid a disruption of its business model in the long-term. 
Nonetheless, decision-makers at the established firm need to be aware of the coopetitive 
balance throughout the process to ensure a win-win-relationship. In particular, it is 
important to establish mutual trust and long-term commitment, so that not only the start-
up gains an advantage through realizing the short-term benefits. If the partnership is 
construed only for a short period, the incumbent company risks boosting the growth of 
the disruptive start-up and eventually supports the disruption of the market it is operating 
in.  
For both parties, I recommend keeping the defined critical success factors in mind 
throughout all stages of the partnership. At the initiation stage, the parties should ensure 
high complementarity of skills and resources, willingness and capabilities to innovate as 
well as the low distance of each party’s corporate cultures. During the early stages of the 
coopetition, the partners should align visions and objectives and install clear 
communication structures and responsibilities. Throughout the process, I further 
recommend proactive management of coopetitive balance and tensions, to increase the 
probability of value creation on both joint- and firm-level.   
 
5.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This chapter presents the limitations and suggestions for future research, before it 
concludes the thesis. Limitations are crucial for explaining the generalizability of the 
research. Based on my methodological approach, I define several limitations.  
First, the multiple case study is based on four cases within the energy industry. Since I 
indicate that the commercial environment has a significant impact on the strategies of the 
involved parties as well as on the coopetition itself, the findings are only generalizable on 
industries with certain characteristics. I determine that industries with high entry barriers 
due to regulatory or infrastructural requirements fulfil these characteristics. By no means, 
the findings are only applicable to the energy industry. In fact, I argue that the healthcare 
industry is only one exemplary environment for which these findings can be transferred. 
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Nevertheless, this assumption has yet to be affirmed and thus replicating this study in 
other industry environments represents a clear path for future research.  
Second, as I follow the multiple case study approach as outlined by Eisenhardt (1989), it 
is necessary to establish comparative grounds among the cases. As I selected cases from 
a clearly defined population through theoretical sampling based on three specific 
requirements, I control extraneous variation. While Appendix 1 illustrates the results of 
the highly systematic selection process, certain dissimilarities among the cases persist. 
Similar to the study of Harris and Sutton (1986) and in alignment with the 
recommendations of Eisenhardt (1989), the procedure led to selecting cases from diverse 
geographies to develop new theory, which is generalizable across different geographical 
environments. Furthermore, by analysing the cases separately, it became evident that the 
start-ups are in slightly deviating stages of the commercialization process. I claim that 
this does not undermine the necessary comparative grounds because it supports the insight 
into different stages of the commercialization process. Moreover, I argue that the high 
concordance among the cases further signalize that appropriate comparability was 
established across the cases. However, certain limitations and suggestions for future 
research due to the case selection remain. On the one hand, the novel empirical findings 
are only substantiated by the four cases of my study. Undoubtedly, these findings have to 
be corroborated or repudiated by replication of the methodology on other cases. The cases 
of the defined population, which were not considered due to immaturity, would be 
interesting for replication once they reach the required stage of the commercialization 
process. On the other hand, a single case could be selected to gain even deeper insight 
into the underlying processes of heterogeneous coopetition. This is also in line with the 
described trade-off between richness and the number of cases by Piekkari et al. (2009). 
The single case study can focus on generating even richer insight and reaffirming the 
findings of my multiple case study, as explicated by Langley and Abdallah (2011). 
Third, this study explicitly focuses on the perspective of the start-up. In the 
methodological approach, I decided to concentrate on collecting data on this perspective, 
while reaching the required saturation for data on the incumbent’s perspective was solely 
achieved with primary data from the expert interview with Michael Barnard as well as 
comprehensive secondary data published by these companies. Even though the collected 
data ensures validity and reliability for the scope of this study, collecting further primary 
data from the incumbent’s innovation departments on the collaborations would further 
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bolster the findings. Hence, I define the exploration of the incumbents perspective as 
another path for future research to elucidate emerging patterns on the other perspective.  
Fourth, although I was able to choose four globally leading start-ups in the blockchain-
based P2P energy trading space, all four enterprises are at a relatively early stage of their 
venture and thus the magnitude of the collected data represents ex-ante information. Even 
though this data is very suitable for the purpose of this study as it elucidates reasons for 
strategic choices, this data does not allow the retrospective evaluation of these decisions.  
Consequently, I cannot reliably analyse the effectivity of diverging actions of the start-
ups. However, this limitation represents a promising research area for the future, once ex-
post data is available to evaluate key decisions.   
Fifth, as I frequently mentioned throughout this study, the research area of heterogeneous 
coopetition is still in its infancy. This exploratory study in combination with previous 
findings from other authors builds a fundament for future research. However, to bolster 
the current state of research on this topic, I recommend additional studies particularly on 
motivation factors, coopetitive balance and tensions, critical success factors as well as the 
impact on the innovation diffusion process. Undoubtedly, the defined term 
“heterogeneous coopetition” demands further substantiation, as it comprises not only 
partnerships among start-ups and incumbents, but also among other dissimilar types of 
companies such as small and medium-sized enterprises or multinationals. 
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